§7#3Ἔχει δὲ ἀπορίαν πότερον οὐδεμία οὐσία τῶν πρός τι λέγεται, καθάπερ δοκεῖ, ἢ τοῦτο ἐνδέχεται κατά τινας τῶν δευτέρων οὐσιῶν.
There is a difficulty as to whether no substance is spoken of as a relative, as is thought to be the case, or whether this is possible in the case of some of the secondary substances.
Ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν ἀληθές ἐστιν· οὔτε γὰρ τὰ ὅλα οὔτε τὰ μέρη πρός τι λέγεται.
In the case of primary substances, this is true; for neither wholes nor parts are spoken of as relatives.
Ὁ γάρ τις ἄνθρωπος οὐ λέγεται τινός τις ἄνθρωπος, οὐδὲ ὁ τὶς βοῦς τινός τις βοῦς.
For a certain individual man is not called a certain individual man of someone, nor is a certain individual ox called a certain individual ox of someone.
Ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὰ μέρη· ἡ γάρ τις χεὶρ οὐ λέγεται τινός τις χεὶρ ἀλλά τινος χείρ, καὶ ἡ τὶς κεφαλὴ οὐ λέγεται τινός τις κεφαλὴ ἀλλά τινος κεφαλή.
Likewise with the parts; for a certain individual hand is not called a certain individual hand of someone, but a hand of someone, and a certain individual head is not called a certain individual head of someone, but a head of someone.
Ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν δευτέρων οὐσιῶν, ἐπί γε τῶν πλείστων, οἷον ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὐ λέγεται τινὸς ἄνθρωπος, οὐδὲ ὁ βοῦς τινὸς βοῦς, οὐδὲ τὸ ξύλον τινὸς ξύλον, ἀλλά τινος κτῆμα λέγεται.
Likewise also in the case of secondary substances, at least for the most part; for example, a man is not called a man of someone, nor an ox an ox of someone, nor timber timber of someone, but it is called a possession of someone.
Ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν τοιούτων φανερὸν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τῶν πρός τι· ἐπ᾿ ἐνίων δὲ τῶν δευτέρων οὐσιῶν ἔχει ἀμφισβήτησιν, οἶον ἡ κεφαλὴ τινὸς λέγεται κεφαλὴ καὶ ἡ χεὶρ τινὸς λέγεται χεὶρ καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων, ὥστε ταῦτα τῶν πρός τι δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι.
In these cases, then, it is manifest that they do not belong to relatives; but in the case of some of the secondary substances there is room for dispute, as, for example, a head is called a head of someone, and a hand is called a hand of someone, and each of such things, so that these might seem to belong to relatives.
Εἰ μὲν οὖν ἱκανῶς ὁ τῶν πρός τι ὁρισμὸς ἀποδέδοται, ἢ τῶν πάνυ χαλεπῶν ἢ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστὶ τὸ δεῖξαι ὡς οὐδεμία οὐσία τῶν πρός τι λέγεται·
Now, if the definition of relatives has been adequately rendered, it is either of the extremely difficult or of the impossible things to show that no substance is spoken of as a relative.
εἰ δὲ μὴ ἱκανῶς, ἀλλ᾿ ἔστι τὰ πρός τι οἷς τὸ εἶναι ταὐτόν ἐστι τῷ πρός τί πως ἔχειν, ἴσως ἂν ῥηθείη τι πρὸς αὐτά.
But if it has not been adequately rendered, but relatives are those things for which being is the same as being related in some way to something, perhaps something might be said in reply to them.
Ὁ δὲ πρότερος ὁρισμὸς παρακολουθεῖ μὲν πᾶσι τοῖς πρός τι, οὐ μὴν ταὐτόν γέ ἐστι τῷ πρός τι αὐτοῖς εἶναι τὸ αὐτὰ ἅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρων λέγεσθαι.
The former definition, indeed, accompanies all relatives, yet being a relative is not the same for them as their being precisely what they are being spoken of as belonging to other things.
Ἐκ δὲ τούτων δῆλόν ἐστιν ὅτι ἐάν τις εἰδῇ τι ὡρισμένως τῶν πρός τι, κἀκεῖνο πρὸς ὃ λέγεται ὡρισμένως εἴσεται.
From these things it is clear that if someone knows any one of the relatives determinately, he will also know determinately that in relation to which it is spoken.
Φανερὸν μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἐστίν.
It is, then, manifest also from the things themselves.
