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Aristotle · Categories §6#2

Absence of Contraries and Equality in Quantity

Passage 6 of 19 · Greek

Summary

The author argues that there is no inherent contrary to quantity, that quantity does not admit the more and the less, and that the most peculiar property of quantity is to be called equal and unequal.

§6#2Ἔτι τῷ ποσῷ οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐναντίον.
Moreover, there is no contrary to quantity.
Ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἀφωρισμένων φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐναντίον, οἷον τῷ διπήχει ἢ τριπήχει ἢ τῇ ἐπιφανείᾳ ἢ τῶν τοιούτων τινί· οὐδὲν γάρ ἐστιν αὐτοῖς ἐναντίον, εἰ μὴ ἄρα τὸ πολὺ τῷ ὀλίγῳ φαίη τις εἶναι ἐναντίον ἢ τὸ μέγα τῷ μικρῷ.
In the case of definite quantities, it is obvious that there is no contrary, as for example in "two cubits long" or "three cubits long", or "surface", or any such thing; for there is no contrary to them, unless indeed someone should say that "much" is contrary to "few", or "large" to "small".
Τούτων δὲ οὐδέν ἐστι ποσὸν ἀλλὰ τῶν πρός τι· οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτὸ καθ᾿ αὑτὸ μέγα λέγεται ἢ μικρόν, ἀλλὰ τῷ πρὸς ἕτερον ἀναφέρεσθαι, οἷον ὄρος μὲν μικρὸν λέγεται, κέγχρος δὲ μεγάλη τῷ τὴν μὲν τῶν ὁμογενῶν μείζονα εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἔλαττον τῶν ὁμογενῶν.
But none of these is a quantity, but rather of the relatives; for nothing is called large or small in itself, but by being referred to something else. For example, a mountain is called small, and a millet seed large, because the former is smaller than those of the same kind, while the latter is larger than those of the same kind.
Οὐκοῦν πρὸς ἕτερον ἡ ἀναφορά, ἐπεὶ εἴγε καθ᾿ αὑτὸ μικρὸν ἢ μέγα ἐλέγετο, οὐκ ἄν ποτε τὸ μὲν ὄρος μικρὸν ἐλέγετο, ἡ δὲ κέγχρος μεγάλη.
Therefore, the reference is to something else; since if indeed they were called small or large in themselves, a mountain would never be called small, nor a millet seed large.
Πάλιν ἐν μὲν τῇ κώμῃ φαμὲν πολλοὺς ἀνθρώπους εἶναι, ἐν Ἀθήναις δὲ ὀλίγους πολλαπλασίους αὐτῶν ὄντας, καὶ ἐν μὲν τῇ οἰκίᾳ πολλούς, ἐν δὲ τῷ θεάτρῳ ὀλίγους πολλῷ πλείους ὄντας.
Again, we say that there are many people in the village, but in Athens few, though they are many times more than them; and in a house many, but in the theatre few, though they are much more than them.
Ἔτι τὸ μὲν δίπηχυ καὶ τρίπηχυ καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων ποσὸν σημαίνει, τὸ δὲ μέγα ἢ μικρὸν οὐ σημαίνει ποσὸν ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πρός τι· πρὸς γὰρ ἕτερον θεωρεῖται τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρόν.
Moreover, "two cubits long" and "three cubits long" and each of such things signifies a quantity, but "large" or "small" does not signify a quantity but rather a relative; for the large and the small are viewed in relation to something else.
Ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι ταῦτα τῶν πρός τί ἐστιν.
So that it is clear that these are of the relatives.
Ἔτι ἐάν τε τιθῇ τις ταῦτα ποσὰ εἶναι ἐάν τε μὴ τιθῇ, οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτοῖς ἐναντίον οὐδέν· ὃ γὰρ μή ἐστιν αὐτὸ καθ᾿ αὑτὸ λαβεῖν ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕτερον ἀναφέρεται, πῶς ἂν φαίη τις τούτῳ τι ἐναντίον;
Furthermore, whether one posits that these are quantities or does not posit so, there is no contrary to them; for how could anyone say that there is a contrary to that which cannot be grasped in itself but is referred to something else?
ἔτι δὲ εἰ ἔσται τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρὸν ἐναντία, συμβήσεται τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα τὰ ἐναντία ἐπιδέχεσθαι καὶ αὐτὰ ἑαυτοῖς εἶναι ἐναντία.
And moreover, if "large" and "small" are to be contraries, it will happen that the same thing admits contraries at the same time, and that they are contraries to themselves.
Συμβαίνει γάρ ποτε ἅμα τὸ αὐτὸ μέγα τε καὶ μικρὸν εἶναι· ἔστι γὰρ πρὸς μὲν τοῦτο μικρόν, πρὸς ἕτερον δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο μέγα.
For it sometimes happens that the same thing is both large and small at the same time; for in relation to this thing it is small, but the very same thing is large in relation to another.
Ὥστε τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ μέγα καὶ μικρὸν κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον εἶναι συμβαίνει· ὥστε ἅμα τὰ ἐναντία ἐπιδέχεσθαι.
So that it happens that the same thing is both large and small at the same time; so that it admits contraries at the same time.
Ἀλλ᾿ οὐδὲν δοκεῖ ἅμα τὰ ἐναντία ἐπιδέχεσθαι, οἷον ἐπὶ τῆς οὐσίας· δεκτικὴ μὲν τῶν ἐναντίων δοκεῖ εἶναι, ἀλλ᾿ οὔτι γε ἅμα νοσεῖ καὶ ὑγιαίνει.
