§10#2Στέρησις δὲ καὶ ἕξις λέγεται μὲν περὶ ταὐτόν τι, οἷον ἡ ὄψις καὶ ἡ τυφλότης περὶ ὀφθαλμόν· καθόλου δὲ εἰπεῖν, ἐν ᾧ ἡ ἕξις πέφυκε γίνεσθαι, περὶ τοῦτο λέγεται ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν.
Privation and possession are spoken of concerning some same thing, e.g., sight and blindness concerning the eye; and to speak generally, concerning that in which the possession is naturally inborn to arise, each of them is spoken of.
Ἐστερῆσθαι δὲ τότε λέγομεν ἕκαστον τῶν τῆς ἕξεως δεκτικῶν, ὅταν ἐν ᾧ πέφυκεν ὑπάρχειν καὶ ὅτε πέφυκεν ἔχειν μηδαμῶς ὑπάρχῃ.
And we say that each of the things receptive of the possession is deprived at that time, when it in no way belongs to it in what it is naturally inborn to belong and when it is naturally inborn to have it.
Νωδόν τε γὰρ λέγομεν οὐ τὸ μὴ ἔχον ὀδόντας, καὶ τυφλὸν οὐ τὸ μὴ ἔχον ὄψιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχον ὅτε πέφυκεν ἔχειν· τινὰ γὰρ ἐκ γενετῆς οὔτε ὄψιν ἔχει οὔτε ὀδόντας, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ λέγεται οὔτε νωδὰ οὔτε τυφλά.
For we call toothless not that which does not have teeth, and blind not that which does not have sight, but that which does not have them when it is naturally inborn to have them; for some things from birth have neither sight nor teeth, but they are called neither toothless nor blind.
Τὸ δὲ ἐστερῆσθαι καὶ τὸ τὴν ἕξιν ἔχειν οὐκ ἔστι στέρησις καὶ ἕξις.
But being deprived and having the possession are not privation and possession.
Ἕξις μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἡ ὄψις, στέρησις δὲ ἡ τυφλότης· τὸ δὲ ἔχειν τὴν ὄψιν οὐκ ἔστιν ὄψις, οὐδὲ τὸ τυφλὸν εἶναι τυφλότης.
For sight is a possession, and blindness is a privation; but having sight is not sight, nor is being blind blindness.
Στέρησις γάρ τίς ἡ τυφλότης ἐστὶν, τὸ δὲ τυφλὸν εἶναι ἐστερῆσθαι, οὐ στέρησίς ἐστιν.
For blindness is a certain privation, but being blind is to be deprived, not a privation.
Ἔτι εἰ ἦν ἡ τυφλότης ταὐτὸν τῷ τυφλὸν εἶναι, κατηγορεῖτο ἂν ἀμφότερα κατὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ· ἀλλὰ τυφλὸς μὲν λέγεται ὁ ἄνθρωπος, τυφλότης δὲ οὐδαμῶς λέγεται ὁ ἄνθρωπος.
Furthermore, if blindness were the same as being blind, both would be predicated of the same thing; but a man is called blind, whereas a man is by no means called blindness.
Ἀντικεῖσθαι δὲ καὶ ταῦτα δοκεῖ, τὸ ἐστερῆσθαι καὶ τὸ τὴν ἕξιν ἔχειν, ὡς στέρησις καὶ ἕξις· ὁ γὰρ τρόπος τῆς ἀντιθέσεως ὁ αὐτός· ὡς γὰρ ἡ τυφλότης τῇ ὄψει ἀντίκειται, οὕτω καὶ τὸ τυφλὸν εἶναι τῷ ὄψιν ἔχειν ἀντίκειται.
But these also seem to be opposed, namely being deprived and having the possession, as privation and possession; for the way of opposition is the same; for just as blindness is opposed to sight, so also being blind is opposed to having sight.
Οὐκ ἔστι δὲ οὐδὲ τὸ ὑπὸ τὴν ἀπόφασιν καὶ κατάφασιν ἀπόφασις καὶ κατάφασις· ἡ μὲν γὰρ κατάφασις λόγος ἐστὶ καταφατικὸς καὶ ἡ ἀπόφασις λόγος ἀποφατικός, τῶν δὲ ὑπὸ τὴν κατάφασιν καὶ ἀπόφασιν οὐδέν ἐστι λόγος.
