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Aristotle · Categories §8#1

Definition of Quality: Habits, Dispositions, and Capacities

Passage 10 of 19 · Greek

Summary

The author defines the category of quality, distinguishing its first species, 'state' (hexis) and 'disposition' (diathesis), and discussing its second species, 'natural capacity and incapacity'.

§8#1Ποιότητα δὲ λέγω καθ᾿ ἣν ποιοί τινες εἶναι λέγονται.
By quality I mean that in virtue of which things are said to be qualified in some way.
Ἔστι δὲ ἡ ποιότης τῶν πλεοναχῶς λεγομένων.
Quality is among those things which are spoken of in many ways.
Ἒν μὲν οὖν εἶδος ποιότητος ἕξις καὶ διάθεσις λεγέσθωσαν.
Let one species of quality, then, be called state and disposition.
Διαφέρει δὲ ἕξις διαθέσεως τῷ πολὺ χρονιώτερον εἶναι καὶ μονιμώτερον.
A state differs from a disposition in being much more long-lasting and more stable.
Τοιαῦται δὲ αἵ τε ἐπιστῆμαι καὶ αἱ ἀρεταί· ἥ τε γὰρ ἐπιστήμη δοκεῖ τῶν παραμονίμων εἶναι καὶ δυσκινήτων, ἐὰν καὶ μετρίως τις ἐπιστήμην λάβῃ, ἐάν περ μὴ μεγάλη μεταβολὴ γένηται ὑπὸ νόσου ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς τοιούτου· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀρετή, οἷον ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων, οὐκ εὐκίνητον δοκεῖ εἶναι οὐδ᾿ εὐμετάβολον.
Of this kind are both branches of knowledge and the virtues; for knowledge is thought to be among those things which are permanent and difficult to change, even if one acquires knowledge only moderately, unless some great change should occur through sickness or some other such thing; and likewise virtue, such as justice and temperance and each of such things, is not thought to be easily changed or easily altered.
Διαθέσεις δὲ λέγονται ἅ ἐστιν εὐκίνητα καὶ ταχὺ μεταβάλλοντα, οἷον θερμότης καὶ κατάψυξις καὶ νόσος καὶ ὑγίεια καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα· διάκειται μὲν γάρ πως κατὰ ταύτας ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ταχὺ δὲ μεταβάλλει ἐκ θερμοῦ ψυχρὸς γενόμενος καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν εἰς τὸ νοσεῖν, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, εἰ μή τις καὶ αὐτῶν τούτων τυγχάνοι διὰ χρόνου πλῆθος ἤδη πεφυσιωμένη καὶ ἀνίατος ἢ πάνυ δυσκίνητος οὖσα, ἣν ἄν τις ἴσως ἕξιν ἤδη προσαγορεύοι.
And those things are called dispositions which are easily changed and quickly alter, such as heat and cold, disease and health, and all other such things; for a man is disposed in some way according to these, but he quickly alters, becoming cold from hot, and from being healthy into being diseased, and likewise also in the other cases, unless one of these very things should happen, through length of time, to have already become part of one's nature and incurable or very difficult to change, which one might perhaps then call a state.
Φανερὸν δὲ ὅτι ταῦτα βούλονται ἕξεις λέγειν, ἅ ἐστι πολυχρονιώτερα καὶ δυσκινητότερα· τοὺς γὰρ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν μὴ πάνυ κατέχοντας ἀλλ᾿ εὐκινήτους ὄντας οὔ φασιν ἕξιν ἔχειν, καίτοι διάκεινταί γέ πως κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἢ χεῖρον ἢ βέλτιον.
It is manifest that people wish to call those things states which are longer-lasting and more difficult to change; for those who do not thoroughly possess branches of knowledge but are easily changed are not said to have a state, although they are disposed in some way, either worse or better, in respect of knowledge.
Ὥστε διαφέρει ἕξις διαθέσεως τῷ τὴν μὲν εὐκίνητον εἶναι, τὴν δὲ πολυχρονιωτέραν τε καὶ δυσκινητοτέραν.
So a state differs from a disposition in that the latter is easily changed, while the former is longer-lasting and more difficult to change.
