§1.1ὁ μὲν ἐν Δήλῳ παρὰ τῷ θεῷ τὴν αὑτοῦ γνώμην ἀποφηνάμενος συνέγραψεν ἐπὶ τὸ προπύλαιον τοῦ Λητῴου, διελὼν οὐχ ὑπάρχοντα πάντα τῷ αὐτῷ, τό τε ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ ἡδύ, ποιήσας
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κάλλιστον τὸ δικαιότατον, λῷστον δʼ ὑγιαίνειν· ,
πάντων ἥδιστον δʼ οὗ τις ἐρᾷ τὸ τυχεῖν· "
tlg0002. tlg001 ἡμεῖς δʼ αὐτῷ μὴ συγχωρῶμεν.
The man who at Delos expressed his own opinion in the presence of the god wrote it upon the propylaeum of the Letoum, separating things which do not all belong to the same subject, namely the good, the beautiful, and the pleasant, making "The most beautiful is the most just, and the best is to be healthy; but the most pleasant of all is to obtain what one loves." tlg0002.tlg001 But let us not agree with him.
ἡ γὰρ εὐδαιμονία κάλλιστον καὶ ἄριστον ἁπάντων οὖσα ἥδιστον ἐστίν.
For happiness, being the most beautiful and the best of all things, is the most pleasant.
πολλῶν δʼ ὄντων θεωρημάτων ἃ περὶ ἕκαστον πρᾶγμα καὶ περὶ ἑκάστην φύσιν ἀπορίαν ἔχει καὶ δεῖται σκέψεως, τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν συντείνει πρὸς τὸ γνῶναι μόνον, τὰ δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις καὶ περὶ τὰς πράξεις τοῦ πράγματος.
And while there are many subjects of inquiry which concerning each thing and each nature present difficulties and require investigation, some of them tend only towards knowing, others also concern the acquisitions and actions of the thing.
ὅσα μὲν οὖν ἔχει φιλοσοφίαν μόνον θεωρητικήν, λεκτέον κατὰ τὸν ἐπιβάλλοντα καιρόν, ὅ τι περ οἰκεῖον ἦν τῇ μεθόδῳ· πρῶτον δὲ σκεπτέον ἐν τίνι τὸ εὖ ζῆν καὶ πῶς κτητόν, πότερον φύσει γίγνονται πάντες εὐδαίμονες οἱ τυγχάνοντες ταύτης τῆς προσηγορίας, ὥσπερ μεγάλοι καὶ μικροὶ καὶ τὴν χροιὰν διαφέροντες, ἢ διὰ μαθήσεως, ὡς οὔσης ἐπιστήμης τινὸς τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, ἢ διά τινος ἀσκήσεως (πολλὰ γὰρ οὔτε κατὰ φύσιν οὔτε μαθοῦσιν ἀλλʼ ἐθισθεῖσιν ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, φαῦλα μὲν τοῖς φαύλως ἐθισθεῖσι, χρηστὰ δὲ τοῖς χρηστῶς), ἢ τούτων μὲν κατʼ οὐδένα τῶν τρόπων, δυοῖν δὲ θάτερον, ἤτοι καθάπερ οἱ νυμφόληπτοι καὶ θεόληπτοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἐπιπνοίᾳ δαιμονίου τινὸς ὥσπερ ἐνθουσιάζοντες, ἢ διὰ τὴν τύχην ʽπολλοὶ γὰρ ταὐτόν φασιν εἶναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ τὴν εὐτυχίαν).
Now, whatever subjects have only theoretical philosophy, we must speak of at the appropriate occasion, whatever was peculiar to this method; but first we must investigate in what the good life consists and how it is to be acquired, whether all who attain this appellation become happy by nature, just as they become tall or short or different in complexion, or through learning, as though happiness were some kind of science, or through some kind of training (for many things belong to men neither by nature nor through learning but by being habituated, bad things to those badly habituated, good things to those well habituated), or in none of these ways, but in one of two others, namely either like those among men who are nymph-possessed or god-possessed, being as it were inspired by the breath of some divine being, or through fortune (for many say that happiness and good fortune are the same).
ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ παρουσία διὰ τούτων ἁπάντων ἢ τινῶν ἢ τινὸς ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, οὐκ ἄδηλον (ἅπασαι γὰρ αἱ γενέσεις σχεδὸν πίπτουσιν εἰς ταύτας τὰς ἀρχάς· καὶ γὰρ τὰς ἀπὸ τῆς διανοίας ἁπάσας πρὸς τὰς ἀπὸ ἐπιστήμης ἄν τις συναγάγοι πράξεις)· τὸ δʼ εὐδαιμονεῖν καὶ τὸ ζῆν μακαρίως καὶ καλῶς εἴη ἂν ἐν τρισὶ μάλιστα, τοῖς εἶναι δοκοῦσιν αἰρετωτάτοις.
That its presence, then, belongs to men through all these or some or one of them is not unclear (for almost all modes of coming into being fall under these principles; for one might bring all actions arising from thought under those arising from science); but to be happy and to live blessedly and beautifully would consist mostly in three things, which are thought to be the most desirable.