And neither is that which falls under negation and affirmation negation and affirmation; for the affirmation is an affirmative statement and the negation is a negative statement, but of the things falling under affirmation and negation, none is a statement.
Λέγεται δὲ καὶ ταῦτα ἀντικεῖσθαι ἀλλήλοις ὡς κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις· καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτων ὁ τρόπος τῆς ἀντιθέσεως ὁ αὐτός.
But these also are said to be opposed to each other as affirmation and negation; for in these too the way of opposition is the same.
Ὡς γάρ ποτε ἡ κατάφασις πρὸς τὴν ἀπόφασιν ἀντίκειται, οἷον τὸ κάθηται τῷ οὐ κάθηται, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ὑφ᾿ ἑκάτερον πρᾶγμα ἀντίκειται, τὸ καθῆσθαι τῷ μὴ καθῆσθαι.
For just as the affirmation is at some time opposed to the negation, e.g., "he sits" to "he does not sit", so also the fact falling under each is opposed, namely sitting to not sitting.
Ὅτι δὲ ἡ στέρησις καὶ ἡ ἕξις οὐκ ἀντίκειται ὡς τὰ πρός τι, φανερόν· οὐ γὰρ λέγεται αὐτὸ ὅπερ ἐστὶ τοῦ ἀντικειμένου.
And that privation and possession are not opposed as relatives is clear; for each is not said to be what it is of its opposite.
Ἡ γὰρ ὄψις οὐκ ἔστι τυφλότητος ὄψις, οὐδ᾿ ἄλλως οὐδαμῶς πρὸς αὐτὸ λέγεται.
For sight is not sight of blindness, nor is it spoken of in any other way at all in relation to it.
Ὡσαύτως δὲ οὐδὲ ἡ τυφλότης λέγοιτ᾿ ἂν τυφλότης ὄψεως, ἀλλὰ στέρησις μὲν ὄψεως ἡ τυφλότης λέγεται, τυφλότης δὲ ὄψεως οὐ λέγεται.
Likewise neither would blindness be called blindness of sight, but blindness is indeed said to be privation of sight, though it is not called blindness of sight.
Ἔτι τὰ πρός τι πάντα πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα λέγεται, ὥστε καὶ ἡ τυφλότης εἴπερ ἦν τῶν πρός τι, ἀντέστρεφεν ἂν κἀκεῖνο πρὸς ὃ λέγεται.
Furthermore, all relatives are spoken of in relation to things that convert, so that if blindness were also one of the relatives, that too in relation to which it is spoken of would convert.
Ἀλλ᾿ οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει· οὐ γὰρ λέγεται ἡ ὄψις τυφλότητος ὄψις.
But it does not convert; for sight is not called sight of blindness.
Ὅτι δὲ οὐδ᾿ ὡς τὰ ἐναντία ἀντίκειται τὰ κατὰ στέρησιν καὶ ἕξιν λεγόμενα, ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον.
And that the things spoken of in terms of privation and possession are not opposed as contraries either, is clear from the following.
Τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἐναντίων, ὧν μηδέν ἐστιν ἀνὰ μέσον, ἀναγκαῖον, ἐν ᾧ πέφυκε γίνεσθαι ἢ ὧν κατηγορεῖται, θάτερον αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν ἀεί· τούτων γὰρ οὐδὲν ἦν ἀνὰ μέσον, ὧν θάτερον ἦν ἀναγκαῖον τῷ δεκτικῷ ὑπάρχειν, οἱον ἑπὶ νόσου καὶ ὑγιείας καὶ περιττοῦ καὶ ἀρτίου.
For among contraries of which there is nothing intermediate, it is necessary, in that in which they naturally occur or of which they are predicated, for one or the other of them always to belong; for there was nothing intermediate of those for which it was necessary for one or the other to belong to the receptive subject, as in the case of sickness and health, and odd and even.
Ὧν δὲ ἔστι τι ἀνὰ μέσον, οὐδέποτε ἀνάγκη παντὶ ὑπάρχειν θάτερον· οὔτε γὰρ λευκὸν ἢ μέλαν ἀνάγκη πᾶν εἶναι τὸ δεκτικόν, οὔτε θερμὸν οὔτε ψυχρόν· τούτων γὰρ ἀνὰ μέσον τι οὐδὲν κωλύει ὑπάρχειν.
