§7#1Πρός τι δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεται, ὅσα αὐτὰ ἅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρων εἶναι λέγεται, ἢ ὁπωσοῦν ἄλλως πρὸς ἕτερον, οἷον τὸ μεῖζον τοῦθ᾿ ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρου λέγεται· τινὸς γὰρ λέγεται μεῖζον·
Those things are called relatives which, being what they are, are said to be of other things, or in some other way in relation to something else. For example, "the greater" is said to be what it is of something else; for it is called greater "than something".
καὶ τὸ διπλάσιον τοῦθ᾿ ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρου λέγεται· τινὸς γὰρ διπλάσιον λέγεται.
And "the double" is said to be what it is of something else; for it is called double "of something".
Ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα.
Likewise also with all other such things.
Ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν πρός τι οἷον ἕξις, διάθεσις, αἴσθησις, ἐπιστήμη, θέσις.
And such things as habit, disposition, perception, knowledge, and position are also of the relatives.
Πάντα γὰρ τὰ εἰρημένα αὐτὰ ἅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρων εἶναι λέγεται καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο τι· ἡ γὰρ ἕξις τινὸς ἕξις λέγεται καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη τινὸς ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἡ θέσις τινὸς θέσις, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δὲ ὡσαύτως.
For all the mentioned things are said to be what they are of other things, and not anything else; for habit is called habit "of something", and knowledge is called knowledge "of something", and position is called position "of something", and the others likewise.
Πρός τι οὖν ἐστὶν ὅσα αὐτὰ ἅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρων εἶναι λέγεται, ἢ ὁπωσοῦν ἄλλως πρὸς ἕτερον, οἷον ὄρος μέγα λέγεται πρὸς ἕτερον· πρός τι γὰρ μέγα λέγεται τὸ ὄρος· καὶ τὸ ὅμοιον τινὶ ὅμοιον λέγεται, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὡσαύτως πρός τι λέγεται.
Therefore, relatives are those things which, being what they are, are said to be of other things, or in some other way in relation to something else, as a mountain is called "large" in relation to something else (for the mountain is called large in relation to something), and "the similar" is called similar "to something", and other such things are likewise called relatives.
Ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀνάκλισις καὶ ἡ στάσις καὶ ἡ καθέδρα θέσεις τινές, ἡ δὲ θέσις τῶν πρός τι.
Moreover, reclining, standing, and sitting are certain positions, and position is of the relatives.
Τὸ δὲ ἀνακεῖσθαι ἢ ἑστάναι ἢ καθῆσθαι αὐτὰ μὲν οὐκ εἰσὶ θέσεις, παρωνύμως δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν εἰρημένων θέσεων λέγεται.
But to recline, to stand, or to sit are not themselves positions, but are called paronymously from the mentioned positions.
Ὑπάρχει δὲ καὶ ἐναντιότης ἐν τοῖς πρός τι, οἷον ἀρετὴ κακίᾳ ἐναντίον, ἑκάτερον ὂν τῶν πρός τι, καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἀγνοίᾳ.
There also exists contrariety in relatives, as virtue is contrary to vice, each of them being a relative, and knowledge to ignorance.
Οὐ πᾶσι δὲ τοῖς πρός τι ὑπάρχει τὸ ἐναντίον· τῷ γὰρ διπλασίῳ οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐναντίον, οὐδὲ τῷ τριπλασίῳ, οὐδὲ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδενί.
But contrariety does not belong to all relatives; for there is no contrary to "the double", nor to "the triple", nor to any such things.
Δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον ἐπιδέχεσθαι τὰ πρός τι· ὅμοιον γὰρ καὶ ἀνόμοιον μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον λέγεται, καὶ ἴσον καὶ ἄνισον μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον λέγεται, ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν πρός τι ὄν· τό τε γὰρ ὅμοιον τινὶ ὅμοιον λέγεται καὶ τὸ ἀνόμοιον τινὶ ἀνόμοιον.
Relatives also seem to admit the more and the less; for similar and dissimilar are said to be more and less, and equal and unequal are said to be more and less, each of them being a relative; for the similar is called similar "to something" and the dissimilar dissimilar "to something".
Οὐ πάντα δὲ τὰ πρός τι ἐπιδέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον· τὸ γὰρ διπλάσιον οὐ λέγεται μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον διπλάσιον, οὐδὲ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν.
But not all relatives admit the more and the less; for the double is not said to be more or less double, nor is any of such things.
Πάντα δὲ τὰ πρός τι πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα λέγεται, οἷον ὁ δοῦλος δεσπότου δοῦλος λέγεται καὶ ὁ δεσπότης δούλου δεσπότης, καὶ τὸ διπλάσιον ἡμίσεος διπλάσιον καὶ τὸ ἥμισυ διπλασίου ἥμισυ, καὶ τὸ μεῖζον ἐλάττονος μεῖζον καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον μείζονος ἔλαττον.
