§8#2Τρίτον δὲ γένος ποιότητος παθητικαὶ ποιότητες καὶ πάθη.
\nA third genus of quality is affective qualities and affections.
Ἔστι δὲ τὰ τοιάδε οἶον γλυκύτης τε καὶ πικρότης καὶ στρυφνότης καὶ πάντα τὰ τούτοις συγγενῆ, ἔτι δὲ θερμότης καὶ ψυχρότης καὶ λευκότης καὶ μελανία. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν αὗται ποιότητές εἰσι, φανερόν· τὰ γὰρ δεδεγμένα αὐτὰ ποιὰ λέγεται κατ᾿ αὐτάς, οἷον τὸ μέλι τῷ γλυκύτητα δεδέχθαι γλυκὺ λέγεται καὶ τὸ σῶμα λευκὸν τῷ λευκότητα δεδέχθαι· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔχει. Παθητικαὶ δὲ ποιότητες λέγονται οὐ τῷ αὐτὰ τὰ δεδεγμένα τὰς ποιότητας πεπονθέναι τι· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ μέλι τῷ πεπονθέναι τι λέγεται γλυκύ, οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν. Ὁμοίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ ἡ θερμότης καὶ ἡ ψυχρότης παθητικαὶ ποιότητες λέγονται οὐ τῷ αὐτὰ τὰ δεδεγμένα πεπονθέναι τι, τῷ δὲ κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἑκάστην τῶν εἰρημένων ποιοτήτων πάθους εἶναι ποιητικὴν παθητικαὶ ποιότητες λέγονται· ἥ τε γὰρ γλυκύτης πάθος τι κατὰ τὴν γεῦσιν ἐμποιεῖ καὶ ἡ θερμότης κατὰ τὴν ἁφήν.
Of this kind are such things as sweetness, bitterness, sourness, and all things kindred to these, and further heat, cold, whiteness, and blackness.\n That these are qualities is manifest; for the things which have received them are said to be qualified in virtue of them, for example, honey is said to be sweet by having received sweetness, and a body is said to be white by having received whiteness; and it is likewise also in the other cases.\n But they are called affective qualities not because the things themselves which have received the qualities have suffered something; for honey is not said to be sweet because it has suffered something, nor is any other of such things.\n And in a similar way to these, heat and cold are called affective qualities not because the things themselves which have received them have suffered something, but they are called affective qualities because each of the mentioned qualities is productive of an affection in respect of the senses; for sweetness produces a certain affection in respect of taste, and heat in respect of touch.\n And likewise also the others.
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι. Λευκότης δὲ καὶ μελανία καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι χροιαὶ οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τοῖς εἰρημένοις παθητικαὶ ποιότητες λέγονται, ἀλλὰ τῷ αὐτὰς ἀπὸ πάθους γεγονέναι. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν γίνονται διὰ πάθος πολλαὶ μεταβολαὶ χρωμάτων, δῆλον· αἰσχυνθεὶς γάρ τις ἐρυθρὸς ἐγένετο καὶ φοβηθεὶς ὠχρὸς καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων· ὥστε καὶ εἴ τις φύσει τῶν τοιούτων τι παθῶν πέπονθεν ἔκ τινων φυσικῶν συμπτωμάτων, τὴν ὁμοίαν χροιὰν εἰκός ἐστιν ἔχειν αὐτόν· ἥτις γὰρ νῦν ἐν τῷ αἰσχυνθῆναι διάθεσις τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἐγένετο, καὶ κατὰ φυσικὴν σύστασιν ἡ αὐτὴ γένοιτ᾿ ἄν, ὥστε φύσει καὶ τὴν χροιὰν ὁμοίαν γίγνεσθαι.
But whiteness and blackness and the other colors are not called affective qualities in the same way as those mentioned, but by having themselves arisen from an affection.\n That many changes of color occur through an affection is clear; for a man when ashamed becomes red, and when frightened pale, and each of such things; so that if someone has naturally suffered some such affection from certain natural circumstances, it is likely that he has a similar color; for whatever disposition of the body occurs now in being ashamed, the same might also occur in accordance with a natural constitution, so that a similar color occurs also by nature.
