§8#3Ἐπ᾿ ἐνίων δὲ διὰ τὸ μὴ κεῖσθαι ταῖς ποιότησιν ὀνόματα οὐκ ἐνδέχεται παρωνύμως ἀπ᾿ αὐτῶν λέγεσθαι οἷον δρομικὸς ἢ πυκτικὸς ὁ κατὰ δύναμιν φυσικὴν λεγόμενος ἀπ᾿ οὐδεμιᾶς ποιότητος παρωνύμως λέγεται· οὐ γὰρ κεῖται ὀνόματα ταῖς δυνάμεσι καθ᾿ ἃς οὗτοι ποιοὶ λέγονται, ὥσπερ ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις καθ᾿ ἃς πυκτικοὶ ἢ παλαιστρικοὶ κατὰ διάθεσιν λέγονται·
But in some cases, because names are not established for the qualities, it is not possible for things to be spoken of paronymously from them. For example, he who is spoken of in virtue of a natural capacity as a runner or a boxer is not spoken of paronymously from any quality; for names are not established for the capacities in virtue of which these are said to be qualified, as they are for the branches of knowledge in virtue of which people are spoken of as boxers or wrestlers in accordance with a disposition.
πυκτικὴ γὰρ λέγεται ἐπιστήμη καὶ παλαιστρική, ποιοὶ δ᾿ ἀπὸ τούτων παρωνύμως οἱ διακείμενοι λέγονται.
For boxing and wrestling are spoken of as branches of knowledge, and those who are disposed in accordance with them are spoken of paronymously as qualified from these.
Ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ὀνόματος κειμένου οὐ λέγεται παρωνύμως τὸ κατ᾿ αὐτὴν ποιὸν λεγόμενον, οἷον ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς ὁ σπουδαῖος·
And sometimes, even when a name is established, that which is said to be qualified in virtue of it is not spoken of paronymously, for example, the excellent man from virtue.
τῷ γὰρ ἀρετὴν ἔχειν σπουδαῖος λέγεται, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ παρωνύμως ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς.
For in virtue of having virtue he is said to be excellent, but not paronymously from virtue.
Οὐκ ἐπὶ πολλῶν δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν.
This sort of thing is not found in many cases.
Ποιὰ τοίνυν λέγεται τὰ παρωνύμως ἀπὸ τῶν εἰρημένων ποιοτήτων λεγόμενα ἢ ὁπωσοῦν ἄλλως ἀπ᾿ αὐτῶν.
Qualified things, then, are those which are spoken of paronymously from the mentioned qualities, or in some other way from them.
Ὑπάρχει δὲ καὶ ἐναντιότης κατὰ τὸ ποιόν, οἷον δικαιοσύνη ἀδικίᾳ ἐναντίον καὶ λευκότης μελανίᾳ καὶ τἆλλα δὲ ὡσαύτως, καὶ τὰ κατ᾿ αὐτὰς ποιὰ λεγόμενα, οἷον τὸ ἄδικον τῷ δικαίῳ καὶ τὸ λευκὸν τῷ μέλανι.
There is also contrariety in respect of quality, for example, justice is contrary to injustice, and whiteness to blackness, and likewise also in the other cases; and also the things said to be qualified in virtue of them, for example, the unjust to the just, and the white to the black.
Οὐκ ἐπὶ πάντων δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτο· τῷ γὰρ πυῤῥῷ ἢ ὠχρῷ ἢ ταῖς τοιαύταις χροιαῖς οὐδὲν ἐναντίον ποιοῖς οὖσιν.
But this is not so in all cases; for to red or pale or such colors there is no contrary, although they are qualified things.
Ἔτι δέ, ἐὰν τῶν ἐναντίων θάτερον ᾖ ποιόν, καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἔσται ποιόν.
Furthermore, if one of the contraries is a quality, the remaining one will also be a quality.
Τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον προχειριζομένῳ τὰς ἄλλας κατηγορίας, οἷον εἰ ἔστιν ἡ δικαιοσύνη τῇ ἀδικίᾳ ἐναντίον, ποιὸν δὲ ἡ δικαιοσύνη, ποιὸν ἄρα καὶ ἡ ἀδικία·
This is clear to one who examines the other categories, for example, if justice is contrary to injustice, and justice is a quality, then injustice also is a quality.