And all relatives are spoken of in relation to correlatives that convert, as a slave is called slave "of a master" and a master is called master "of a slave", and the double is double "of a half" and the half is half "of a double", and the greater is greater "than the less" and the less is less "than the greater".
Ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, πλὴν τῇ πτώσει ἐνίοτε διοίσει κατὰ τὴν λέξιν, οἷον ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστητοῦ λέγεται ἐπιστήμη καὶ τὸ ἐπιστητὸν ἐπιστήμῃ ἐπιστητόν, καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις αἰσθητοῦ αἴσθησις καὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν αἰσθήσει αἰσθητόν.
Likewise also with the others, except that sometimes they will differ in expression in their case ending, as knowledge is called knowledge "of the knowable" and the knowable is knowable "by knowledge", and perception is perception "of the sensible" and the sensible is sensible "by perception".
Οὐ μὴν ἀλλ᾿ ἐνίοτε οὐ δόξει ἀντιστρέφειν, ἐὰν μὴ οἰκείως πρὸς ὃ λέγεται ἀποδοθῇ, ἀλλὰ διαμάρτῃ ὁ ἀποδιδούς, οἷον τὸ πτερὸν ἐὰν ἀποδοθῇ ὄρνιθος, οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει ὄρνις πτεροῦ.
Nevertheless, sometimes it will not seem to convert, if it is not properly assigned to that in relation to which it is spoken, but the one who assigns it makes a mistake, as for example, if a wing is assigned to "a bird", bird does not convert as "of a wing".
Οὐ γὰρ οἰκείως τὸ πρῶτον ἀποδέδοται πτερὸν ὄρνιθος· οὐ γὰρ ᾗ ὄρνις, ταύτῃ τὸ πτερὸν αὐτοῦ λέγεται, ἀλλ᾿ ᾗ πτερωτόν ἐστι· πολλῶν γὰρ καὶ ἄλλων πτερά ἐστιν, ἃ οὐκ εἰσὶν ὄρνιθες.
For the wing was not properly assigned first as "of a bird"; for it is not insofar as it is a bird that its wing is spoken of, but insofar as it is a winged thing; for there are wings of many other things also which are not birds.
Ὥστε ἐὰν ἀποδοθῇ οἰκείως, καὶ ἀντιστρέφει, οἷον τὸ πτερὸν πτερωτοῦ πτερὸν καὶ τὸ πτερωτὸν πτερῷ πτερωτόν.
So that if it is assigned properly, it also converts, as the wing is wing "of a winged thing", and the winged thing is winged "by a wing".
Ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ὀνοματοποιεῖν ἴσως ἀναγκαῖον, ἐὰν μὴ κείμενον ᾖ ὄνομα πρὸς ὃ οἰκείως ἂν ἀποδοθείη, οἷον τὸ πηδάλιον τοῦ πλοίου ἐὰν ἀποδοθῇ, οὐκ οἰκεία ἡ ἀπόδοσις γίνεται· οὐ γὰρ ᾗ πλοῖον, ταύτῃ αὐτοῦ τὸ πηδάλιον λέγεται· ἔστι γὰρ πλοῖα ὧν οὐκ ἔστι πηδάλια.
Sometimes it is perhaps also necessary to coin a name, if there is no established name to which it might be properly assigned, as for example, if a rudder is assigned to "a boat", the assignment becomes not proper; for it is not insofar as it is a boat that its rudder is spoken of; for there are boats of which there are no rudders.
Διὸ οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει· τὸ γὰρ πλοῖον οὐ λέγεται πηδαλίου πλοῖον.
Therefore it does not convert; for a boat is not called boat "of a rudder".
Ἀλλ᾿ ἴσως οἰκειοτέρα ἂν ἡ ἀπόδοσις εἴη, εἰ οὕτω πως ἀποδοθείη, τὸ πηδάλιον πηδαλιωτοῦ πηδάλιον, ἢ ὁπωσοῦν ἄλλως· ὄνομα γὰρ οὐ κεῖται.
But perhaps the assignment would be more proper if it were assigned somewhat like this: the rudder is rudder "of a ruddered thing", or in any other way; for no name is established.
Καὶ ἀντιστρέφει γε, ἐὰν οἰκείως ἀποδοθῇ· τὸ γὰρ πηδαλιωτὸν πηδαλίῳ πηδαλιωτόν.
And it certainly converts if it is assigned properly; for the ruddered thing is ruddered "by a rudder".
Ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, οἶον ἡ κεφαλὴ οἰκειοτέρως ἂν ἀποδοθείη κεφαλωτοῦ ἢ ζῴου ἀποδιδομένη· οὐ γὰρ ᾗ ζῷον, κεφαλὴν ἔχει· πολλὰ γὰρ τῶν ζῴων κεφαλὴν οὐκ ἔχει.
Likewise also with the others, as the head would be more properly assigned as of "a headed thing" than as of "an animal"; for it is not insofar as it is an animal that it has a head; for many animals do not have a head.