§2.11τούτων δὲ διωρισμένων, λέγωμεν πότερον ἡ ἀρετὴ ἀναμάρτητον ποιεῖ τὴν προαίρεσιν καὶ τὸ τέλος ὀρθόν, οὕτως ὥστε οὗ ἕνεκα δεῖ προαιρεῖσθαι, ἢ ὥσπερ δοκεῖ τισί, τὸν λόγον.
These things having been defined, let us state whether virtue makes choice unerring and the end correct, so that one chooses for the sake of what one ought, or, as it seems to some, the reason.
ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο ἐγκράτεια· αὕτη γὰρ οὐ διαφθείρει τὸν λόγον.
But this is self-control; for this does not corrupt reason.
ἔστι δʼ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἐγκράτεια ἕτερον.
And virtue and self-control are different.
λεκτέον δʼ ὕστερον περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐπεὶ ὅσοις γε δοκεῖ τὸν λόγον ὀρθὸν παρέχειν ἡ ἀρετή, τοῦτο αἴτιον.
We must speak about them later, since for those to whom it seems that virtue provides correct reason, this is the cause.
ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐγκράτεια τοιοῦτον, τῶν ἐπαινετῶν δʼ ἡ ἐγκράτεια.
For self-control is of such a kind, and self-control is among the things praised.
λέγομεν δὲ προαπορήσαντες.
But let us speak after first raising difficulties.
ἔστι γὰρ τὸν μὲν σκοπὸν ὀρθὸν εἶναι, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς τὸν σκοπὸν διαμαρτάνειν· ἔστι δὲ τὸν μὲν σκοπὸν ἡμαρτῆσθαι, τὰ δὲ πρὸς ἐκεῖνον περαίνοντα ὀρθῶς ἔχειν, καὶ μηδέτερον.
For it is possible for the goal to be correct, but to fail in the things towards the goal; and it is possible for the goal to have been missed, but for the things leading to that to be correct, and neither.
πότερον δʼ ἡ ἀρετὴ ποιεῖ τὸν σκοπὸν ἢ τὰ πρὸς τὸν σκοπόν;
But does virtue make the goal correct, or the things towards the goal?
τιθέμεθα δὴ ὅτι τὸν σκοπόν, διότι τούτου οὐκ ἔστι συλλογισμὸς οὐδὲ λόγος.
We assume indeed that it makes the goal correct, because of this there is neither deduction nor reason.
ἀλλὰ δὴ ὥσπερ ἀρχὴ τοῦτο ὑποκείσθω.
But indeed let this be assumed like a starting-point.
οὔτε γὰρ ἰατρὸς σκοπεῖ εἰ δεῖ ὑγιαίνειν ἢ μή, ἀλλʼ εἰ περιπατεῖν ἢ μή, οὔτε ὁ γυμναστικὸς εἰ δεῖ εὖ ἔχειν ἢ μή, ἀλλʼ εἰ παλαῖσαι ἢ μή.
For neither does a doctor consider whether he ought to be healthy or not, but whether to walk or not, nor does a trainer consider whether he ought to be in good condition or not, but whether to wrestle or not.
ὁμοίως δʼ οὐδʼ ἄλλη οὐδεμία περὶ τοῦ τέλους· ὥσπερ γὰρ ταῖς θεωρητικαῖς αἱ ὑποθέσεις ἀρχαί, οὕτω καὶ ταῖς ποιητικαῖς τὸ τέλος ἀρχὴ καὶ ὑπόθεσις.
And similarly no other science or art considers about the end; for just as hypotheses are starting-points for the theoretical sciences, so also for the productive sciences the end is a starting-point and a hypothesis.
ἐπειδὴ δεῖ τόδε ὑγιαίνειν, ἀνάγκη τοδὶ ὑπάρξαι, εἰ ἔσται ἐκεῖνο, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ, εἰ ἔστι τὸ τρίγωνον δύο ὀρθαί, ἀνάγκη τοδὶ εἶναι.
Since it is necessary to be healthy in this way, it is necessary for this to belong, if that is to be, just as in the former case, if the triangle is equal to two right angles, it is necessary for this to be.
τῆς μὲν οὖν νοήσεως ἀρχὴ τὸ τέλος, τῆς δὲ πράξεως ἡ τῆς νοήσεως τελευτή.
Of thinking, therefore, the starting-point is the end, but of action, the end of thinking.
εἰ οὖν πάσης ὀρθότητος ἢ ὁ λόγος ἢ ἡ ἀρετὴ αἰτία, εἰ μὴ ὁ λόγος, διὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἂν ὀρθὸν εἴη τὸ τέλος, ἀλλʼ οὐ τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος.
