§3.7Τὸ δʼ αὐτό ἐστιν ἡ κατʼ ἐνέργειαν ἐπιστήμη τῷματι.
Actual knowledge is the same as the object.
ἡ δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν χρόνῳ προτέρα ἐν τῷ ἐνί, ὅλως δὲ οὐδὲ χρόνῳ· ἔστι γάρ ἐξ ἐντελεχείᾳ ὄντος πάντα τὰ γινόμενα. —φαίνεται δὲ τὸ μὲν αἰσθητὸν ἐκ δυνάμει ὄντος τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ ἐνεργείᾳ ποιοῦν·
But potential knowledge is prior in time in the individual, though completely not even in time; for all things that come to be are from that which exists in actuality. — And on the one hand, the object of sense is seen to make actual that which is potentially sensitive; for it is not affected nor altered.
οὐ γὰρ πάσχει οὐδʼ ἀλλοιοῦται. διὸ ἄλλο εἶδος τοῦτο κινήσεως· ἡ γὰρ κίνησις τοῦ ἀτελοῦς ἐνέργεια, ἡ δʼ ἁπλῶς ἐνέργεια ἑτέρα, ἡ τοῦ τετελεσμένου. — τὸ μὲν οὖν αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅμοιον τῷ φάναι μόνον καὶ νοεῖν·
Therefore, this is another species of motion; for motion is the actuality of the incomplete, but simple actuality is different, being that of the complete. — The sensing, then, is similar to merely saying and thinking; but when it is pleasant or painful, as if affirming or denying, it pursues or avoids.
ὅταν δὲ ἡδὺ ἢ λυπηρόν, οἷον καταφᾶσα ἢ ἀποφᾶσα διώκει ἢ φεύγει· καὶ ἔστι τὸ ἥδεσθαι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι τὸ ἐνεργεῖν τῇ αἰσθητικῇ μεσότητι πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν, ᾗ τοιαῦτα.
And to feel pleasure or pain is to act with the sensitive mean towards the good or bad, in so far as they are such.
καὶ ἡ φυγὴ δὲ καὶ ἡ ὄρεξις ταὐτό, ἡ κατʼ ἐνέργειαν, καὶ οὐχ ἕτερον τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν καὶ τὸ φευκτικόν, οὔτʼ ἀλλήλων οὔτε τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ· ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι ἄλλο.
And avoidance and desire are the same, in actuality, and the faculty of desire and that of avoidance are not different, either from each other or from the sensitive faculty; but their essence is different.
τῇ δὲ διανοητικῇ ψυχῇ τὰ φαντάσματα οἷον αἰσθήματα ὑπάρχει.
And to the thinking soul, images are like sensations.
ὅταν δὲ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν φήσῃ ἢ ἀποφήσῃ, φεύγει ἢ διώκει.
And when it affirms or denies good or bad, it avoids or pursues.
διὸ οὐδέποτε νοεῖ ἄνευ φαντάσματος ἡ ψυχή. —ὥσπερ δὲ ὁ ἀὴρ τὴν κόρην· τοιονδὶ ἐποίησεν, αὕτη δʼ ἕτερον, καὶ ἡ ἀκοὴ ὡσαύτως, τὸ δὲ ἔσχατον ἕν, καὶ μία μεσότης, τὸ δʼ εἶναι αὐτῇ πλείω —τίνι δʼ ἐπικρίνει τί διαφέρει γλυκὺ καὶ θερμόν, εἴρηται μὲν καὶ πρότερον, λεκτέον δὲ καὶ ὧδε.
Therefore, the soul never thinks without an image. — Just as the air makes the pupil such-and-such, and this in turn makes another, and hearing likewise, but the ultimate is one, and is a single mean, though its essence is multiple — but by what it judges how sweet and hot differ, has indeed been said before, but must also be stated here.
