§1.8#1σκεπτέον τοίνυν τί τὸ ἄριστον, καὶ λέγεται ποσαχῶς.
We must, therefore, examine what the best is, and in how many ways it is said.
ἐν τρισὶ δὴ μάλιστα φαίνεται δόξαις εἶναι τοῦτο.
This indeed appears to lie chiefly in three opinions.
φασὶ γὰρ ἄριστον μὲν εἶναι πάντων αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθόν, αὐτὸ δʼ εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθὸν ᾧ ὑπάρχει τό τε πρώτῳ εἶναι τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ τὸ αἰτίῳ τῇ παρουσίᾳ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῦ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι.
For they say that the best of all things is the good itself, and that the good itself is that to which belong both being the first of goods and being, by its presence, the cause for the others of their being good.
ταῦτα δʼ ὑπάρχειν ἀμφότερα τῇ ἰδέᾳ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.
And both of these are said to belong to the idea of the good.
λέγω δὲ ἀμφότερα τό τε πρῶτον τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ τὸ τοῖς ἄλλοις αἴτιον ἀγαθοῖς τῇ παρουσίᾳ τοῦ ἀγαθοῖς εἶναι.
And by "both" I mean being the first of goods and being, by its presence, the cause for other goods of their being goods.
μάλιστά τε γὰρ τἀγαθὸν λέγεσθαι κατʼ ἐκείνης ἀληθῶς (κατὰ μετοχὴν γὰρ καὶ ὁμοιότητα τἆλλα ἀγαθὰ ἐκείνης εἶναι), καὶ πρῶτον τῶν ἀγαθῶν· ἀναιρουμένου γὰρ τοῦ μετεχομένου ἀναιρεῖσθαι καὶ τὰ μετέχοντα τῆς ἰδέας, ἃ λέγεται τῷ μετέχειν ἐκείνης, τὸ δὲ πρῶτον τοῦτον ἔχειν τὸν τρόπον πρὸς τὸ ὕστερον.
For the good is said most truly of that (for the other goods exist by participation in and resemblance to it), and it is the first of goods; for when that which is participated in is destroyed, the things participating in the idea—which are so called by participating in it—are also destroyed, and the first stands in this relation to the subsequent.
ὥστʼ εἶναι αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὴν ἰδέαν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ· καὶ γὰρ χωριστὴν εἶναι τῶν μετεχόντων, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἰδέας.
So that the good itself is the idea of the good; for it is indeed separable from the participating things, just like the other ideas.
ἔστι μὲν οὖν τὸ διασκοπεῖν περὶ ταύτης τῆς δόξης ἑτέρας τε διατριβῆς καὶ τὰ πολλὰ λογικωτέρας ἐξ ἀνάγκης (οἱ γὰρ ἅμα ἀναιρετικοί τε καὶ κοινοὶ λόγοι κατʼ οὐδεμίαν εἰσὶν ἄλλην ἐπιστήμην)· εἰ δὲ δεῖ συντόμως εἰπεῖν περὶ αὐτῶν, λέγομεν ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν τὸ εἶναι ἰδέαν μὴ μόνον ἀγαθοῦ ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν λέγεται λογικῶς καὶ κενῶς.
Now, to examine thoroughly this opinion belongs to another study and is of necessity for the most part more logical (for arguments that are at once destructive and common belong to no other science); but if we must speak briefly about them, we say first that for there to be an idea not only of the good but of anything else whatsoever is spoken of logically and emptily.
ἐπέσκεπται δὲ πολλοῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ τρόποις καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν.
And this has been examined in many ways both in the exoteric discourses and in those concerning philosophy.
ἔπειτʼ εἰ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστʼ εἰσὶν αἱ ἰδέαι καὶ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα, μή ποτʼ οὐδὲ χρήσιμος πρὸς ζωὴν ἀγαθὴν οὐδὲ πρὸς τὰς πράξεις.
Next, even if ideas and the idea of the good exist in the highest degree, perhaps it is not at all useful for a good life nor for actions.
πολλαχῶς γὰρ λέγεται καὶ ἰσαχῶς τῷ ὄντι τὸ ἀγαθόν.
For the good is said in many ways, and in just as many ways as "being".
τό τε γὰρ ὄν, ὥσπερ ἐν ἄλλοις διῄρηται, σημαίνει τὸ μὲν τί ἐστί, τὸ δὲ ποιόν, τὸ δὲ ποσόν, τὸ δὲ πότε, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις τὸ μὲν ἐν τῷ κινεῖσθαι τὸ δὲ ἐν τῷ κινεῖν, καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐν ἑκάστῃ τῶν πτώσεών ἐστι τούτων, ἐν οὐσίᾳ μὲν ὁ νοῦς καὶ ὁ θεός, ἐν δὲ τῷ ποιῷ τὸ δίκαιον, ἐν δὲ τῷ ποσῷ τὸ μέτριον, ἐν δὲ τῷ πότε ὁ καιρός, τὸ δὲ διδάσκον καὶ τὸ διδασκόμενον περὶ κίνησιν.
