§1.6πειρατέον δὲ περὶ πάντων τούτων ζητεῖν τὴν πίστιν διὰ τῶν λόγων, μαρτυρίοις καὶ παραδείγμασι χρώμενον τοῖς φαινομένοις.
But we must try to seek conviction about all these things through arguments, using the appearing phenomena as testimonies and examples.
κράτιστον μὲν γὰρ πάντας ἀνθρώπους φαίνεσθαι συνομολογοῦντας τοῖς ῥηθησομένοις, εἰ δὲ μή, τρόπον γέ τινα πάντας, ὅπερ μεταβιβαζόμενοι ποιήσουσιν· ἔχει γὰρ ἕκαστος οἰκεῖόν τι πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ἐξ ὧν ἀναγκαῖον δεικνύναι πως περὶ αὐτῶν· ἐκ γὰρ τῶν ἀληθῶς μὲν λεγομένων οὐ σαφῶς δέ, προϊοῦσιν ἔσται καὶ τὸ σαφῶς, μεταλαμβάνουσιν ἀεὶ τὰ γνωριμώτερα τῶν εἰωθότων λέγεσθαι συγκεχυμένως.
For it is best that all humans appear to agree with what will be said, but if not, at least in some way all, which they will do being led to change their minds; for each has something of his own toward the truth, from which starting points it is necessary to show somehow about them; for starting from things said truly but not clearly, as we proceed, clarity also will be attained by always receiving in exchange the things more knowable than those accustomed to be said confusedly.
διαφέρουσι δʼ οἱ λόγοι περὶ ἑκάστην μέθοδον, οἵ τε φιλοσόφως λεγόμενοι καὶ μὴ φιλοσόφως.
But arguments in each method differ, both those spoken philosophically and those not philosophically.
διόπερ καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν οὐ χρὴ νομίζειν περίεργον εἶναι τὴν τοιαύτην θεωρίαν, διʼ ἧς οὐ μόνον τὸ τί φανερόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ διὰ τί.
Therefore, even for political men, one should not think such contemplation is superfluous, through which not only the 'what' is clear, but also the 'why'.
φιλόσοφον γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτον περὶ ἑκάστην μέθοδον.
For such is the philosophical approach in each method.
δεῖται μέντοι τοῦτο πολλῆς εὐλαβείας.
Nevertheless, this requires much caution.
εἰσὶ γάρ τινες οἳ διὰ τὸ δοκεῖν φιλοσόφου εἶναι τὸ μηθὲν εἰκῇ λέγειν ἀλλὰ μετὰ λόγου, πολλάκις λανθάνουσι λέγοντες ἀλλοτρίους λόγους τῆς πραγματείας καὶ κενούς.
For there are some who, because it seems to be characteristic of a philosopher to say nothing at random but with a reason, often without realizing it, speak arguments foreign to the subject matter and empty.
τοῦτο δὲ ποιοῦσιν ὁτὲ μὲν διʼ ἄγνοιαν, ὁτὲ δὲ διʼ ἀλαζονείαν, ὑφʼ ὧν ἁλίσκεσθαι συμβαίνει καὶ τοὺς ἐμπείρους καὶ δυναμένους πράττειν ὑπὸ τούτων τῶν μήτʼ ἐχόντων μήτε δυναμένων διάνοιαν ἀρχιτεκτονικὴν ἢ πρακτικήν.
And they do this sometimes through ignorance and sometimes through pretension, by which arguments it happens that even those who are experienced and able to act are captured by these who neither have nor are capable of architectonic or practical thought.
πάσχουσι δὲ τοῦτο διʼ ἀπαιδευσίαν· ἀπαιδευσία γάρ ἐστι περὶ ἕκαστον πρᾶγμα τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι κρίνειν τούς τʼ οἰκείους λόγους τοῦ πράγματος καὶ τοὺς ἀλλοτρίους.
And they suffer this through lack of education; for lack of education concerning each matter is the inability to judge both the arguments proper to the matter and those foreign to it.
καλῶς δʼ ἔχει καὶ τὸ χωρὶς κρίνειν τὸν τῆς αἰτίας λόγον καὶ τὸ δεικνύμενον, διά τε τὸ ῥηθὲν ἀρτίως, ὅτι προσέχειν οὐ δεῖ πάντα τοῖς διὰ τῶν λόγων, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις μᾶλλον τοῖς φαινομένοις (νῦν δʼ ὁπότʼ ἂν λύειν μὴ ἔχωσιν, ἀναγκάζονται πιστεύειν τοῖς εἰρημένοις), καὶ διότι πολλάκις τὸ μὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου δεδεῖχθαι δοκοῦν ἀληθὲς μὲν ἐστίν, οὐ μέντοι διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν διʼ ἥν φησιν ὁ λόγος.