οἳ μὲν γὰρ τὴν φρόνησιν μέγιστον εἶναί φασιν ἀγαθόν, οἳ δὲ τὴν ἀρετήν, οἳ δὲ τὴν ἡδονήν.
For some say wisdom is the greatest good, others virtue, others pleasure.
καὶ πρὸς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἔνιοι περὶ τοῦ μεγέθους αὐτῶν διαμφισβητοῦσι, συμβάλλεσθαι φάσκοντες θάτερον θατέρου μᾶλλον εἰς αὐτήν, οἳ μὲν ὡς οὖσαν μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν τὴν φρόνησιν τῆς ἀρετῆς, οἳ δὲ ταύτης τὴν ἀρετήν, οἳ δʼ ἀμφοτέρων τούτων τὴν ἡδονήν.
And with respect to happiness, some dispute about their relative magnitude, saying that one contributes to it more than another, some saying that wisdom is a greater good than virtue, others virtue than wisdom, others pleasure than both of these.
καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἐκ πάντων δοκεῖ τούτων, τοῖς δʼ ἐκ δυοῖν, τοῖς δʼ ἐν ἑνί τινι τούτων εἶναι τὸ ζῆν εὐδαιμόνως.
And to some it seems that happy living consists in all of these, to others in two, to others in some one of these.
§1.2περὶ δὴ τούτων ἐπιστήσαντας, ἅπαντα τὸν δυνάμενον ζῆν κατὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ προαίρεσιν θέσθαι τινὰ σκοπὸν τοῦ καλῶς ζῆν, ἤτοι τιμὴν ἢ δόξαν ἢ πλοῦτον ἢ παιδείαν, πρὸς ὃν ἀποβλέπων ποιήσεται πάσας τὰς πράξεις (ὡς τό γε μὴ συντετάχθαι τὸν βίον πρός τι τέλος ἀφροσύνης πολλῆς σημεῖον ἐστίν), μάλιστα δὴ δεῖ πρῶτον ἐν αὑτῷ διορίσασθαι μήτε προπετῶς μήτε ῥαθύμως, ἐν τίνι τῶν ἡμετέρων τὸ ζῆν εὖ, καὶ τίνων ἄνευ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τοῦθʼ ὑπάρχειν.
Now, concerning these matters, having directed our attention, everyone who is able to live according to his own choice must set up some goal for the good life, whether honor or reputation or wealth or education, looking to which he will perform all his actions (since not to have ordered one's life towards some end is a sign of great folly), but especially indeed one must first define in oneself, neither hastily nor carelessly, in which of our affairs the good life consists, and without which things it is not possible for it to belong to men.
οὐ γὰρ ταὐτόν, ὧν τʼ ἄνευ οὐχ οἷόν τε ὑγιαίνειν, καὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν· ὁμοίως δʼ ἔχει τοῦτο καὶ ἐφʼ ἑτέρων πολλῶν, ὥστʼ οὐδὲ τὸ ζῆν καλῶς καὶ ὧν ἄνευ οὐ δυνατὸν ζῆν καλῶς (ἔστι δὲ τῶν τοιούτων τὰ μὲν οὐκ ἴδια τῆς ὑγιείας οὐδὲ τῆς ζωῆς ἀλλὰ κοινὰ πάντων ὡς εἰπεῖν, καὶ τῶν ἕξεων καὶ τῶν πράξεων, οἷον ἄνευ τοῦ ἀναπνεῖν ἢ ἐγρηγορέναι ἢ κινήσεως μετέχειν οὐθὲν ἂν ὑπάρξειεν ἡμῖν οὔτʼ ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακόν, τὰ δʼ ἴδια μᾶλλον περὶ ἑκάστην φύσιν· ἃ δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν· οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως οἰκεῖον πρὸς εὐεξίαν τοῖς εἰρημένοις κρεωφαγία καὶ τῶν περιπάτων οἱ μετὰ δεῖπνον).
For that without which it is not possible to be healthy is not the same as being healthy; and this is likewise the case with many other things, so that neither is living beautifully the same as that without which it is not possible to live beautifully (and of such things, some are not peculiar to health nor to life, but are common to all things, so to speak, both states and actions; for instance, without breathing or being awake or participating in motion, nothing either good or bad would belong to us, whereas others are more peculiar to each nature, which must not escape our notice; for eating meat and after-dinner walks are not in the same way appropriate to good condition as the aforementioned things).
ἔστι γὰρ ταῦτʼ αἴτια τῆς ἀμφισβητήσεως περὶ τοῦ εὐδαιμονεῖν, τί ἐστι καὶ γίνεται διὰ τίνων· ὧν ἄνευ γὰρ οὐχ οἷόν τε εὐδαιμονεῖν, ἔνιοι μέρη τῆς εὐδαιμονίας εἶναι νομίζουσι.
For these are the causes of the dispute about being happy—what it is and through what things it comes about; for some think that those things without which it is not possible to be happy are parts of happiness.