Εἰ γὰρ οἶδέ τις τόδε τι ὅτι ἔστι τῶν πρός τι, ἔστι δὲ τὸ εἶναι τοῖς πρός τι ταὐτὸν τῷ πρός τί πως ἔχειν, κἀκεῖνο οἶδε πρὸς ὃ τοῦτό πως ἔχει· εἰ γὰρ οὐκ οἶδεν ὅλως πρὸς ὃ τοῦτό πως ἔχει, οὐδ᾿ εἰ πρός τί πως ἔχει εἴσεται.
For if someone knows that this particular thing is of the relatives, and for relatives being is the same as being related in some way to something, he also knows that in relation to which this is in some way related; for if he does not know at all in relation to what this is in some way related, neither will he know whether it is related in some way to something.
Καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν καθ᾿ ἕκαστα δὲ δῆλον τὸ τοιοῦτον, οἷον τόδε τι εἰ οἶδε ἀφωρισμένως ὅτι ἔστι διπλάσιον, καὶ ὅτου διπλάσιόν ἐστιν εὐθὺς ἀφωρισμένως οἶδεν· εἰ γὰρ μηδενὸς τῶν ἀφωρισμένων οἶδεν αὐτὸ διπλάσιον, οὐδ᾿ εἰ διπλάσιόν ἐστιν ὅλως οἶδεν.
And in the case of particular instances, such a thing is clear, as, for example, if someone knows determinately that this particular thing is double, he immediately knows determinately also of what it is double; for if he knows it to be double of none of the determinate things, neither does he know at all whether it is double.
Ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τόδε τι εἰ οἶδεν ὅτι κάλλιόν ἐστι, καὶ ὅτου κάλλιόν ἐστιν εὐθὺς ἀφωρισμένως ἀναγκαῖον εἰδέναι διὰ ταῦτα.
Likewise also, if he knows that this particular thing is more beautiful, it is necessary because of these things that he immediately knows determinately also than what it is more beautiful.
Οὐκ ἀορίστως δὲ εἴσεται ὅτι τοῦτό ἐστι χείρονος κάλλιον· ὑπόληψις γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτο γίνεται, οὐκ ἐπιστήμη· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ἀκριβῶς εἴσεται ὅτι ἐστὶ χείρονος κάλλιον.
And he will not know indeterminately that this is more beautiful than something worse; for such a thing becomes a mere belief, not knowledge; for he will no longer know precisely that it is more beautiful than something worse.
Εἰ γὰρ οὕτως ἔτυχεν, οὐδέν ἐστι χεῖρον αὐτοῦ.
For if it should so happen by chance, there may be nothing worse than it.
Ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν, ὃ ἂν εἰδῇ τις τῶν πρός τι ἀφωρισμένως, κἀκεῖνο πρὸς ὃ λέγεται ἀφωρισμένως εἰδέναι.
So it is manifest that it is necessary, whichever of the relatives one knows determinately, to know determinately also that in relation to which it is spoken.
Τὴν δέ γε κεφαλὴν καὶ τὴν χεῖρα καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων, ἅ εἰσιν οὐσίαι, αὐτὸ μὲν ὅπερ ἐστὶν ὡρισμένως ἔστιν εἰδέναι, πρὸς ὃ δὲ λέγεται, οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον.
But as for the head and the hand and each of such things, which are substances, it is possible to know determinately what they themselves are, but it is not necessary to know that in relation to which they are spoken.
Τίνος γὰρ αὕτη ἡ κεφαλὴ ἢ τίνος ἡ χείρ, οὐκ ἔστιν εἰδέναι ὡρισμένως.
For whose this head is, or whose this hand is, it is not possible to know determinately.
Ὥστε οὐκ ἂν εἴη ταῦτα τῶν πρός τι.
Therefore, these would not belong to relatives.
Εἰ δὲ μή ἐστι ταῦτα τῶν πρός τι, ἀληθὲς ἂν εἴη λέγειν ὅτι οὐδεμία οὐσία τῶν πρός τί ἐστιν.
And if these do not belong to relatives, it would be true to say that no substance is of the relatives.
Ἴσως δὲ χαλεπὸν ὑπὲρ τῶν τοιούτων σφοδρῶς ἀποφαίνεσθαι μὴ πολλάκις ἐπεσκεμμένον· τὸ μέντοι διηπορηκέναι ἐφ᾿ ἑκάστου αὐτῶν οὐκ ἄχρηστόν ἐστιν.
But perhaps it is difficult to declare firmly on such matters without having examined them many times; yet to have raised difficulties on each of them is not without usefulness.