§3.10Φαίνεται δέ γε δύο ταῦτα κινοῦντα, ἢ ὄρεξις ἢ νοῦς, εἴ τις τὴν φαντασίαν τιθείη ὡς νόησίν τινα·
At any rate, these two things appear to produce motion, either appetite or intellect, if one were to set down imagination as a kind of thinking.
πολλοὶ γὰρ παρὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἀκολουθοῦσι ταῖς φαντασίαις, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις οὐ νόησις οὐδὲ λογισμὸς ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ φαντασία.
For many people follow imaginations contrary to knowledge, and in the other animals there is no thinking or calculation, but only imagination.
ἄμφω ἄρα ταῦτα κινητικὰ κατὰ τόπον, νοῦς καὶ ὄρεξις, νοῦς δὲ ὁ ἕνεκά του λογιζόμενος καὶ ὁ πρακτικός· διαφέρει δὲ τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ τῷ τέλει.
Both of these, therefore, are capable of producing local motion, intellect and appetite—intellect, that is, which calculates for the sake of something and is practical; and it differs from the contemplative intellect in its end.
καὶ ἡ ὄρεξις δʼ ἕνεκά του πᾶσα· οὗ γὰρ ἡ ὄρεξις, αὕτη ἀρχὴ τοῦ πρακτικοῦ νοῦ· τὸ δʼ ἔσχατον ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως.
And all appetite is also for the sake of something; for that of which there is appetite is the starting-point of the practical intellect, and the last term of the thought is the starting-point of action.
ὥστε εὐλόγως δύο ταῦτα φαίνεται τὰ κινοῦντα, ὄρεξις καὶ διάνοια πρακτική· τό ὀρεκτὸν γὰρ κινεῖ, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἡ διάνοια κινεῖ, ὅτι ἀρχὴ αὐτῆς ἐστι τὸ ὀρεκτόν.
So it is with good reason that these two appear to be the movers, appetite and practical thought; for the object of appetite moves, and on this account thought moves, because its starting-point is the object of appetite.
καὶ ἡ φαντασία δὲ ὅταν κινῇ, οὐ κινεῖ ἄνευ ὀρέξεως.
And when imagination moves, it does not move without appetite.
ἓν δή τι τὸ κινοῦν, τὸ ὀρεκτικόν.
Thus there is some single mover, the appetitive faculty.
εἰ γὰρ δύο, νοῦς καὶ ὄρεξις, ἐκίνουν, κατὰ κοινὸν ἄν· τι ἐκίνουν εἶδος· νῦν δὲ ὁ μὲν νοῦς οὐ φαίνεται κινῶν ἄνευ ὀρέξεως (ἡ γὰρ βούλησις ὄρεξις, ὅταν δὲ κατὰ τὸν λογισμὸν κινῆται, καὶ κατὰ βούλησιν κινεῖται), ἡ δʼ ὄρεξις κινεῖ καὶ παρὰ τὸν λογισμόν· ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία ὄρεξίς τίς ἐστιν.
For if two things, intellect and appetite, moved, they would move in virtue of some common form; but as it is, intellect is not seen to move without appetite (for wish is an appetite, and when one is moved according to calculation, one is also moved according to wish), while appetite moves even contrary to calculation; for desire is a kind of appetite.
νοῦς μὲν οὖν πᾶς ὀρθός ἐστιν· ὄρεξις δὲ καὶ φαντασία καὶ ὀρθὴ καὶ οὐκ ὀρθή.
Now, while intellect is always right, appetite and imagination are both right and not right.
διὸ ἀεὶ κινεῖ μὲν τὸ ὀρεκτόν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτʼ ἐστὶν ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν· οὐ πᾶν δέ, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν.
Therefore, that which moves is always the object of appetite, but this is either the good or the apparent good; not every good, however, but the practical good.
πρακτὸν δʼ ἐστὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν.
And the practical good is that which is capable of being otherwise.
ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ τοιαύτη δύναμις κινεῖ τῆς ψυχῆς, ἡ καλουμένη ὄρεξις, φανερόν.
That, therefore, it is this kind of faculty of the soul, namely that which is called appetite, which moves, is clear.
τοῖς δὲ διαιροῦσι τὰ μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς, ἐὰν κατὰ τὰς δυνάμεις διαιρῶσι καὶ χωρίζωσι, πάμπολλα γίνεται, θρεπτικόν, αἰσθητικόν, νοητικόν, βουλευτικόν, ἔτι ὀρεκτικόν· ταῦτα γὰρ πλέον διαφέρει ἀλλήλων ἢ ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ θυμικόν.
And for those who divide the parts of the soul, if they divide and separate them according to faculties, very many parts result: nutritive, sensitive, intellective, deliberative, and further, appetitive; for these differ more from one another than the appetitive and the spirited.