For being, as has been divided in other works, signifies now what a thing is, now quality, now quantity, now time, and in addition to these, now consisting in being moved, now in moving, and the good is in each of these cases: in substance, intellect and God; in quality, the just; in quantity, the moderate; in time, the right moment; and as for movement, that which teaches and that which is taught.
ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδὲ τὸ ὂν ἕν τί ἐστι περὶ τὰ εἰρημένα, οὕτως οὐδὲ τὸ ἀγαθόν, οὐδὲ ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶ μία οὔτε τοῦ ὄντος οὔτε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.
Therefore, just as being is not some single thing across the aforementioned, so neither is the good, nor is there one science either of being or of the good.
ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ τὰ ὁμοιοσχημόνως λεγόμενα ἀγαθὰ μιᾶς ἐστι θεωρῆσαι, οἷον τὸν καιρὸν ἢ τὸ μέτριον, ἀλλʼ ἑτέρα ἕτερον καιρὸν θεωρεῖ καὶ ἑτέρα ἕτερον μέτριον, οἷον περὶ τροφὴν μὲν τὸν καιρὸν καὶ τὸ μέτριον ἰατρικὴ καὶ γυμναστική, περὶ δὲ τὰς πολεμικὰς πράξεις στρατηγία, καὶ οὕτως ἑτέρα περὶ ἑτέραν πρᾶξιν, ὥστε σχολῇ αὐτό γε τὸ ἀγαθὸν θεωρῆσαι μιᾶς.
Moreover, not even goods that are spoken of in the same category are for a single science to contemplate, such as the right moment or the moderate; but a different science contemplates a different right moment, and a different one a different moderate: for example, concerning food, medicine and gymnastics contemplate the right moment and the moderate, while concerning warlike actions, generalship does, and in this way a different science concerns a different action, so that it is hardly possible for a single science to contemplate the good itself.
ἔτι ἐν ὅσοις ὑπάρχει τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον, οὐκ ἔστι κοινόν τι παρὰ ταῦτα, καὶ τοῦτο χωριστόν.
Furthermore, in those things where there is a "prior" and "posterior", there is no common thing apart from these, and still less is this separable.
εἴη γὰρ ἄν τι τοῦ πρώτου πρότερον· πρότερον γὰρ τὸ κοινὸν καὶ χωριστὸν διὰ τὸ ἀναιρουμένου τοῦ κοινοῦ ἀναιρεῖσθαι τὸ πρῶτον.
For there would be something prior to the first; for the common and separable is prior, because when the common is destroyed, the first is destroyed.
οἷον εἰ τὸ διπλάσιον πρῶτον τῶν πολλαπλασίων, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τὸ πολλαπλάσιον τὸ κοινῇ κατηγορούμενον εἶναι χωριστόν· ἔσται γὰρ τοῦ διπλασίου πρότερον.
For example, if the double is the first of the multiples, it is not possible for the multiple which is predicated in common to be separable; for it will be prior to the double.
εἰ συμβαίνει τὸ κοινὸν εἶναι τὴν ἰδέαν, οἷον εἰ χωριστὸν ποιήσειέ τις τὸ κοινόν.
This happens if the common is the idea, as for instance if one were to make the common separable.
εἰ γάρ ἐστι δικαιοσύνη ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἀνδρεία. ἔστι τοίνυν, φασίν, αὐτό τι ἀγαθόν.
For if justice is a good, and courage is also, then they say there is some "good itself".
τὸ οὖν αὐτὸ πρόσκειται πρὸς τὸν λόγον τὸν κοινόν.
Therefore "itself" is added to the common definition.
τοῦτο δὲ τί ἂν εἴη πλὴν ὅτι ἀίδιον καὶ χωριστόν;
But what could this be except that it is eternal and separable?
ἀλλʼ οὐθὲν μᾶλλον λευκὸν τὸ πολλὰς ἡμέρας λευκὸν τοῦ μίαν ἡμέραν· ὥστʼ οὐδὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν μᾶλλον ἀγαθὸν τῷ ἀίδιον εἶναι·
But that which is white for many days is no more white than that which is white for one day; so that neither is the good any more a good by being eternal.
οὐδὲ δὴ τὸ κοινὸν ἀγαθὸν ταὐτὸ τῇ ἰδέᾳ· πᾶσι γὰρ ὑπάρχει τὸ κοινόν.
Nor indeed is the common good identical with the idea; for the common belongs to all.