Ὅσα μὲν οὖν τῶν τοιούτων συμπτωμάτων ἀπό τινων παθῶν δυσκινήτων καὶ παραμονίμων τὴν ἀρχὴν εἴληφε, παθητικαὶ ποιότητες λέγονται.
\n Those of such symptoms, then, which have taken their origin from certain affections that are difficult to change and permanent, are called affective qualities.
Εἴτε γὰρ ἐν τῇ κατὰ φύσιν συστάσει ὠχρότης ἢ μελανία γεγένηται, ποιότητες λέγονται (ποιοὶ γὰρ κατὰ ταύτας λεγόμεθα), εἴτε διὰ νόσον μακρὰν ἢ διὰ καῦμα τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο συμβέβηκεν ὠχρότης ἢ μελανία, καὶ μὴ ῥᾳδίως ἀποκαθίστανται ἢ καὶ διὰ βίου παραμένουσι, ποιότητες καὶ αὐταὶ λέγονται· ὁμοίως γὰρ ποιοὶ κατὰ ταύτας λεγόμεθα. Ὅσα δὲ ἀπὸ ῥᾳδίως διαλυομένων καὶ ταχὺ ἀποκαθισταμένων γίνεται, πάθη λέγεται, ποιότητες δὲ οὔ·
For whether paleness or blackness has arisen in the natural constitution, they are called qualities (for we are said to be qualified in virtue of them), or whether through long illness or through sunburn this very same thing has happened, paleness or blackness, and they are not easily restored or even remain through life, these also are called qualities; for we are likewise said to be qualified in virtue of them.\n But those which arise from things easily dissolved and quickly restored are called affections, but not qualities; for people are not said to be qualified in virtue of them.
οὐ γὰρ λέγονται ποιοί τινες κατὰ ταύτας. Οὔτε γὰρ ὁ ἐρυθριῶν διὰ τὸ αἰσχυνθῆναι ἐρυθρίας λέγεται, οὔτε ὁ ὠχριῶν διὰ τὸ φοβηθῆναι ὠχρίας, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πεπονθέναι τι. Ὥστε πάθη μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεται, ποιότητες δὲ οὔ.
For neither is he who blushes because of being ashamed called a red-faced man, nor he who turns pale because of being frightened called a pale-faced man, but rather to have suffered something.\n So that such things are called affections, but not qualities.
Ὁμοίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν παθητικαὶ ποιότητες καὶ πάθη λέγεται. Ὅσα γὰρ ἐν τῇ γενέσει εὐθὺς ἀπό τινων παθῶν δυσκινήτων γεγένηται, ποιότητες λέγονται, οἷον ἥ τε μανικὴ ἔκστασις καὶ ἡ ὀργὴ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· ποιοὶ γὰρ κατὰ ταύτας λέγονται, ὀργίλοι τε καὶ μανικοί. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὅσαι ἐκστάσεις μὴ φυσικαί, ἀλλ᾿ ἀπό τινων ἄλλων συμπτωμάτων γεγένηνται δυσαπάλλακτοι ἢ καὶ ὅλως ἀκίνητοι, ποιότητες καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· ποιοὶ γὰρ κατὰ ταύτας λέγονται. Ὅσα δὲ ἀπὸ ταχὺ ἀποκαθισταμένων γίνεται, πάθη λέγεται, οἷον εἰ λυπούμενός τις ὀργιλώτερός ἐστιν· οὐδὲ γὰρ λέγεται ὀργίλος ὁ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ πάθει ὀργιλώτερος ὤν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πεπονθέναι τι.