And it is also well to evaluate separately the account of the cause and that which is demonstrated, both because of what was said just now, that one must not in all things pay attention to arguments, but often rather to phenomena (though now, whenever they cannot refute, they are forced to believe what is said), and because often that which seems to have been shown by argument is true, yet not through that cause which the argument asserts.
ἔστι γὰρ διὰ ψεύδους ἀληθὲς δεῖξαι· δῆλον δʼ ἐκ τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν.
For it is possible to demonstrate truth through falsehood, as is clear from the Analytics.
§1.7πεπροοιμιασμένων δὲ τούτων, λέγωμεν ἀρξάμενοι πρῶτον ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, οὐ σαφῶς λεγομένων, ζητοῦντες ἐπὶ τὸ σαφῶς εὑρεῖν τί ἐστιν ἡ εὐδαιμονία.
These things having been prefaced, let us speak, having started first from the first things, as was said, spoken not clearly, seeking to find toward clarity what happiness is.
ὁμολογεῖται δὴ μέγιστον εἶναι καὶ ἄριστον τοῦτο τῶν ἀγαθῶν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων.
Now it is agreed that this is the greatest and best of human goods.
ἀνθρώπινον δὲ λέγομεν, ὅτι τάχʼ ἂν εἴη καὶ βελτίονός τινος ἄλλου τῶν ὄντων εὐδαιμονία, οἷον θεοῦ.
And we say 'human' because there might perhaps also be happiness of some other better being, such as a god.
τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄλλων ζῴων, ὅσα χείρω τὴν φύσιν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐστίν, οὐθὲν κοινωνεῖ ταύτης τῆς προσηγορίας· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν εὐδαίμων ἵππος οὐδʼ ὄρνις οὐδʼ ἰχθὺς οὐδʼ ἄλλο τῶν ὄντων οὐθέν, ὃ μὴ κατὰ τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἐν τῇ φύσει μετέχει θείου τινός, ἀλλὰ κατʼ ἄλλην τινὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν μετοχὴν τὸ μὲν βέλτιον ζῇ τὸ δὲ χεῖρον αὐτῶν.
For of the other animals, as many as are inferior in nature to humans, none shares in this designation; for no horse is happy, nor bird, nor fish, nor any other of existing things which does not in its nature participate in something divine according to the extension of the term, but by some other participation in goods, some of them live better and some worse.
ἀλλʼ ὅτι τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον, ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον· νῦν δὲ λέγομεν ὅτι τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μέν ἐστιν ἀνθρώπῳ πρακτὰ τὰ δʼ οὐ πρακτά.
But whether this is so must be examined later; but now we say that of goods, some are practicable for a human, while others are not.
τοῦτο δὲ λέγομεν οὕτως, διότι ἔνια τῶν ὄντων οὐθὲν μετέχει κινήσεως, ὥστʼ οὐδὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν· καὶ ταῦτʼ ἴσως ἄριστα τὴν φύσιν ἐστίν.
And we say this because some of the existing things do not participate in movement, so not even in practicable goods; and these are perhaps the best in their nature.
ἔνια δὲ πρακτὰ μέν, ἀλλὰ πρακτὰ κρείττοσιν ἡμῶν.
Others are practicable, but practicable for those better than us.
ἐπειδὴ δὲ διχῶς λέγεται τὸ πρακτόν (καὶ γὰρ ὧν ἕνεκα πράττομεν καὶ ἃ τούτων ἕνεκα μετέχει πράξεως, οἷον καὶ τὴν ὑγίειαν καὶ τὸν πλοῦτον τίθεμεν τῶν πρακτῶν, καὶ τὰ τούτων πραττόμενα χάριν, τά θʼ ὑγιεινὰ καὶ τὰ χρηματιστικά), δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τῶν ἀνθρώπῳ πρακτῶν ἄριστον θετέον.
And since 'practicable' is said in two ways (for both the things for the sake of which we act and the things which for the sake of these participate in action, for example, we place both health and wealth among practicable things, and the things done for the sake of these, both healthy things and business transactions), it is clear that happiness must be placed as the best of the things practicable for a human.