οὐδεμία γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων κατηγοριῶν ἐφαρμόσει τῇ ἀδικίᾳ· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ποσὸν οὔτε τὸ πρός τι οὔτε ποῦ οὔθ᾿ ὅλως τι τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν, ἀλλ᾿ ἢ ποιόν.
For none of the other categories will apply to injustice; for it is neither quantity, nor relation, nor place, nor indeed any of such things, but only quality.
Ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν ἐναντίων.
And likewise also in the case of the other contraries in respect of quality.
Ἐπιδέχεται δὲ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἦττον τὰ ποιά.
Qualified things also admit of the more and the less.
Λευκὸν γὰρ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον ἕτερον ἑτέρου λέγεται, καὶ δίκαιον ἕτερον ἑτέρου μᾶλλον.
For one thing is said to be more or less white than another, and one is more just than another.
Καὶ αὐτὸ δὲ ἐπίδοσιν λαμβάνει· λευκὸν γὰρ ὂν ἔτι ἐνδέχεται λευκότερον γενέσθαι.
And it also admits of increase in itself; for what is white can become still whiter.
Οὐ πάντα δέ, ἀλλὰ τὰ πλεῖστα.
Not all, however, but most of them.
Δικαιοσύνη γὰρ δικαιοσύνης εἰ λέγεται μᾶλλον καὶ ἦττον, ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων διαθέσεων.
For whether one justice is said to be more or less than another justice, someone might raise a question; and likewise also in the case of the other dispositions.
Ἔνιοι γὰρ διαμφισβητοῦσι περὶ τῶν τοιούτων· δικαιοσύνην μὲν γὰρ δικαιοσύνης οὐ πάνυ φασὶ δεῖν λέγεσθαι μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον, οὐδὲ ὑγίειαν ὑγιείας, ἧττον μέντοι ἔχειν ἕτερον ἑτέρου ὑγίειαν, καὶ δικαιοσύνην ἕτερον ἑτέρου, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ γραμματικὴν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας διαθέσεις.
For some people dispute about such things; for they say that one justice cannot very well be said to be more or less than another justice, nor one health than another health, but they say that one person has health less than another, and justice less than another, and likewise also grammar and the other dispositions.
Ἀλλ᾿ οὖν τά γε κατὰ ταύτας λεγόμενα ἀναμφισβητήτως ἐπιδέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον· γραμματικώτερος γὰρ ἕτερος ἑτέρου λέγεται καὶ ὑγιεινότερος καὶ δικαιότερος, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὡσαύτως.
But at any rate, the things spoken of in virtue of these qualities indisputably admit of the more and the less; for one person is said to be more grammatical than another, and healthier, and more just, and likewise also in the other cases.
Τρίγωνον δὲ καὶ τετράγωνον οὐ δοκεῖ τὸ μᾶλλον ἐπιδέχεσθαι, οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων σχημάτων οὐδέν.
But a triangle and a square do not seem to admit of the more, nor does any of the other shapes.
Τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιδεχόμενα τὸν τοῦ τριγώνου λόγον ἢ τὸν τοῦ κύκλου πάνθ᾿ ὁμοίως τρίγωνα ἢ κύκλοι εἰσί, τῶν δὲ μὴ ἐπιδεχομένων οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἕτερον ἑτέρου ῥηθήσεται· οὐδὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον τὸ τετράγωνον τοῦ ἑτερομήκους κύκλος ἐστίν·
For those things which admit of the definition of a triangle or of a circle are all equally triangles or circles, and of those which do not admit of it, none will be said to be more so than another; for a square is not any more a circle than an oblong is, since neither of them admits of the definition of a circle.
οὐδέτερον γὰρ ἐπιδέχεται τὸν τοῦ κύκλου λόγον. Ἁπλῶς δέ, ἐὰν μὴ ἐπιδέχηται ἀμφότερα τὸν τοῦ προκειμένου λόγον, οὐ ῥηθήσεται τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου μᾶλλον.
And simply, unless both admit of the definition of the subject in question, the one will not be said to be more so than the other.
Οὐ πάντα οὖν τὰ ποιὰ ἐπιδέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον.
Therefore, not all qualified things admit of the more and the less.