But nothing seems to admit contraries at the same time, as for example in the case of substance; it seems to be receptive of contraries, but it is by no means sick and healthy at the same time.
Ἀλλ᾿ οὐδὲ λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν ἐστὶν ἅμα.
Nor is a thing white and black at the same time.
Ἀλλ᾿ οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδέν ἐστιν ὃ ἅμα τὰ ἐναντία ἐπιδέχεται.
Nor indeed is there any other thing that admits contraries at the same time.
Καὶ αὐτὰ δ᾿ ἑαυτοῖς συμβαίνει ἐναντία εἶναι.
And it also happens that they themselves are contraries to themselves.
Εἰ γάρ ἐστι τὸ μέγα τῷ μικρῷ ἐναντίον, τὸ δ᾿ αὐτό ἐστιν ἅμα μέγα καὶ μικρόν, αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ εἴη ἂν ἐναντίον.
For if "large" is contrary to "small", and the same thing is both large and small at the same time, it would be contrary to itself.
Ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστὶν αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ εἶναί τι ἐναντίον.
But it is of the impossible things for anything to be contrary to itself.
Οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ μέγα τῷ μικρῷ ἐναντίον, οὐδὲ τὸ πολὺ τῷ ὀλίγῳ.
Therefore, "large" is not contrary to "small", nor "much" to "few".
Ὥστε εἰ καὶ μὴ τῶν πρός τι ταῦτά τις ἐρεῖ ἀλλὰ τοῦ ποσοῦ, οὐδὲν ἐναντίον ἕξει.
So that even if one says that these are not of the relatives but of quantity, they will have no contrary.
Μάλιστα δὲ ἡ ἐναντιότης τοῦ ποσοῦ περὶ τὸν τόπον δοκεῖ ὑπάρχειν.
Most of all, contrariety of quantity seems to exist in the case of place.
Τὸ γὰρ ἄνω τῷ κάτω ἐναντίον τιθέασι, τὴν πρὸς τὸ μέσον χώραν κάτω λέγοντες διὰ τὸ πλείστην τῷ μέσῳ διάστασιν πρὸς τὰ πέρατα τοῦ κόσμου εἶναι.
For they posit "up" as contrary to "down", calling the region towards the center "down", because the distance from the center to the limits of the world is greatest.
Ἐοίκασι δὲ καὶ τὸν τῶν ἄλλων ἐναντίων ὁρισμὸν ἀπὸ τούτων ἐπιφέρειν· τὰ γὰρ πλεῖστον ἀλλήλων διεστηκότα τῶν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει ἐναντία ὁρίζονται.
And they seem to apply the definition of other contraries from these; for things which are most distant from each other among those in the same genus are defined as contraries.
Οὐ δοκεῖ δὲ τὸ ποσὸν ἐπιδέχεσθαι τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον, οἷον τὸ δίπηχυ· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἕτερον ἑτέρου μᾶλλον δίπηχυ.
Also, quantity does not seem to admit the more and the less, as for example "two cubits long"; for one thing is not more "two cubits long" than another.
Οὐδ᾿ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ, οἷον τὰ τρία τῶν πέντε οὐδὲν μᾶλλον τὰ τρία, οὐδὲ τὰ πέντε τῶν τριῶν.
Nor is it so in the case of number, as for example three is not any more "three" than five, nor five than three.
Οὐδὲ χρόνος ἕτερος ἑτέρου μᾶλλον χρόνος εἶναι λέγεται.
Nor is one time said to be more "time" than another.
Οὐδ᾿ ἐπὶ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅλως οὐδενὸς τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον λέγεται.
Nor indeed is the more and the less spoken of in any of the mentioned things at all.
Ὥστε καὶ τὸ ποσὸν οὐκ ἐπιδέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον.
So that quantity also does not admit the more and the less.
Ἴδιον δὲ μάλιστα τοῦ ποσοῦ τὸ ἴσον τε καὶ ἄνισον λέγεσθαι.
But most peculiar to quantity is to be called equal and unequal.
Ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν εἰρημένων ποσῶν ἴσον τε καὶ ἄνισον λέγεται, οἷον σῶμα καὶ ἴσον καὶ ἄνισον λέγεται, καὶ χρόνος καὶ ἴσος καὶ ἄνισος.
For each of the mentioned quantities is called equal and unequal, as for example a body is called both equal and unequal, and a time both equal and unequal.
Ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ῥηθέντων ἕκαστον ἴσον τε καὶ ἄνισον λέγεται.
Likewise also in the case of each of the other things mentioned, it is called equal and unequal.
Τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ὅσα μή ἐστι ποσά, οὐ πάνυ ἂν δόξαι ἴσα τε καὶ ἄνισα λέγεσθαι, οἷον ἡ διάθεσις οὐ πάνυ ἴση τε καὶ ἄνισος λέγεται, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὁμοία, καὶ τὸ λευκὸν ἴσον τε καὶ ἄνισον οὐ πάνυ, ἀλλ᾿ ὅμοιον.
But of the remaining things which are not quantities, they would not seem at all to be called equal and unequal; for example, a disposition is not at all called equal and unequal, but rather similar, and a white thing is not at all called equal and unequal, but similar.
Ὥστε τοῦ ποσοῦ μάλιστα ἂν εἴη ἴδιον τὸ ἴσον τε καὶ ἄνισον λέγεσθαι.
So that to be called equal and unequal would be most peculiar to quantity.

