§2.10#2ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν οὔτε βούλησις οὔτε δόξα οὔθʼ ὑπόληψις ἁπλῶς ἡ προαίρεσις, δῆλον· τί δὲ διαφέρει τούτων, καὶ πῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὸ ἑκούσιον;
Therefore, it is clear that choice is not simply wish or opinion or belief; but how does it differ from these, and how is it related to the voluntary?
ἅμα δὲ δῆλον ἔσται, καὶ τί ἐστι προαίρεσις.
And at the same time, it will also be clear what choice is.
ἔστι δὴ τῶν δυνατῶν καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ τὰ μὲν τοιαῦτα ὥστε ἐνδέχεσθαι βουλεύσασθαι περὶ αὐτῶν· περὶ ἐνίων δʼ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται.
Now, of things that are possible both to be and not to be, some are of such a nature as to admit of deliberation about them, while about others it is not possible.
τὰ μὲν γὰρ δυνατὰ μέν ἐστι καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν αὐτῶν ἡ γένεσις ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν διὰ φύσιν τὰ δὲ διʼ ἄλλας αἰτίας γίνεται, περὶ ὧν οὐδεὶς ἂν ἐγχειρήσειε βουλεύεσθαι μὴ ἀγνοῶν· περὶ ὧν δʼ ἐνδέχεται μὴ μόνον τὸ εἶναι καὶ μή, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ βουλεύσασθαι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ταῦτα δʼ ἐστὶν ὅσα ἐφʼ ἡμῖν ἐστι πρᾶξαι ἢ μὴ πρᾶξαι.
For some things are indeed possible both to be and not to be, but their coming to be is not in our power, but some come to be through nature and others through other causes, about which no one would attempt to deliberate unless he were ignorant; but those things about which it is possible not only to be and not to be, but also for human beings to deliberate, are all those which it is in our power to do or not to do.
διὸ οὐ βουλευόμεθα περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἰνδοῖς, οὐδὲ πῶς ἂν ὁ κύκλος τετραγωνισθείη.
Therefore we do not deliberate about things in India, nor how the circle might be squared.
τὰ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν· τὸ δʼ ὅλως οὐ πρακτόν ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἐφʼ ἡμῖν πρακτῶν περὶ ἁπάντων. ] (ᾗ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲ δόξα ἁπλῶς ἡ προαίρεσις ἐστίν)· , τὰ δὲ προαιρετὰ καὶ πρακτὰ τῶν ἐφʼ ἡμῖν ὄντων ἐστίν.
For the former are not in our power, and the latter is not practicable at all. [But neither do we deliberate about all practicable things that are in our power.] (by which indeed it is clear that choice is not simply opinion either); but the objects of choice and of action are among the things in our power.
διὸ καὶ ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις, τί δή ποθʼ οἱ μὲν ἰατροὶ βουλεύονται περὶ ὧν ἔχουσι τὴν ἐπιστήμην, οἱ δὲ γραμματικοὶ οὔ;
Therefore one might also wonder, why on earth do doctors deliberate about things of which they have knowledge, whereas grammarians do not?
αἴτιον δʼ ὅτι διχῇ γινομένης τῆς ἁμαρτίας (ἢ γὰρ λογιζόμενοι ἁμαρτάνομεν ἢ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν αὐτὸ δρῶντες) ἐν μὲν τῇ ἰατρικῇ ἀμφοτέρως ἐνδέχεται ἁμαρτεῖν, ἐν δὲ τῇ γραμματικῇ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ πρᾶξιν, περὶ ἧς ἂν σκοπῶσιν, εἰς ἄπειρον ἥξουσιν.
And the cause is that, error occurring in two ways (for we err either in calculating or in doing it according to sensation), in medicine it is possible to err in both ways, whereas in grammar it is according to sensation and action, about which if they should inquire, they will arrive at infinity.
ἐπειδὴ οὖν οὔτε δόξα οὔτε βούλησίς ἐστι προαίρεσίς ἐστιν ὡς ἑκάτερον, οὐδʼ ἄμφω (ἐξαίφνης γὰρ προαιρεῖται μὲν οὐθείς, δοκεῖ δὲ πράττειν καὶ βούλονται)· ὡς ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἄρα. ἄμφω γὰρ ὑπάρχει τῷ προαιρουμένῳ ταῦτα.
Since, then, choice is neither opinion nor wish, either as each of them or as both (for no one chooses suddenly, but they are thought to act and they wish suddenly), it must therefore be from both; for both of these belong to the one who chooses.
ἀλλὰ πῶς ἐκ τούτων σκεπτέον;
But how it is from these must be considered.
δηλοῖ δέ πως καὶ τὸ ὄνομα αὐτό.
And the name itself also makes it clear in a way.
ἡ γὰρ προαίρεσις αἵρεσις μὲν ἐστίν, οὐχ ἁπλῶς δέ, ἀλλʼ ἑτέρου πρὸ ἑτέρου· τοῦτο δὲ οὐχ οἷόν τε ἄνευ σκέψεως καὶ βουλῆς.
For choice is indeed a choosing, but not simply, but of one thing before another; and this is not possible without consideration and deliberation.
διὸ ἐκ δόξης βουλευτικῆς ἐστιν ἡ προαίρεσις.
Therefore, choice is from deliberative opinion.
περὶ μὲν δὴ τοῦ τέλους οὐδεὶς βουλεύεται, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο κεῖται πᾶσι, περὶ δὲ τῶν εἰς τοῦτο τεινόντων, πότερον τόδε ἢ τόδε συντείνει, ἢ δεδογμένου τοῦτο πῶς ἔσται.
Now, about the end itself no one deliberates, but this is laid down for all, but about things leading to this, whether this or that contributes to it, or, this being decided, how it will be accomplished.
