§1.5#2ἐκ μὲν οὖν τῶν εἰρημένων φανερὸν ὅτι πάντες ἐπὶ τρεῖς βίους φέρουσι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, πολιτικὸν φιλόσοφον ἀπολαυστικόν· τούτων δʼ ἡ μὲν περὶ τὰ σώματα καὶ τὰς ἀπολαύσεις ἡδονή, καὶ τίς καὶ ποία τις γίνεται καὶ διὰ τίνων, οὐκ ἄδηλον, ὥστʼ οὐ τίνες εἰσὶ δεῖ ζητεῖν αὐτάς, ἀλλʼ εἰ συντείνουσί τι πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν ἢ μή, καὶ πῶς συντείνουσι, καὶ πότερον εἰ δεῖ προσάπτειν τῷ ζῆν καλῶς ἡδονάς τινας, ταύτας δεῖ προσάπτειν, ἢ τούτων μὲν ἄλλον τινὰ τρόπον ἀνάγκη κοινωνεῖν, ἕτεραι δʼ εἰσὶν ἡδοναὶ διʼ ἃς εὐλόγως οἴονται τὸν εὐδαίμονα ζῆν ἡδέως καὶ μὴ μόνον ἀλύπως.
So from what has been said it is clear that everyone refers happiness to three lives: the political, the philosophical, and the voluptuous; and of these, the pleasure concerning bodies and enjoyments, both what it is and of what kind it is and through what things it arises, is not unclear, so that we do not need to inquire what they are, but whether they contribute anything toward happiness or not, and how they contribute, and whether, if indeed one must attach certain pleasures to living well, these must be attached, or whether it is necessary to participate in these in some other way, while there are other pleasures because of which they reasonably think that the happy person lives pleasantly and not merely without pain.
ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον· περὶ δʼ ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως πρῶτον θεωρήσωμεν, τήν τε φύσιν αὐτῶν ἑκατέρου τίς ἐστι, καὶ πότερον μόρια ταῦτα τῆς ἀγαθῆς ζωῆς ἐστίν, ἢ αὐτὰ ἢ αἱ πράξεις αἱ ἀπʼ αὐτῶν, ἐπειδὴ προσάπτουσιν αὐτὰ κἂν εἰ μὴ πάντες εἰς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, ἀλλʼ οὖν οἱ λόγου ἄξιοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων πάντες.
But about these things we must examine later; let us first contemplate virtue and wisdom, both what the nature of each of them is, and whether these—either themselves or the actions arising from them—are parts of the good life, since people attach them to happiness, even if not everyone, yet at least all those who are worthy of account.
Σωκράτης μὲν οὖν ὁ πρεσβύτης ᾤετʼ εἶναι τέλος τὸ γινώσκειν τὴν ἀρετήν, καὶ ἐπεζήτει τί ἐστιν ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ τί ἡ ἀνδρεία καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν μορίων αὐτῆς.
Now Socrates the elder thought that the end was to know virtue, and he used to investigate what justice is and what courage and each of the parts of it.
ἐποίει γὰρ ταῦτʼ εὐλόγως.
For he used to do this reasonably.
ἐπιστήμας γὰρ ᾤετʼ εἶναι πάσας τὰς ἀρετάς, ὥσθʼ ἅμα συμβαίνειν εἰδέναι τε τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ εἶναι δίκαιον.
For he thought all virtues were sciences, so that it happened simultaneously to know justice and to be just.
ἅμα μὲν γὰρ μεμαθήκαμεν τὴν γεωμετρίαν καὶ οἰκοδομίαν καὶ ἐσμὲν οἰκοδόμοι καὶ γεωμέτραι.
For at the same time we have learned geometry and building, and we are builders and geometers.
διόπερ ἐζήτει τί ἐστιν ἀρετή, ἀλλʼ οὐ πῶς γίνεται καὶ ἐκ τίνων.
Therefore he investigated what virtue is, but not how it arises and from what things.
τοῦτο δὲ ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν συμβαίνει τῶν θεωρητικῶν (οὐθὲν γὰρ ἕτερόν ἐστι τῆς ἀστρολογίας οὐδὲ τῆς περὶ φύσεως ἐπιστήμης οὐδὲ γεωμετρίας πλὴν τὸ γνωρίσαι καὶ θεωρῆσαι τὴν φύσιν τῶν πραγμάτων τῶν ὑποκειμένων ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς οὐθὲν κωλύει πρὸς πολλὰ τῶν ἀναγκαίων εἶναι χρησίμους αὐτὰς ἡμῖν)· τῶν δὲ ποιητικῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἕτερον τὸ τέλος τῆς ἐπιστήμης καὶ γνώσεως, οἷον ὑγίεια μὲν ἰατρικῆς, εὐνομία δὲ ἤ τι τοιοῦθʼ ἕτερον τῆς πολιτικῆς.
But this happens in the case of the theoretical sciences (for there is nothing else to astronomy or natural science or geometry except to recognize and contemplate the nature of the things underlying the sciences; nevertheless, nothing prevents them from being accidentally useful to us for many of our necessities); but in the case of the productive sciences, the end of the science and knowledge is different, for example, health in the case of medicine, and good order or some other such thing in the case of political science.
καλὸν μὲν οὖν καὶ τὸ γνωρίζειν ἕκαστον τῶν καλῶν· οὐ μὴν ἀλλά γε περὶ ἀρετῆς οὐ τὸ εἰδέναι τιμιώτατον τί ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ γινώσκειν ἐκ τίνων ἐστίν.
Indeed, it is also beautiful to recognize each of the beautiful things; nevertheless, concerning virtue, it is not knowing what it is that is most valuable, but knowing from what things it arises.
οὐ γὰρ εἰδέναι βουλόμεθα τί ἐστιν ἀνδρεία, ἀλλʼ εἶναι ἀνδρεῖοι, οὐδέ τί ἐστι δικαιοσύνη, ἀλλʼ εἶναι δίκαιοι, καθάπερ καὶ ὑγιαίνειν μᾶλλον ἢ γινώσκειν τί ἐστι τὸ ὑγιαίνειν καὶ εὖ ἔχειν τὴν ἕξιν μᾶλλον ἢ γινώσκειν τί ἐστι τὸ εὖ ἔχειν.
For we do not wish to know what courage is, but to be courageous, nor what justice is, but to be just, just as we also wish to be healthy rather than to know what being healthy is, and to have our condition in a good state rather than to know what being in a good state is.