§3.8Νῦν δέ, περὶ ψυχῆς τὰ λεχθέντα συγκεφαλαιώσαντες, εἴπωμεν πάλιν ὅτι ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ ὄντα πώς ἐστι πάντα· ἢ γὰρ αἰσθητὰ τὰ ὄντα ἢ νοητά, ἔστι δʼ ἡ ἐπιστήμη μὲν τὰ ἐπιστητά πως, ἡ δʼ αἴσθησις τὰ αἰσθητά·
But now, having summarized what has been said about the soul, let us state again that the soul is in a way all existing things; for existing things are either sensible or intelligible, and on the one hand knowledge is in a way the knowable things, and on the other hand sensation is the sensible things.
πῶς δὲ τοῦτο, δεῖ ζητεῖν.
But how this is so, we must investigate.
τέμνεται οὖν ἡ ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις εἰς τὰ πράγματα, ἡ μὲν δυνάμει εἰς τὰ δυνάμει, ἡ δʼ ἐντελεχείᾳ εἰς τὰ ἐντελεχείᾳ.
Therefore, knowledge and sensation are divided into their objects, the potential into the potential, and the actual into the actual.
τῆς δὲ ψυχῇς τὸ αἰσθητικὸν καὶ τὸ ἐπιστημονικὸν δυνάμει ταῦτά ἐστι, τό μὲν ἐπιστητὸν τὸ δὲ αἰσθητόν.
And the sensitive and cognitive parts of the soul are potentially these things, the one the knowable, the other the sensible.
ἀνάγκη δʼ ἢ αὐτὰ ἢ τὰ εἴδη εἶναι.
And it must be that they are either the things themselves or their forms.
αὐτὰ μὲν δὴ οὔ· οὐ γὰρ ὁ λίθος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶδος· ὥστε ἡ ψυχὴ ὥσπερ ἡ χείρ ἐστιν· καὶ γὰρ ἡ χείρ ὄργανόν ἐστιν ὀργάνων, καὶ ὁ νοῦς εἶδος εἰδῶν καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις εἶδος αἰσθητῶν.
Certainly not the things themselves; for the stone is not in the soul, but its form; so that the soul is like the hand; for the hand is an instrument of instruments, and the intellect is a form of forms, and sensation is a form of sensible things.
ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐδὲ πρᾶγμα οὐθὲν ἔστι παρὰ τὰ μεγέθη, ὡς δοκεῖ, τὰ αἰσθητὰ κεχωρισμένον, ἐν τοῖς εἴδεσι τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς τὰ νοητά ἐστι, τά τε ἐν ἀφαιρέσει λεγόμενα καὶ ὅσα τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἕξεις καὶ πάθη.
And since there is no thing apart from sensible magnitudes, as it seems, existing separate, the intelligible things are in the sensible forms, both those called in abstraction and all those which are states and affections of sensible things.
καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὔτε μὴ αἰσθανόμενος μηθὲν οὐθὲν ἂν μάθοι οὐδὲ ξυνείη, ὅταν τε θεωρῇ, ἀνάγκη ἅμα φάντασμά τι θεωρεῖν· τὰ γὰρ φαντάσματα ὥσπερ αἰσθήματά ἐστι, πλὴν ἄνευ ὕλης.
And because of this, neither could one who senses nothing learn or understand anything, and when one contemplates, it is necessary to contemplate some image at the same time; for images are like sensations, except without matter.
ἔστι δʼ ἡ φαντασία ἕτερον φάσεως καὶ ἀποφάσεως· συμπλοκὴ γὰρ νοημάτων ἐστὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος.
But imagination is different from affirmation and negation; for truth or falsehood is a combination of thoughts.
τὰ δὲ πρῶτα νοήματα τί διοίσει τοῦ μὴ φαντάσματα εἶναι;
But how will primary thoughts differ from being images?
ἢ οὐδὲ τἄλλα φαντάσματα, ἄλλʼ οὐκ ἄνευ φαντασμάτων.
Or are neither the others indeed images, yet not without images?