βουλευόμεθα δὲ τοῦτο πάντες, ἕως ἂν εἰς ἡμᾶς ἀναγάγωμεν τῆς γενέσεως τὴν ἀρχήν.
And we all deliberate about this until we bring back the starting-point of the coming to be to ourselves.
εἰ δὴ προαιρεῖται μὲν μηθεὶς μὴ παρασκευασάμενος μηδὲ βουλευσάμενος, εἰ χεῖρον ἢ βέλτιον, βουλεύεται δὲ ὅσα ἐφʼ ἡμῖν ἐστι τῶν δυνατῶν καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, δῆλον ὅτι ἡ προαίρεσις μέν ἐστιν ὄρεξις τῶν ἐφʼ αὑτῷ βουλευτική.
If, then, no one chooses without preparation and deliberation as to whether a thing is worse or better, and one deliberates about those of possible things, both to be and not to be, which are in our power and lead to the end, it is clear that choice is a deliberative desire for things in one's power.
ἅπαντες γὰρ βουλευόμεθα ἃ καὶ προαιρούμεθα, οὐ μέντοι γε ἃ βουλευόμεθα, πάντα προαιρούμεθα.
For we all deliberate about what we also choose, yet indeed we do not choose all the things about which we deliberate.
λέγω δὲ βουλευτικήν, ἧς ἀρχὴ καὶ αἰτία βούλευσίς ἐστι, καὶ ὀρέγεται διὰ τὸ βουλεύσασθαι.
And I call it deliberative, that of which the starting-point and cause is deliberation, and one desires because of having deliberated.
διὸ οὔτε ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις ἐστὶν ἡ προαίρεσις, οὔτε ἐν πάσῃ ἡλικίᾳ, οὔτε πάντως ἔχοντος ἀνθρώπου.
Therefore, choice is neither in other animals, nor at every age, nor in a human being under all conditions.
οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ βουλεύσασθαι, οὐδʼ ὑπόληψις τοῦ διὰ τί· ἀλλὰ δοξάσαι μὲν εἰ ποιητέον ἢ μὴ ποιητέον οὐθὲν κωλύει πολλοῖς ὑπάρχειν, τὸ δὲ διὰ λογισμοῦ οὐκέτι.
For neither deliberation nor the belief of "why" is in them; although to form an opinion on whether one ought to do or not to do something is not prevented from belonging to many, but to do so through reasoning is no longer so.
ἔστι γὰρ βουλευτικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ θεωρητικὸν αἰτίας τινός.
For the deliberative part of the soul is that which contemplates some cause.
ἡ γὰρ οὗ ἕνεκα μία τῶν αἰτιῶν ἐστίν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ διὰ τί αἰτία· οὗ δʼ ἕνεκά ἐστιν ἢ γίγνεταί τι, τοῦτʼ αἴτιόν φαμεν εἶναι, οἷον τοῦ βαδίζειν ἡ κομιδὴ τῶν χρημάτων, εἰ τούτου ἕνεκα βαδίζει.
For the "for the sake of what" is one of the causes; for the "why" is a cause; and that for the sake of which something is or comes to be, this we say is a cause, as for instance, of walking, the collection of money, if one walks for the sake of this.
διὸ οἷς μηθεὶς κεῖται σκοπός, οὐ βουλευτικοί.
Therefore, those for whom no goal is laid down are not deliberative.
ὥστʼ ἐπεὶ τὸ μὲν ἐφʼ αὑτῷ ὂν ἢ πράττειν ἢ μὴ πράττειν, ἐάν τις πράττῃ ἢ ἀπρακτῇ διʼ αὑτὸν καὶ μὴ διʼ ἄγνοιαν, ἑκὼν πράττει ἢ ἀπρακτεῖ, πολλὰ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων πράττομεν οὐ βουλευσάμενοι οὐδὲ προνοήσαντες, ἀνάγκη τὸ μὲν προαιρετὸν ἅπαν ἑκούσιον εἶναι, τὸ δʼ ἑκούσιον μὴ προαιρετόν, καὶ τὰ μὲν κατὰ προαίρεσιν πάντα ἑκούσια εἶναι, τὰ δʼ ἀκούσια μὴ πάντα κατὰ προαίρεσιν.
So that since, while doing or not doing what is in one's power, if one does or fails to do it through oneself and not through ignorance, one does or fails to do it voluntarily, and yet we do many such things without having deliberated or forethought, it is necessary that the object of choice is all voluntary, but the voluntary is not all the object of choice, and that all things according to choice are voluntary, but involuntary things are not all contrary to choice.
ἅμα δʼ ἐκ τούτων φανερὸν καὶ ὅτι καλῶς διορίζονται οἳ τῶν παθημάτων τὰ μὲν ἑκούσια τὰ δʼ ἀκούσια τὰ δʼ ἐκ προνοίας νομοθετοῦσιν· εἰ γὰρ καὶ μὴ διακριβοῦσιν, ἀλλʼ ἅπτονταί γέ πῃ τῆς ἀληθείας.
At the same time, from these things it is also clear that those who legislate concerning injuries, making some voluntary, some involuntary, and some from forethought, define them well; for even if they do not make them thoroughly precise, yet they touch upon the truth in some way.
ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἐροῦμεν ἐν τῇ περὶ τῶν δικαίων ἐπισκέψει· ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις ὅτι οὔτε ἁπλῶς βούλησις οὔτε δόξα ἐστί, δῆλον, ἀλλὰ δόξα τε καὶ ὄρεξις, ὅταν ἐκ τοῦ βουλεύσασθαι συμπερανθῶσιν.
But about these things we shall speak in our inquiry concerning things that are just; but that choice is neither simply wish nor opinion is clear, but opinion and desire, when they are concluded from having deliberated.