§7#2Οὕτω δὲ ῥᾷστα ἂν ἴσως τις λάβοι οἷς μὴ κεῖται ὀνόματα, εἰ ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων καὶ τοῖς πρὸς αὐτὰ ἀντιστρέφουσι τιθείη τὰ ὀνόματα, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν προειρημένων ἀπὸ τοῦ πτεροῦ τὸ πτερωτὸν καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ πηδαλίου τὸ πηδαλιωτόν.
In this way, one might perhaps most easily obtain names for those things which do not have established names, if one should assign names from the primary things to those that convert in relation to them, just as in the aforementioned cases, "winged" from "wing" and "ruddered" from "rudder".
Πάντα οὖν τὰ πρός τι, ἐάν περ οἰκείως ἀποδιδῶται, πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα λέγεται, ἐπεὶ ἐάν γε πρὸς τὸ τυχὸν ἀποδιδῶται καὶ μὴ πρὸς αὐτὸ ὃ λέγεται, οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει.
All relatives, therefore, if they are assigned properly, are spoken of in relation to correlatives that convert; since if they are assigned to any chance thing, and not to that itself in relation to which they are spoken, they do not convert.
Λέγω δὲ ὅτι οὐδὲ τῶν ὁμολογουμένως πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα λεγομένων, καὶ ὀνομάτων αὐτοῖς κειμένων, οὐδὲν ἀντιστρέφει, ἐὰν πρός τι τῶν συμβεβηκότων ἀποδιδῶται καὶ μὴ πρὸς αὐτὸ ὃ λέγεται, οἷον ὁ δοῦλος ἐὰν μὴ δεσπότου ἀποδοθῇ ἀλλ᾿ ἀνθρώπου ἢ δίποδος ἢ ὁτουοῦν τῶν τοιούτων, οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει· οὐ γὰρ οἰκεία ἡ ἀπόδοσίς ἐστιν.
And I mean that even of those things which are confessedly spoken of in relation to correlatives that convert, and which have names established for them, not one converts if it is assigned to one of its accidents and not to that itself in relation to which it is spoken—as, for example, if a slave is assigned not to "a master" but to "a man" or to "a biped" or to any other such thing, it does not convert; for the assignment is not proper.
Ἔτι δ᾿ ἐὰν μέν τι οἰκείως ἀποδεδομένον ᾖ πρὸς ὃ λέγεται, πάντων περιαιρουμένων τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα συμβεβηκότα ἐστί, καταλειπομένου δὲ μόνου τούτου πρὸς ὃ ἀπεδόθη οἰκείως, ἀεὶ πρὸς αὐτὸ ῥηθήσεται, οἶον ὁ δοῦλος ἐὰν πρὸς δεσπότην λέγηται, περιαιρουμένων τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων ὅσα συμβεβηκότα ἐστὶ τῷ δεσπότῃ, οἶον τὸ δίποδι εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικῷ καὶ τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ, καταλειπομένου δὲ μόνου τοῦ δεσπότην εἶναι, ἀεὶ ὁ δοῦλος πρὸς αὐτὸ ῥηθήσεται·
Furthermore, if something is properly assigned to that in relation to which it is spoken, then, even if all other things that are accidents are stripped away, and only this to which it was properly assigned is left, it will always be spoken of in relation to it.
ὁ γὰρ δοῦλος δεσπότου δοῦλος λέγεται.
For example, if a slave is spoken of in relation to "a master", and if all other things that are accidents of the master are stripped away—such as being a biped, being capable of receiving knowledge, and being a man—and only being a master is left, the slave will always be spoken of in relation to it; for a slave is called slave of a master.
Ἐὰν δέ γε μὴ οἰκείως ἀποδοθῇ πρὸς ὅ ποτε λέγεται, περιαιρουμένων μὲν τῶν ἄλλων, καταλειπομένου δὲ μόνου τοῦ πρὸς ὃ ἀπεδόθη, οὐ ῥηθήσεται πρὸς αὐτό.
But if it is not properly assigned to that in relation to which it is spoken, then, if the other things are stripped away and only that to which it was assigned is left, it will not be spoken of in relation to it.