If, then, of all correctness either reason or virtue is the cause, if it is not reason, the end would be correct through virtue, but not the things towards the end.
τέλος δʼ ἐστὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα.
And the end is that for the sake of which.
ἔστι γὰρ πᾶσα προαίρεσις τινὸς καὶ ἕνεκα τινός.
For every choice is of something and for the sake of something.
οὗ μὲν οὖν ἕνεκα τὸ μέσον ἐστίν, οὗ αἰτία ἡ ἀρετὴ τῷ προαιρεῖσθαι οὗ ἕνεκα.
That for the sake of which, therefore, is the mean, of which virtue is the cause by choosing that for the sake of which.
ἔστι μέντοι ἡ προαίρεσις οὐ τούτου, ἀλλὰ τῶν τούτου ἕνεκα.
However, choice is not of this, but of the things for the sake of this.
τὸ μὲν οὖν τυγχάνειν τούτων ἄλλης δυνάμεως, ὅσα ἕνεκα τοῦ τέλους δεῖ πράττειν· τοῦ δὲ τὸ τέλος ὀρθὸν εἶναι τῆς προαιρέσεως ἡ ἀρετὴ αἰτία.
Therefore, to attain these, as many as one must do for the sake of the end, belongs to another power; but of the end of choice being correct, virtue is the cause.
καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐκ τῆς προαιρέσεως κρίνομεν ποῖός τις· τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶ τὸ τίνος ἕνεκα πράττει, ἀλλʼ οὐ τί πράττει.
And because of this, we judge from choice what sort of person someone is; and this is for the sake of what he acts, but not what he acts.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ κακία τῶν ἐναντίων ἕνεκα ποιεῖ τὴν προαίρεσιν.
And similarly, vice also makes choice for the sake of the opposites.
εἰ δή τις, ἐφʼ αὑτῷ ὂν πράττειν μὲν τὰ καλὰ ἀπρακτεῖν δὲ τὰ αἰσχρά, τοὐναντίον ποιεῖ, δῆλον ὅτι οὐ σπουδαῖός ἐστιν οὗτος ὁ ἄνθρωπος.
If, then, someone, when it is in his power to do noble things and not to do shameful things, does the contrary, it is clear that this man is not excellent.
ὥστʼ ἀνάγκη τήν τε κακίαν ἑκούσιον εἶναι καὶ τὴν ἀρετήν· οὐδεμία γὰρ ἀνάγκη τὰ μοχθηρὰ πράττειν.
So that it is necessary that both vice is voluntary and virtue; for there is no necessity to do base things.
διὰ ταῦτα καὶ ψεκτὸν ἡ κακία καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ ἐπαινετόν· τὰ γὰρ ἀκούσια αἰσχρὰ καὶ κακὰ οὐ ψέγεται οὐδὲ τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἐπαινεῖται, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἑκούσια.
For these reasons also vice is blameworthy and virtue is praiseworthy; for involuntary shameful and bad things are not blamed, nor are good things praised, but voluntary ones.
ἔτι πάντας ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ ψέγομεν εἰς τὴν προαίρεσιν βλέποντες μᾶλλον ἢ εἰς τὰ ἔργα· καίτοι αἱρετώτερον ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς ἀρετῆς, ὅτι πράττουσι μὲν φαῦλα καὶ ἀναγκαζόμενοι, προαιρεῖται δʼ οὐδείς.
Moreover, we praise and blame everyone looking to choice rather than to deeds; although activity is more desirable than virtue, because they do base things also when forced, but no one chooses them.
ἔτι διὰ τὸ μὴ ῥᾴδιον εἶναι ἰδεῖν τὴν προαίρεσιν ὁποία τις, διὰ ταῦτα ἐκ τῶν ἔργων ἀναγκαζόμεθα κρίνειν ποῖός τις.
Moreover, because of its not being easy to see what sort of choice someone has, because of these things we are forced to judge from deeds what sort of person someone is.
αἱρετώτερον μὲν οὖν ἡ ἐνέργεια, ἐπαινετώτερον δʼ ἡ προαίρεσις.
Therefore, activity is more desirable, but choice is more praiseworthy.
ἔκ τε τῶν κειμένων οὖν συμβαίνει ταῦτα, καὶ ἔτι ὁμολογεῖται τοῖς φαινομένοις.
These things, then, follow from what has been laid down, and moreover, they agree with the appearances.