§2.55 Ἐπεὶ δʼ ἔστι διχῶς ἐπὶ τοῦ κύκλου κινηθῆναι, οἷον ἀπὸ τοῦ Α τὴν μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ Β τὴν δʼ ἐπὶ τὸ Γ, ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ εἰσὶν ἐναντίαι αὗται, πρότερον εἴρηται.
Since it is possible to move in two ways on a circle, for example from A, one [movement] toward B and the other toward C, that these are not contrary has been said before.
ἀλλʼ εἰ μηδὲν ὡς ἔτυχε μηδʼ ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου ἐνδέχεται ἐν τοῖς ἀιδίοις εἶναι, ὁ δʼ οὐρανὸς ἀΐδιος καὶ ἡ κύκλῳ φορά, διὰ τίνα ποτʼ αἰτίαν ἐπὶ θάτερα φέρεται, ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἐπὶ θάτερα;
But if nothing by chance or of spontaneous origin can exist in eternal things, and the heaven and its circular motion are eternal, for what cause is it carried in one direction and not in the other?
ἀνάγκη γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο ἢ ἀρχὴν εἶναι ἢ εἶναι αὐτοῦ ἀρχήν.
For this also must either be a principle or have a principle of itself.
ἴσως μὲν οὖν τὸ περὶ ἐνίων ἀποφαίνεσθαί τι πειρᾶσθαι καὶ τὸ περὶ πάντων καὶ τὸ παριέναι μηθὲν τάχʼ ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι σημεῖον ἢ πολλῆς εὐηθείας ἢ πολλῆς προθυμίας.
Perhaps, then, attempting to declare something about certain things, and indeed about everything, and passing over nothing, might seem to be a sign of either great folly or great zeal.
οὐ μὴν δίκαιόν γε πᾶσιν ὁμοίως ἐπιτιμᾶν, ἀλλʼ ὁρᾶν δεῖ τὴν αἰτίαν τοῦ λέγειν τίς ἐστιν, ἔτι δὲ πῶς ἔχον τῷ πιστεύειν, πότερον ἀνθρωπίνως ἢ καρτερικώτερον.
Yet it is not right to censure everyone alike, but one must look to what the cause of speaking is, and furthermore, how they stand in respect of belief, whether in a human way or more steadfastly.
ταῖς μὲν οὖν ἀκριβεστέραις ἀνάγκαις ὅταν 288a τις ἐπιτύχῃ, τότε χάριν ἔχειν δεῖ τοῖς εὐρίσκουσι, νῦν δὲ τὸ φαινόμενον ῥητέον.
Therefore, when one hits upon more precise necessities, then one must be grateful to those who find them, but now we must state what appears [to be the case].
εἰ γὰρ ἡ φύσις ἀεὶ ποιεῖ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων τὸ βέλτιστον, ἔστι δὲ καθάπερ τῶν ἐπὶ τῆς εὐθείας φορρῶν ἡ πρὸς τὸν ἄνω τόπον τιμιωτέρα (θειότερος γὰρ ὁ ἄνω τόπος τοῦ κάτω), τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ἡ εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν τῆς εἰς τοὔπισθεν, ἔχει δὴ, εἴπερ καὶ τὸ δεξιὸν καὶ τὸ ἀριστερόν, καθάπερ ἐλέχθη πρότερον (καὶ μαρτυρεῖ δʼ ἡ ῥηθεῖσα ἀπορία, ὅτι ἔχει), τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον· αὕτη γὰρ ἡ αἰτία λύει τὴν ἀπορίαν.
For if nature always does the best of possible things, and just as among movements on a straight line, that toward the upper place is more honorable (for the upper place is more divine than the lower), in the same way also that toward the front is [more honorable] than that toward the back, and indeed it has, if indeed it has also right and left, as was said before (and the mentioned difficulty witnesses that it has), front and back; for this cause resolves the difficulty.
εἰ γὰρ ἔχει ὡς ἐνδέχεται βέλτιστα, αὕτη ἂν εἴη αἰτία καὶ τοῦ εἰρημένου· βέλτιστον γὰρ κινεῖσθαι ἁπλῆν τε κίνησιν καὶ ἄπαυστον, καὶ ταύτην ἐπὶ τὸ τιμιώτερον.
For if it is in the best possible state, this would be the cause also of what has been said; for it is best to move with a motion that is both simple and unceasing, and this toward the more honorable [direction].