Notes

  1. 13τῷ τὴν μὲν τῶν ὁμογενῶν μείζονα εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἔλαττον τῶν ὁμογενῶν — This is an accusative-with-infinitive construction introduced by `τῷ` (dative of cause/reason, "by the fact that..."). The feminine singular article `τὴν μὲν` and the neuter singular article `τὸ δὲ` function pronominally, referring back to the feminine noun `κέγχρος` (millet seed) and the neuter noun `ὄρος` (mountain) respectively from the preceding context.
  2. 16συμβήσεται τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα τὰ ἐναντία ἐπιδέχεσθαι καὶ αὐτὰ ἑαυτοῖς εἶναι ἐναντία — Two accusative-with-infinitive clauses, `τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα τὰ ἐναντία ἐπιδέχεσθαι` and `αὐτὰ ἑαυτοῖς εἶναι ἐναντία`, are coordinated by `καί` and serve as the subject of the impersonal verb `συμβήσεται` ("it will happen/result that...").
  3. 21διὰ τὸ πλείστην τῷ μέσῳ διάστασιν πρὸς τὰ πέρατα τοῦ κόσμου εἶναι — An infinitive construction introduced by the preposition `διά` with the articular accusative `τὸ`. The subject of the infinitive `εἶναι` is the accusative noun `διάστασιν` (distance), which is modified by the dative `τῷ μέσῳ` (for/to the center) and the prepositional phrase `πρὸς τὰ πέρατα τοῦ κόσμου` (towards the limits of the world).

Cite this passage

Aristotle, Categories §6#2. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg006.humanitext-grc1:6%232

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