Εἰσὶ δὲ αἱ μὲν ἕξεις καὶ διαθέσεις, αἱ δὲ διαθέσεις οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἕξεις· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἕξεις ἔχοντες καὶ διάκεινταί γέ πως κατ᾿ αὐτάς, οἱ δὲ διακείμενοι οὐ πάντως καὶ ἕξιν ἔχουσιν.
And states are also dispositions, but dispositions are not of necessity states; for those who have states are also disposed in some way according to them, but those who are disposed do not in all cases also have a state.
Ἕτερον δὲ γένος ποιότητος καθ᾿ ὃ πυκτικοὺς ἢ δρομικοὺς ἢ ὑγιεινοὺς ἢ νοσώδεις λέγομεν, καὶ ἁπλῶς ὅσα κατὰ δύναμιν φυσικὴν ἢ ἀδυναμίαν λέγεται.
Another genus of quality is that in virtue of which we call people boxers or runners or healthy or sickly, and simply whatever is spoken of in virtue of a natural capacity or incapacity.
Οὐ γὰρ τῷ διακεῖσθαί γέ πως ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων ποιὸν λέγεται, ἀλλὰ τῷ δύναμιν ἔχειν φυσικὴν ἢ ἀδυναμίαν τοῦ ποιῆσαί τι ῥᾳδίως ἢ μηδὲν πάσχειν, οἷον πυκτικοὶ ἢ δρομικοὶ οὐ τῷ διακεῖσθαί πως λέγονται ἀλλὰ τῷ δύναμιν ἔχειν φυσικὴν τοῦ ποιῆσαί τι ῥᾳδίως, ὑγιεινοὶ δὲ λέγονται τῷ δύναμιν ἔχειν φυσικὴν τοῦ μηδὲν πάσχειν ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων ῥᾳδίως, νοσώδεις δὲ τῷ ἀδυναμίαν ἔχειν φυσικὴν τοῦ μηδὲν πάσχειν ῥᾳδίως ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων.
For it is not by being disposed in some way that each of such things is said to be qualified, but by having a natural capacity or incapacity to do something easily or to suffer nothing; for example, they are called boxers or runners not by being disposed in some way but by having a natural capacity to do something easily, and they are called healthy by having a natural capacity to suffer nothing easily from whatever happens to meet them, and sickly by having a natural incapacity to suffer nothing easily from whatever happens to meet them.
Ὁμοίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ τὸ σκληρὸν καὶ τὸ μαλακὸν ἔχει· τὸ μὲν γὰρ σκληρὸν λέγεται τῷ δύναμιν ἔχειν τοῦ μὴ ῥᾳδίως διαιρεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ μαλακὸν τῷ ἀδυναμίαν ἔχειν τοῦ αὐτοῦ τούτου.
And the hard and the soft have in a similar way to these; for the hard is so called by having a capacity not to be easily divided, and the soft by having an incapacity for this very same thing.

Notes

  1. ¦1¦ἕξις καὶ διάθεσις — Aristotle distinguishes these two concepts of the first species of quality based on temporal duration and stability. A state (ἕξις) is stable and hard to change, whereas a disposition (διάθεσις) is transient and easily changed. It is also shown that every state is a disposition, establishing a relation of inclusion.
  2. ¦3¦εἰ μή τις καὶ αὐτῶν τούτων τυγχάνοι... προσαγορεύοι — This is a potential conditional sentence using the optative (εἰ + optative ... ἄν + optative). It hypothetically describes an exceptional case where a 'disposition' (διάθεσις), which is normally easily changed and temporary, becomes deeply ingrained over time and may eventually be called a 'state' (ἕξις).
  3. ¦6¦δύναμιν ἔχειν φυσικὴν ἢ ἀδυναμίαν — Regarding the second species of quality, Aristotle distinguishes it from passively 'being disposed in some way' (διακεῖσθαί πως). He defines it as being characterized by an intrinsic 'natural capacity or incapacity' to do something actively or to remain unaffected (or easily affected) by external influences.

Cite this passage

Aristotle, Categories §8#1. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg006.humanitext-grc1:8%231

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