Τῶν μὲν οὖν εἰρημένων οὐδὲν ἴδιον ποιότητος, ὅμοια δὲ καὶ ἀνόμοια κατὰ μόνας τὰς ποιότητας λέγεται·
Of the things mentioned, then, none is peculiar to quality, but it is in virtue of qualities alone that things are said to be similar and dissimilar; for one thing is similar to another in virtue of nothing other than that by which it is qualified.
ὅμοιον γὰρ ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ οὐκ ἔστι κατ᾿ ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἢ καθ᾿ ὃ ποιόν ἐστιν. Ὥστε ἴδιον ἂν εἴη τῆς ποιότητος τὸ ὅμοιον καὶ ἀνόμοιον λέγεσθαι κατ᾿ αὐτήν.
So that it would be peculiar to quality to be spoken of as similar and dissimilar in virtue of it.
Οὐ δεῖ δὲ ταράττεσθαι, μή τις ἡμᾶς φήσῃ ὑπὲρ ποιότητος τὴν πρόθεσιν ποιησαμένους πολλὰ τῶν πρός τι συγκαταριθμεῖσθαι· τὰς γὰρ ἕξεις καὶ διαθέσεις τῶν πρός τι εἶναι ἐλέγομεν.
We should not be disturbed lest someone should say that, having made our proposal to speak about quality, we are co-enumerating many things belonging to relation; for we said that habits and dispositions belong to relation.
Σχεδὸν γὰρ ἐπὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων τὰ γένη πρός τι λέγεται, τῶν δὲ καθ᾿ ἕκαστα οὐδέν.
For in pretty much all such cases, the genera are spoken of as relations, but none of the particulars is.
Ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστήμη, γένος οὖσα, αὐτὸ ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρου λέγεται (τινὸς γὰρ ἐπιστήμη λέγεται), τῶν δὲ καθ᾿ ἕκαστα οὐδὲν αὐτὸ ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρου λέγεται, οἷον ἡ γραμματικὴ οὐ λέγεται τινὸς γραμματικὴ οὐδ᾿ ἡ μουσικὴ τινὸς μουσική.
For knowledge, being a genus, is said to be just what it is of something else (for it is said to be knowledge of something), but none of the particulars is said to be just what it is of something else, for example, grammar is not said to be grammar of something, nor music music of something.
Ἀλλ᾿ εἰ ἄρα, κατὰ τὸ γένος καὶ αὗται τῶν πρός τι λέγονται, οἶον ἡ γραμματικὴ λέγεται τινὸς ἐπιστήμη, οὐ τινὸς γραμματικὴ, καὶ ἡ μουσικὴ τινὸς ἐπιστήμη λέγεται, οὐ τινὸς μουσική.
But if, then, these also are spoken of as relations, it is in respect of their genus; for example, grammar is said to be knowledge of something, not grammar of something, and music is said to be knowledge of something, not music of something.
Ὥστε αἱ καθ᾿ ἕκαστα οὐκ εἰσὶ τῶν πρός τι.
So that the particulars are not relations.
Λεγόμεθα δὲ ποιοὶ ταῖς καθ᾿ ἕκαστα· ταύτας γὰρ καὶ ἔχομεν·
And we are said to be qualified in virtue of the particulars; for we also possess these.
ἐπιστήμονες γὰρ λεγόμεθα τῷ ἔχειν τῶν καθ᾿ ἕκαστα ἐπιστημῶν τινά.
For we are said to be knowledgeable by having some one of the particular sciences.
Ὥστε αὗται ἂν καὶ ποιότητες εἴησαν, αἱ καθ᾿ ἕκαστα, καθ᾿ ἅς ποτε καὶ ποιοὶ λεγόμεθα· αὗται δὲ οὐκ εἰσὶ τῶν πρός τι.
So that these, the particulars, in virtue of which we are indeed said to be qualified, would be qualities; and these are not relations.
Ἔτι εἰ τυγχάνοι τὸ αὐτὸ πρός τι καὶ ποιὸν ὄν, οὐδὲν ἄτοπον ἐν ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς γένεσιν αὐτὸ καταριθμεῖσθαι.
Furthermore, if the same thing should happen to be both a relation and a quality, there is nothing absurd in its being co-enumerated in both genera.