Ἀποδεδόσθω γὰρ ὁ δοῦλος ἀνθρώπου καὶ τὸ πτερὸν ὄρνιθος, καὶ περιῃρήσθω τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ δεσπότην αὐτὸν εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ὁ δοῦλος πρὸς ἄνθρωπον ῥηθήσεται· μὴ γὰρ ὄντος δεσπότου οὐδὲ δοῦλός ἐστιν.
For let a slave be assigned to "a man" and a wing to "a bird", and let being a master itself be stripped away from the man; then the slave will no longer be spoken of in relation to the man; for if there is no master, there is no slave either.
Ὡσαύτως καὶ τοῦ ὄρνιθος περιῃρήσθω τὸ πτερωτῷ εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ἔσται τὸ πτερὸν τῶν πρός τι· μὴ γὰρ ὄντος πτερωτοῦ οὐδὲ πτερὸν ἔσται τινός.
Likewise also, let being winged be stripped away from the bird; then the wing will no longer be of the relatives; for if there is no winged thing, there will not be a wing of anything either.
Ὥστε δεῖ μὲν ἀποδιδόναι πρὸς ὅ ποτε οἰκείως λέγεται.
So one must assign to that in relation to which it is properly spoken.
Κἂν μὲν ὄνομα ᾖ κείμενον, ῥᾳδία ἡ ἀπόδοσις γίνεται· μὴ ὄντος δὲ ἀναγκαῖον ἴσως ὀνοματοποιεῖν.
And if there is an established name, the assignment becomes easy; but if there is not, it is perhaps necessary to coin a name.
Οὕτω δὲ ἀποδιδομένων φανερὸν ὅτι πάντα τὰ πρός τι πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα λέγεται.
When they are assigned in this way, it is manifest that all relatives are spoken of in relation to correlatives that convert.
Δοκεῖ δὲ τὰ πρός τι ἅμα τῇ φύσει εἶναι, καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν πλείστων ἀληθές ἐστιν.
Relatives also seem to be simultaneous by nature, and in most cases this is true.
Ἄμα γὰρ διπλάσιόν τέ ἐστι καὶ ἥμισυ, καὶ ἡμίσεος ὄντος διπλάσιόν ἐστι· καὶ δεσπότου ὄντος δοῦλός ἐστι, καὶ δούλου ὄντος δεσπότης ἐστίν· ὁμοίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ τὰ ἄλλα.
For the double and the half are simultaneous, and when there is a half there is a double, and when there is a master there is a slave, and when there is a slave there is a master; and likewise with the others.
Καὶ συναναιρεῖ δὲ ταῦτα ἄλληλα· μὴ γὰρ ὄντος διπλασίου οὐκ ἔστιν ἥμισυ, καὶ ἡμίσεος μὴ ὄντος οὐκ ἔστι διπλάσιον· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα τοιαῦτα.
And these also destroy each other along with themselves; for if there is no double, there is no half, and if there is no half, there is no double; and likewise with other such things.
Οὐκ ἐπὶ πάντων δὲ τῶν πρός τι ἀληθὲς δοκεῖ τὸ ἅμα τῇ φύσει εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ ἐπιστητὸν πρότερον ἂν δόξειε τῆς ἐπιστήμης εἶναι.
But it does not seem to be true of all relatives that they are simultaneous by nature; for the knowable would seem to be prior to knowledge.
Ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ προϋπαρχόντων τῶν πραγμάτων τὰς ἐπιστήμας λαμβάνομεν· ἐπ᾿ ὀλίγων γὰρ ἂν ἢ ἐπ᾿ οὐδενὸς ἴδοι τις ἂν ἅμα τῷ ἐπιστητῷ τὴν ἐπιστήμην γινομένην.
For, for the most part, it is when things pre-exist that we acquire knowledge of them; for in few cases, or in none, would one see knowledge arising simultaneously with the knowable.
Ἔτι τὸ μὲν ἐπιστητὸν ἀναιρεθὲν συναναιρεῖ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ἡ δὲ ἐπιστήμη τὸ ἐπιστητὸν οὐ συναναιρεῖ·
Furthermore, the knowable, if destroyed, destroys knowledge along with itself, but knowledge does not destroy the knowable.
