§1.3πάσας μὲν οὖν τὰς δόξας ἐπισκοπεῖν, ὅσας ἔχουσί τινες περὶ αὐτῆς, περίεργον (πολλὰ γὰρ φαίνεται καὶ τοῖς παιδαρίοις καὶ τοῖς κάμνουσι καὶ παραφρονοῦσι, περὶ ὧν ἂν οὐθεὶς νοῦν ἔχων διαπορήσειεν· δέονται γὰρ οὐ λόγων, ἀλλʼ οἳ μὲν ἡλικίας ἐν ᾗ μεταβαλοῦσιν, οἳ δὲ κολάσεως ἰατρικῆς ἢ πολιτικῆς· κόλασις γὰρ ἡ φαρμακεία τῶν πληγῶν οὐκ ἐλάττων ἐστίν), ὁμοίως δὲ ταύταις οὐδὲ τὰς τῶν πολλῶν ἐπισκεπτέον (εἰκῇ γὰρ λέγουσι σχεδὸν περὶ ἁπάντων, καὶ μάλιστα περὶ εὐδαιμονίας· ἄτοπον γὰρ προσφέρειν λόγον τοῖς λόγου μηθὲν δεομένοις, ἀλλὰ πάθους)·
Therefore, to examine all the opinions that people hold about it is superfluous (for many things appear also to children and to the sick and insane, about which no one in his right mind would raise difficulties; for they do not need arguments, but some of them need the age in which they will change, others medical or political chastisement; for drug therapy is a chastisement no less than blows), and likewise, neither must we examine the opinions of the multitude (for they speak at random about almost everything, and especially about happiness; for it is absurd to present argument to those who need not argument, but passion).
ἐπεὶ δʼ εἰσὶν ἀπορίαι περὶ ἑκάστην πραγματείαν οἰκεῖαι, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ περὶ βίου τοῦ κρατίστου καὶ ζωῆς τῆς ἀρίστης εἰσίν.
But since there are difficulties peculiar to each inquiry, it is clear that there are also some concerning the best life and the most excellent living.
ταύτας οὖν καλῶς ἔχει τὰς δόξας ἐξετάζειν· οἱ γὰρ τῶν ἀμφισβητούντων ἔλεγχοι τῶν ἐναντιουμένων αὐτοῖς λόγων ἀποδείξεις εἰσίν.
These opinions, therefore, it is well to examine; for the refutations of those who dispute them are demonstrations of the arguments opposed to them.
ἔτι δὲ πρὸ ἔργου τὸ τὰ τοιαῦτα μὴ λανθάνειν, μάλιστα πρὸς ἃ δεῖ συντείνειν πᾶσαν σκέψιν, ἐκ τίνων ἐνδέχεται μετασχεῖν τοῦ εὖ καὶ καλῶς ζῆν, εἴ τῳ μακαρίως ἐπιφθονώτερον εἰπεῖν, καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐλπίδα τὴν περὶ ἕκαστα γενομένην ἂν τῶν ἐπιεικῶν.
Furthermore, it is useful not to overlook such matters, especially those towards which all inquiry must be directed, namely, from what things it is possible to share in living well and beautifully (if to say 'blessedly' is too offensive to some), and with a view to the hope that would arise in decent men concerning each of these things.
εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς διὰ τύχην γινομένοις ἢ τοῖς διὰ φύσιν τὸ καλῶς ζῆν ἐστίν, ἀνέλπιστον ἂν εἴη πολλοῖς (οὐ γάρ ἐστι διʼ ἐπιμελείας ἡ κτῆσις ἐπʼ αὐτοῖς οὐδὲ τῆς αὐτῶν πραγματείας)· εἰ δʼ ἐν τῷ αὐτὸν ποιόν τινα εἶναι καὶ τὰς κατʼ αὐτὸν πράξεις, κοινότερον ἂν εἴη τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ θειότερον, κοινότερον μὲν τῷ πλείοσιν ἐνδέχεσθαι μετασχεῖν, θειότερον δὲ τῷ κεῖσθαι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τοῖς αὑτοὺς παρασκευάζουσι ποιούς τινας καὶ τὰς πράξεις.
For if living beautifully consists in things that come about through fortune or through nature, it would be hopeless for many (for its acquisition is not within their power through care or their own effort); but if it consists in oneself being of a certain character and in one's actions being of a certain character, the good would be more common and more divine: more common in that it is possible for more people to share in it, and more divine in that happiness is laid up for those who make themselves and their actions of a certain character.