And in a similar way to these, affective qualities and affections are spoken of also in respect of the soul.\n For those which have arisen right from birth from certain affections that are difficult to change are called qualities, such as madness, anger, and such things; for people are said to be qualified in virtue of them, namely, irascible and mad.\n And similarly also those derangements which are not natural, but have arisen from certain other symptoms and are difficult to rid oneself of or are altogether unchangeable, are qualities, and such things; for people are said to be qualified in virtue of them.\n But those which arise from things quickly restored are called affections, for example, if someone when grieving is more irascible; for he who is more irascible in such an affection is not called irascible, but rather to have suffered something.
Ὥστε πάθη μὲν λέγεται τὰ τοιαῦτα, ποιότητες δ᾿ οὔ. Τέταρτον δὲ γένος ποιότητος σχῆμά τε καὶ ἡ περὶ ἕκαστον ὑπάρχουσα μορφή, ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τούτοις εὐθύτης καὶ καμπυλότης, καὶ εἴ τι τούτοις ὅμοιόν ἐστιν.
So that such things are called affections, but not qualities.\n A fourth genus of quality is shape and the form which belongs to each thing, and in addition to these, straightness and curvedness, and if there is anything similar to these.
Καθ᾿ ἕκαστον γὰρ τούτων ποιόν τι λέγεται· τὸ γὰρ τρίγωνον ἢ τετράγωνον εἶναι ποιόν τι λέγεται, καὶ τὸ εὐθὺ ἢ καμπύλον. Καὶ κατὰ τὴν μορφὴν δὲ ἕκαστον ποιόν τι λέγεται.
For in virtue of each of these a thing is said to be qualified; for being a triangle or a square is said to be qualified in some way, and being straight or curved.\n And in virtue of its form also each thing is said to be qualified.
Τὸ δὲ μανὸν καὶ τὸ πυκνὸν καὶ τὸ τραχὺ καὶ τὸ λεῖον δόξειε μὲν ἂν ποιόν τι σημαίνειν, ἔοικε δὲ ἀλλότρια τὰ τοιαῦτα εἶναι τῆς περὶ τὸ ποιὸν διαιρέσεως· θέσιν γὰρ μᾶλλόν τινα φαίνεται τῶν μορίων ἑκάτερον δηλοῦν. Πυκνὸν μὲν γὰρ τῷ τὰ μόρια σύνεγγυς εἶναι ἀλλήλοις, μανὸν δὲ τῷ διεστάναι ἀπ᾿ ἀλλήλων· καὶ λεῖον μὲν τῷ ἐπ᾿ εὐθείας πως τὰ μόρια κεῖσθαι, τραχὺ δὲ τῷ τὸ μὲν ὑπερέχειν τὸ δὲ ἐλλείπειν. Ἴσως μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλλος ἄν τις φανείη τρόπος ποιότητος, ἀλλ᾿ οἵ γε μάλιστα λεγόμενοι σχεδὸν οὗτοί εἰσιν. Ποιότητες μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν αἱ εἰρημέναι, ποιὰ δὲ τὰ κατὰ ταύτας παρωνύμως λεγόμενα ἢ ὁπωσοῦν ἄλλως ἀπ᾿ αὐτῶν. Ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν πλείστων καὶ σχεδὸν ἐπὶ πάντων παρωνύμως λέγεται, οἷον ἀπὸ τῆς λευκότητος λευκὸς καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς γραμματικῆς γραμματικὸς καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς δικαιοσύνης δίκαιος, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.
But the rare and the dense and the rough and the smooth might seem to signify some quality, but such things seem to be foreign to the division of quality; for each of them appears rather to indicate a certain position of their parts.\n For a thing is dense by its parts being close to one another, and rare by their being separated from one another; and smooth by its parts lying in a straight line in some way, and rough by one part protruding and another falling short.\n Perhaps, then, some other way of quality might appear, but those which are most of all spoken of are pretty much these.\n These, then, are the qualities mentioned, and those things are qualified which are spoken of paronymously in virtue of them, or in some other way from them.\n In most cases, then, and indeed in almost all, they are spoken of paronymously, for example, 'white' from 'whiteness', and 'grammarian' from 'grammar', and 'just' from 'justice', and likewise also in the other cases.