But of those between which there is something intermediate, it is never necessary for one of the two to belong to everything; for it is not necessary for every receptive subject to be either white or black, nor either hot or cold; for nothing prevents some intermediate of these from belonging.
Ἔτι δὲ καὶ τούτων ἦν τι ἀνὰ μέσον, ὧν μὴ ἀναγκαῖον θάτερον ὑπάρχειν ἦν τῷ δεκτικῷ, εἰ μὴ οἷς φύσει τὸ ἓν ὑπάρχει, οἶον τῷ πυρὶ τὸ θερμῷ εἶναι καὶ τῇ χιόνι τὸ λευκῇ.
And furthermore there was some intermediate of those for which it was not necessary for one or the other to belong to the receptive subject, except for those to which one belongs by nature, e.g., to fire being hot and to snow being white.
Ἐπὶ δὲ τούτων ἀφωρισμένως ἀναγκαῖον θάτερον ὑπάρχειν, καὶ οὐχ ὁπότερον ἔτυχεν· οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται τὸ πῦρ ψυχρὸν εἶναι οὐδὲ τὴν χιόνα μέλαιναν.
And in the case of these, it is necessary for one of the two to belong determinately, and not whichever happens; for it is not possible for fire to be cold, nor for snow to be black.
Ὥστε παντὶ μὲν οὐκ ἀνάγκη τῷ δεκτικῷ θάτερον αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλὰ μόνον οἷς φύσει τὸ ἓν ὑπάρχει, καὶ τούτοις ἀφωρισμένως τὸ ἓν καὶ οὐχ ὁπότερον ἔτυχεν.
So that it is not necessary for one of the two to belong to every receptive subject, but only to those to which the one belongs by nature, and to these, the one belongs determinately and not whichever happens.
Ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς στερήσεως καὶ τῆς ἕξεως οὐδέτερον τῶν εἰρημένων ἀληθές· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀεὶ τῷ δεκτικῷ ἀναγκαῖον θάτερον αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν· τὸ γὰρ μήπω πεφυκὸς ὄψιν ἔχειν οὔτε τυφλὸν οὔτε ὄψιν ἔχον λέγεται, ὥστε οὐκ ἂν εἴη ταῦτα τῶν τοιούτων ἐναντίων ὧν οὐδέν ἐστιν ἀνὰ μέσον.
But in the case of privation and possession, neither of the things mentioned is true; for it is indeed not always necessary for one of them to belong to the receptive subject; for that which is not yet naturally inborn to have sight is called neither blind nor having sight, so that these would not belong to those contraries of which there is nothing intermediate.
Ἀλλ᾿ οὐδ᾿ ὧν τι ἔστιν ἀνὰ μέσον· ἀναγκαῖον γάρ ποτε παντὶ τῷ δεκτικῷ θάτερον αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν· ὅταν γὰρ ἤδη πεφυκὸς ᾖ ὄψιν ἔχειν, τότε ἢ τυφλὸν ἢ ὄψιν ἔχον ῥηθήσεται, καὶ τούτων οὐκ ἀφωρισμένως θάτερον, ἀλλ᾿ ὁπότερον ἔτυχεν· οὐ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον ἢ τυφλὸν ἢ ἔχον ὄψιν εἶναι, ἀλλ᾿ ὁπότερον ἔτυχεν.
But neither are they of those between which there is something intermediate; for it is necessary at some time for one of them to belong to every receptive subject; for when it is already naturally inborn to have sight, then it will be spoken of as either blind or having sight, and of these, not one determinately, but whichever happens; for it is not necessary to be either blind or having sight, but whichever happens.
Ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἐναντίων, ὧν ἔστι τι ἀνὰ μέσον, οὐδέποτε ἀναγκαῖον ἦν παντὶ θάτερον ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλὰ τισί, καὶ τούτοις ἀφωρισμένως τὸ ἕν.
But in the case of contraries of which there is something intermediate, it was never necessary for one of the two to belong to everything, but only to some things, and to these, the one determinately.
Ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι κατ᾿ οὐδέτερον τῶν τρόπων ὡς τὰ ἐναντία ἀντίκειται τὰ κατὰ στέρησιν καὶ ἕξιν ἀντικείμενα.
So it is clear that in neither of the ways are the things opposed in terms of privation and possession opposed as contraries.