§1.4ἔσται δὲ φανερὰ τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν ἀμφισβητουμένων καὶ διαπορουμένων, ἂν καλῶς ὁρισθῇ τί χρὴ νομίζειν εἶναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, πότερον ἐν τῷ ποιόν τινα μόνον εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν, καθάπερ τινὲς ᾠήθησαν τῶν σοφῶν καὶ πρεσβυτέρων, ἢ δεῖ μὲν καὶ ποιόν τινα ὑπάρχειν αὐτόν, μᾶλλον δὲ δεῖ τὰς πράξεις εἶναι ποιὰς τινάς.
And most of the disputed and doubted matters will become clear if it is well defined what we ought to think happiness is: whether it consists only in the soul being of a certain character, as some of the wise and older thinkers thought, or whether he himself must indeed be of a certain character, but rather his actions must be of a certain character.
διῃρημένων δὲ τῶν βίων, καὶ τῶν μὲν οὐδʼ ἀμφισβητούντων τῆς τοιαύτης εὐημερίας, ἀλλʼ ὡς τῶν ἀναγκαίων χάριν σπουδαζομένων, οἷον τῶν περὶ τὰς τέχνας τὰς φορτικὰς καὶ τῶν περὶ χρηματισμὸν καὶ τὰς βαναύσους (λέγω δὲ φορτικὰς μὲν τὰς πρὸς δόξαν πραγματευομένας μόνον, βαναύσους δὲ τὰς ἑδραίας καὶ μισθαρνικάς, χρηματιστικὰς δὲ τὰς πρὸς ἀγορὰς μὲν καὶ πράσεις καπηλικάς), τῶν δʼ εἰς ἀγωγὴν εὐδαιμονικὴν ταττομένων τριῶν ὄντων, τῶν καὶ πρότερον ῥηθέντων ἀγαθῶν ὡς μεγίστων τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ ἡδονῆς, τρεῖς ὁρῶμεν καὶ βίους ὄντας, οὓς οἱ ἐπʼ ἐξουσίας τυγχάνοντες προαιροῦνται ζῆν ἅπαντες, πολιτικὸν φιλόσοφον ἀπολαυστικόν.
Now, the lives being divided, some do not even dispute for such well-being, but are pursued for the sake of necessary things, such as those concerned with the vulgar arts and those concerned with money-making and the mechanical ones (and I call vulgar those occupied only with reputation, mechanical those that are sedentary and wage-earning, and money-making those concerned with markets and retail buying and selling); while on the other hand, of those ranked under the heading of happy life, there being three—the goods previously mentioned as the greatest for men: virtue, wisdom, and pleasure—we see that there are also three lives which all who happen to have the power of choice choose to live: the political, the philosophical, and the voluptuous.
τούτων γὰρ ὁ μὲν φιλόσοφος βούλεται περὶ φρόνησιν εἶναι καὶ τὴν θεωρίαν τὴν περὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ὁ δὲ πολιτικὸς περὶ τὰς πράξεις τὰς καλάς (αὗται δʼ εἰσὶν αἱ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς), ὁ δʼ ἀπολαυστικὸς περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς τὰς σωματικάς.
For of these, the philosopher wishes to be concerned with wisdom and the contemplation concerning truth, the political man with beautiful actions (and these are those that arise from virtue), and the voluptuous man with bodily pleasures.
διόπερ ἕτερος ἕτερον τὸν εὐδαίμονα προσαγορεύει, καθάπερ ἐλέχθη καὶ πρότερον.
Wherefore each calls a different person happy, just as was said before.
Ἀναξαγόρας μὲν ὁ Κλαζομένιος ἐρωτηθεὶς τίς ὁ εὐδαιμονέστατος, "οὐθεὶσ", εἶπεν, "ὧν σὺ νομίζεις· ἀλλʼ ἄτοπος ἄν τίς σοι φανείη"· τοῦτον δʼ ἀπεκρίνατο τὸν τρόπον ἐκεῖνος, ὁρῶν τὸν ἐρόμενον ἀδύνατον ὑπολαμβάνοντα μὴ μέγαν ὄντα καὶ καλὸν ἢ πλούσιον ταύτης τυγχάνειν τῆς προσηγορίας, αὐτὸς δʼ ἴσως ᾤετο τὸν ζῶντα ἀλύπως καὶ καθαρῶς πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον ἤ τινος θεωρίας κοινωνοῦντα θείας, τοῦτον ὡς ἄνθρωπον εἰπεῖν μακάριον εἶναι.
Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, indeed, being asked who is the happiest, said: "No one of those you think, but someone who would seem strange to you." And he answered in this manner because he saw that the questioner supposed it impossible for one who is not great and beautiful or rich to obtain this appellation, while he himself perhaps thought that the man who lives without pain and purely with respect to justice, or who participates in some divine contemplation, this man is, as far as a human being can be said to be, blessed.