ἐπιστητοῦ μὲν γὰρ μὴ ὄντος οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη (οὐδενὸς γὰρ ἔσται ἐπιστήμη), ἐπιστήμης δὲ μὴ οὔσης οὐδὲν κωλύει ἐπιστητὸν εἶναι, οἷον καὶ ὁ τοῦ κύκλου τετραγωνισμὸς εἴγε ἔστιν ἐπιστητόν, ἐπιστήμη μὲν αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδέπω, αὐτὸς δὲ ἐπιστητόν ἐστιν.
For if there is no knowable, there is no knowledge (for it will be knowledge of nothing), but if there is no knowledge, nothing prevents the knowable from existing, as for example the squaring of the circle, if indeed it is a knowable, though there is as yet no knowledge of it, yet it is itself a knowable.
Ἔτι ζῴου μὲν ἀναιρεθέντος οὐκ ἔσται ἐπιστήμη, τῶν δ᾿ ἐπιστητῶν πολλὰ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι.
Furthermore, if animal is destroyed, there will be no knowledge, but it is possible for many knowables to exist.
Ὁμοίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἔχει.
And the situation concerning perception is similar to these.
Τὸ γὰρ αἰσθητὸν πρότερον· τῆς αἰσθήσεως δοκεῖ εἶναι.
For the sensible seems to be prior to perception.
Τὸ μὲν γὰρ αἰσθητὸν ἀναιρεθὲν συναναιρεῖ τὴν αἴσθησιν, ἡ δὲ αἴσθησις τὸ αἰσθητὸν οὐ συναναιρεῖ.
For the sensible, if destroyed, destroys perception along with itself, but perception does not destroy the sensible.
Αἱ γὰρ αἰσθήσεις περὶ σῶμα καὶ ἐν σώματί εἰσιν, αἰσθητοῦ δὲ ἀναιρεθέντος ἀναιρεῖται καὶ τὸ σῶμα (τῶν γὰρ αἰσθητῶν τὸ σῶμα), σώματος δὲ μὴ ὄντος ἀναιρεῖται καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις, ὥστε συναναιρεῖ τὸ αἰσθητὸν τὴν αἴσθησιν.
For perceptions are concerned with a body and are in a body, and if the sensible is destroyed, the body is also destroyed (for the body is of the sensibles), and if there is no body, perception is also destroyed; so that the sensible destroys perception along with itself.
Ἡ δέ γε αἴσθησις τὸ αἰσθητὸν οὐ συναναιρεῖ· ζῴου γὰρ ἀναιρεθέντος αἴσθησις μὲν ἀναιρεῖται, αἰσθητὸν δὲ ἔσται, οἶον σῶμα, θερμόν, γλυκύ, πικρόν, και τἆλλα πάντα ὅσα ἐστὶν αἰσθητά.
But perception does not destroy the sensible; for if animal is destroyed, perception is destroyed, but the sensible will exist, such as body, hot, sweet, bitter, and all other things that are sensible.
Ἔτι ἡ μὲν αἴσθησις ἅμα τῷ αἰσθητικῷ γίνεται· ἅμα γὰρ τῷ ζῴῳ γίνεται καὶ αἴσθησις· τὸ δέ γε αἴσθητόν ἐστι καὶ πρὸ τοῦ ζῷον ἢ αἴσθησιν εἶναι· πῦρ γὰρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἐξ ὧν καὶ τὸ ζῷον συνίσταται, ἔστι καὶ πρὸ τοῦ ζῷον ὅλως εἶναι ἢ αἴσθησιν, ὥστε πρότερον ἂν τῆς αἰσθήσεως τὸ αἰσθητὸν εἶναι δόξειεν.
Furthermore, perception arises simultaneously with the sensitive subject; for simultaneously with the animal, perception also arises; but the sensible exists even before there is animal or perception; for fire and water and such things, from which the animal is constituted, exist even before there is animal at all or perception; so that the sensible would seem to be prior to perception.