§3.9Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ κατὰ δύο ὥρισται δυνάμεις ἡ τῶν ζῴων, τῷ τε κριτικῷ, ὃ διανοίας ἔργον ἐστὶ καὶ αἰσθήσεως, καὶ ἔτι τῷ κινεῖν τὴν κατὰ τόπον κίνησιν, περὶ μὲν αἰσθήσεως καὶ νοῦ διωρίσθω τοσαῦτα, περὶ δὲ τοῦ κινοῦντος, τί ποτέ ἐστι τῆς φυχῆς, σκεπτέον, πότερον ἕν τι μόριον αὐτῆς χωριστὸν ἂν ἢ μεγέθει ἢ λόγῳ, ἢ πᾶσα ἡ ψυχή, κἂν εἰ μόριόν τι, πότερον ἴδιόν τι παρὰ τὰ εἰωθότα λέγεσθαι καὶ τὰ εἰρημένα, ἢ τούτων ἕν τι.
Since the soul of animals is defined by two faculties, namely by the judging faculty, which is the work of thought and sensation, and furthermore by the faculty of producing local motion, let so much be defined concerning sensation and intellect; but concerning that which produces motion, what on earth it is of the soul, we must investigate, whether it is some single part of it, separable either in magnitude or in definition, or the whole soul, and if it is some part, whether it is some distinct part besides those which are usually mentioned and those already stated, or some one of these.
ἔχει δὲ ἀπορίαν εὐθὺς πῶς τε δεῖ μόρια λέγειν τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ πόσα.
But difficulty arises immediately as to how one should speak of the parts of the soul and how many there are.
τρόπον γάρ τινα ἄπειρα φαίνεται, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἅ τινες λέγουσι διορίζοντες, λογιστικὸν καὶ θυμικὸν καὶ ἐπιθυμητικόν, οἱ δὲ τὸ λόγον ἔχον καὶ τὸ ἄλογον· κατὰ γὰρ τὰς διαφορὰς δἰ ἃς ταῦτα χωρίζουσι, καὶ ἄλλα φανεῖται μόρια μείζω διάστασιν ἔχοντα τούτων, περὶ ὧν καὶ νῦν εἴρηται, τό τε θρεπτικόν, ὃ καὶ τοῖς φυτοῖς ὑπάρχει καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ζῴοις, καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικόν, ὃ οὔτε ὡς ἄλογον οὔτε ὡς λόγον ἔχον θείη ἄν·
For in a way they seem to be infinite, and not only those which some mention in distinguishing them—namely, the calculative, the spirited, and the appetitive, or others, the rational and the irrational; for according to the differences by which they separate these, other parts will appear which have a greater distance than these that have just been mentioned: the nutritive, which belongs also to plants and to all animals, and the sensitive, which one could not easily classify either as irrational or as rational.
τις ῥᾳδίως. ἔτι δὲ τὸ φανταστικόν, ὃ τῷ μὲν εἶναι πάντων ἕτερον, τίνι δὲ τούτων ταὐτὸν ἢ ἕτερον ἔχει πολλὴν ἀπορίαν, εἴ τις θήσει κεχωρισμένα μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς.
Furthermore, there is the imaginative faculty, which is different in its essence from all of them, but with which of these it is identical or different presents much difficulty, if one assumes separate parts of the soul.
πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τό ὀρεκτικόν, ὃ καὶ λόγῳ καὶ δυνάμει ἕτερον ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι πάντων.
In addition to these, there is the appetitive faculty, which would seem to be different from all of them both in definition and in power.
καὶ ἄτοπον δὴ τὸ τοῦτο διασπᾶν· ἔν τε τῷ λογιστικῷ γὰρ ἡ βούλησις γίνεται, καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀλόγῳ ἡ ἐπιθυμία καὶ ὁ θυμός· εἰ δὲ τρία ἡ ψυχή, ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἔσται ὄρεξις.
And indeed it is absurd to tear this apart; for in the calculative part wish arises, and in the irrational part desire and spiritedness; and if the soul is three parts, there will be appetite in each.
καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ οὗ νῦν ὁ λόγος ἐνέστηκε, τί τό κινοῦν κατὰ τόπον τὸ ζῷόν ἐστιν;
And indeed, concerning that which our present discussion is about, what is it that produces local motion in the animal?
τὴν μὲν γὰρ κατʼ αὔξησιν καὶ φθίσιν κίνησιν, ἅπασιν ὑπάρχουσαν, τὸ πᾶσιν ὑπάρχον δόξειεν ἂν κινεῖν, τὰ γεννητικὸν καὶ θρεπτικόν· περὶ δὲ ἀναπνοῆς καὶ ἐκπνοῆς, καὶ ὕπνου καὶ ἐγρηγόρσεως, ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον· ἔχει γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα πολλὴν ἀπορίαν.
For as for the motion of growth and decay, which belongs to all, that which belongs to all would seem to produce it, namely the generative and nutritive faculty; but concerning respiration and expiration, and sleep and waking, we must investigate later, for these also present much difficulty.