ἐπεὶ δʼ ὀρέξεις γίνονται ἐναντίαι ἀλλήλαις, τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει ὅταν ὁ λόγος καὶ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι ἐναντίαι ὦσι, γίνεται δʼ ἐν τοῖς χρόνου αἴσθησιν ἔχουσιν (ὁ μὲν γὰρ νοῦς διὰ τὸ μέλλον ἀνθέλκειν κελεύει, ἡ δʼ ἐπιθυμία διὰ τὸ ἤδη· φαίνεται γὰρ τὸ ἤδη ἡδὺ καὶ ἁπλῶς ἡδὺ καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἁπλῶς, διὰ τὸ μὴ ὁρᾶν τὸ μέλλον), εἴδει μὲν ἓν ἂν εἴη τὸ κινοῦν, τὸ ὀρεκτικόν, ἀρεκτικόν—πρῶτον δὲ πάντων τὸ ὀρεκτόν· τοῦτο γὰρ κινεῖ οὐ κινούμενον, τῷ νοηθῆναι ἢ φαντασθῆναι—ἀριθμῷ δὲ πλείω τὰ κινοῦντα.
And since appetites arise that are contrary to one another, and this happens when reason and desires are contrary, and this occurs in those who have a perception of time (for the intellect commands resistance on account of the future, while desire commands on account of the immediate present; for the immediate pleasure appears both as absolute pleasure and as absolute good, because of not seeing the future), in form, indeed, that which moves would be one, namely the appetitive faculty as appetitive—but first of all is the object of appetite, for this moves without being moved, by being thought of or imagined—though in number the movers are more than one.
ἐπεὶ δʼ ἔστι τρία, ἓν μὲν τὸ κινοῦν, δεύτερον δʼ ᾧ κινεῖ, ἔτι τρίτον τὸ κινούμενον, τὸ δὲ κινοῦν διττόν, τὸ μὲν ἀκίνητον, τὸ δὲ κινοῦν καὶ κινούμενον, ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀκίνητον τὸ πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ κινοῦν καὶ κινούμενον τὸ ὀρεκτικόν (κινεῖται γὰρ τὸ κινούμενον ᾗ ὀρέγεται, καὶ ἡ ὄρεξις κίνησίς τίς ἐστιν, ἡ ἐνεργείᾳ), τὸ δὲ κινούμενον τὸ ζῷον· ᾧ δὲ κινεῖ ὀργάνῳ ἡ ὄρεξις, ἤδη τοῦτο σωματικόν ἐστιν—διὸ ἐν τοῖς κοινοῖς σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς ἔργοις θεωρητέον περὶ αὐτοῦ.
And since there are three things: first, that which moves; second, that with which it moves; and third, that which is moved; and that which moves is twofold, the one unmoved, and the other both moving and moved; and the unmoved is the practical good, while that which moves and is moved is the appetitive faculty (for that which is moved is moved in so far as it desires, and appetite is a kind of motion, namely motion in actuality), and that which is moved is the animal; and the instrument with which appetite moves is already something bodily—wherefore we must contemplate concerning it among the functions common to body and soul.
νῦν δὲ ὡς ἐν κεφαλαίῳ εἰπεῖν, τό κινοῦν ὀργανικῶς ὅπου ἀρχὴ ακαὶ τελευτὴ τὸ αὐτό—οἷον ὁ γιγγλυμός· ἐνταῦθα γάρ τὸ κυρτὸν καὶ τὸ κοῖλον τὸ μὲν τελευτὴ τὸ δʼ ἀρχή (διὸ τὸ μὲν ἠρεμεῖ τὸ δὲ κινείται), λόγῳ μὲν ἕτερα ὄντα, μεγέθει δʼ ἀχώριστα.
But for now, to speak in summary, that which moves instrumentally is where the starting-point and the end-point are the same—for example, a joint; for there the convex and the concave are, the one the end-point and the other the starting-point (wherefore the one remains at rest while the other is moved), being different in definition but inseparable in magnitude.
πάντα γὰρ ὤσει καὶ ἕλξει κινεῖται· διὸ δεῖ, ὥσπερ ἐν κύκλῳ, μένειν τι, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἄρχεσθαι τὴν κίνησιν.
For all things are moved by pushing and pulling; wherefore, as in a circle, something must remain still, and from there the motion must begin.
ὅλως μὲν οὖν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ᾖ ὀρεκτικὸν τὸ ζῷον, ταύτῃ αὑτοῦ κινητικόν· ὀρεκτικὸν δὲ οὐκ ἄνευ φαντασίας· φαντασία δὲ πᾶσα ἢ λογιστικὴ ἢ αἰσθητική.
In general, then, as has been said, in so far as the animal is appetitive, in this respect it is capable of moving itself; but it is not appetitive without imagination; and all imagination is either calculative or sensitive.
ταύτης μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα μετέχει.
In the latter, the other animals also participate.