ἀλλὰ περὶ τῆς κατὰ τόπον κινήσεως, τί τὸ κινοῦν τὸ ζῷον τὴν πορευτικὴν κίνησιν, σκεπτέον.
But concerning local motion, what is it that moves the animal with respect to locomotive motion, we must investigate.
ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐχ ἡ θρεπτικὴ δύναμις, δῆλον· ἀεί τε γὰρ ἕνεκά του ἡ κίνησις αὕτη, καὶ μετὰ φαντασίας καὶ ὀρέξεώς ἐστιν· οὐθὲν γὰρ μὴ ὀρεγόμενον ἢ φεῦγον κινείται ἀλλʼ ἢ βίᾳ.
Therefore, that it is not the nutritive faculty is clear; for this motion is always for the sake of something, and is accompanied by imagination and appetite; for nothing moves unless it is desiring or avoiding something, except by force.
ἔτι κἂν τὰ φυτά κινητικὰ ἦν, κἂν εἶχέ τι μόριον ὀργανικὸν πρός τὴν κίνησιν ταύτην.
Furthermore, [if it were the nutritive faculty,] plants also would be capable of motion, and would have some organic part for this motion.
ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδὲ τὸ αἰσθητικόν· πολλὰ γὰρ ἔστι τῶν ζῴων ἃ αἴσθησιν μὲν ἔχει, μόνιμα δʼ ἐστὶ καὶ ἀκίνητα διὰ τέλους.
Similarly, neither is it the sensitive faculty; for there are many animals which have sensation, yet are stationary and motionless throughout their lives.
εἰ οὖν ἡ φύσις μήτε ποιεῖ μάτην μηθὲν μήτε ἀπολείπει τι τῶν ἀναγκαίων, πλὴν ἐν τοῖς πηρώμασι καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀτελέσιν, τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα τῶν ζῴων τέλεια καὶ οὐ πηρώματά ἐστιν (σημεῖον δʼ ὅτι ἐστὶ γεννητικά καὶ ἀκμὴν ἔχει καὶ φθίσιν)—ὥστ᾿ εἶγεν ἂν καὶ τὰ ὀργανικὰ μέρη τῆς πορείας.
If, then, nature neither does anything in vain nor omits any of the necessary things, except in mutilated and incomplete things, and such animals are complete and not mutilated (the proof being that they are generative and have a prime and decay)—it would follow that they would also have the organic parts for locomotion.
ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τὸ λογιστικὸν καὶ ὁ καλούμενος νοῦς ἐστιν ὁ κινῶν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ θεωρητικὸς οὐθὲν θεωρεῖ πρακτόν, οὐδὲ λέγει περὶ φευκτοῦ καὶ διωκτοῦ οὐθέν, ἀεὶ δὲ ἡ κίνησις ἢ φεύγοντος ἢ διώκοντός τί ἐστιν.
But surely neither is the calculative faculty or the so-called intellect that which moves; for the contemplative intellect contemplates nothing practicable, nor does it say anything about what is to be avoided or pursued, whereas motion is always that of one who is avoiding or pursuing something.
ἀλλʼ οὐδʼ ὅταν θεωρῇ τι τοιοῦτον, ἤδη κελεύει φεύγειν ἢ διώκειν, οἶον πολλάκις διανοείται φοβερόν τι ἢ ἡδύ, οὐ κελεύει δὲ φοβεῖσθαι, ἡ δὲ καρδία κινεῖται, ἂν δʼ ἡδύ, ἕτερόν τι μόριον.
But not even when it contemplates some such thing does it immediately command to avoid or pursue; for example, it often thinks of something fearful or pleasant, yet it does not command to be afraid, though the heart is moved, and if it is something pleasant, some other part is moved.
ἔτι καὶ ἐπιτάττοντος τοῦ νοῦ καὶ λεγούσης τῆς διανοίας φεύγειν τι ἢ διώκειν οὐ κινεῖται, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν πράττει, οἷον ὁ ἀκρατής.
Furthermore, even when the intellect commands and thought says to avoid or pursue something, the animal does not move, but acts according to desire, as in the case of the incontinent person.
καὶ ὅλως δὲ ὁρῶμεν ὅτι ὁ ἔχων τὴν ἰατρικὴν οὐκ ἰᾶται, ὡς ἑτέρου τινὸς κυρίου ὄντος τοῦ ποιεῖν κατά τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ἀλλʼ οὐ τῆς ἐπιστήμης.
And in general, we see that one who possesses the art of medicine does not cure, implying that some other thing is master of acting according to knowledge, and not knowledge itself.
ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδʼ ἡ ὄρεξις ταύτης κυρία τῆς κινήσεως· οἱ γὰρ ἐγκρατεῖς ὀρεγόμενοι καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦντες οὐ πράττουσιν ὧν ἔχουσι τὴν ὄρεξιν, ἀλλʼ ἀκολουθοῦσι τῷ νῷ.
But surely neither is appetite master of this motion; for continent people, though desiring and appetiting, do not do those things for which they have the appetite, but follow the intellect.