ἔστι γὰρ ἕν τι, οὕτω δὲ ὡς ὁ ὅρος, καὶ ταῦτα, ἓν τῷ ἀνάλογον καὶ τῷ ἀριθμῷ ὄντα, ἔχει ἑκάτερον πρὸς ἑκάτερον ὡς ἐκείνα πρὸς ἄλληλα· τί γὰρ διαφέρει τὸ ἀπορεῖν πῶς τὰ μὴ ὁμογενῆ κρίνει ἢ τὰ ἐναντία, οἷον λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν;
For it is a certain one thing, in the way a limit is, and these also, being one by analogy and in number, each has a relation to each as those have to one another; for what does it differ to puzzle over how it judges things that are not of the same genus or contraries, such as white and black?
ἔστω δὴ ὡς τὸ τὸ λευκὸν πρὸς τὸ Β τὸ μέλαν, τὸ Γ πρὸς τὸ Δ·
Let it be then as white is to B black, so is C to D; so that alternately also holds.
ὥστε καὶ ἐναλλάξ. εἰ δὴ τὰ ΓΑ ἐνὶ εἴη ὑπάρχοντα, οὕτως ἕξει, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ΔΒ, τὸ αὐτὸ μὲν καὶ ἕν, τὸ δʼ εἶναι οὐ τὸ αὐτό—κἀκεῖνα ὁμοίως.
If indeed C and A belong to one thing, they will be related as D and B, the same and one, but their essence is not the same — and likewise with those.
ὁ δʼ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ εἰ τὸ μὲν Α τὸ γλυκὺ εἴη, τὸ δὲ Β τὸ λευκόν.
And the same account holds if A were sweet and B white.
τὰ μὲν οὖν εἴδη τό νοητικόν ἐν τοῖς φαντάσμασι νοεῖ, καὶ ὡς ἐν ἐκείνοις ὥρισται αὐτῷ τὸ διωκτὸν καὶ φευκτόν, καὶ ἐκτὸς τῆς αἰσθήσεως, ὅταν ἐπὶ τῶν φαντασμάτων ᾖ, κινεῖται·
Therefore, the thinking faculty thinks the forms in the images, and as in those what is to be pursued and avoided is determined for it, even in the absence of sensation, when it is concerned with the images, it is moved.
οἷον αἰσθανόμενος τὸν φρυκτόν ὅτι πῦρ, τῇ κοινῇ γνωρίζει, ὁρῶν κινούμενον, ὅτι πολέμιος· ὁτὲ δὲ τοῖς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ φαντάσμασιν ἢ νοήμασιν, ὥσπερ ὁρῶν, λογίζεταυ καὶ βουλεύεται τὰ μέλλοντα πρός τὰ παρόντα· καὶ ὅταν εἴπῃ ὡς ἐκεῖ τὸ ἡδὺ ἢ λυπηρόν, ἐνταῦθα φεύγει ἢ διώκει— καὶ ὅλως ἓν πράξει.
For example, sensing the beacon that it is fire, it knows by the common sense, seeing it moving, that it is an enemy; but at other times by the images or thoughts in the soul, as if seeing, it calculates and deliberates about future things in relation to present ones; and when it says that there is pleasure or pain, here it avoids or pursues — and in general, in action.
καὶ τὸ ἄνευ δὲ πράξεως, τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει ἐστὶ τῷ ἀγαθῷ καὶ τῷ κακῷ· ἀλλὰ τῷ γε ἀπλῶς διαφέρει καὶ τινί. —τὰ δὲ ἐν ἀφαιρέσει λεγόμενα ὥσπερ, εἴ τις τὸ σιμὶν ᾖ μὲν σιμὸν οὔ, κεχωρισμένως δὲ κοῖλον ἐνόει ἐνεργείᾳ, ἄνευ τῆς σαρκὸς ἄν ἐνόει ἐν ᾗ τὸ κοῖλον—οὕτω τὰ μαθηματικά, οὐ κεχωρισμένα, ὡς κεχωρισμένα νοεῖ, ὅταν νοῇ ἐκεῖνα.
And that which is without action, the true and the false, is in the same genus as the good and the bad; but they differ in being absolute and relative. — And those things called in abstraction, just as if one, while snub-nosed is not snub-nosed, but separately thinks of 'concave' in actuality, would think of it without the flesh in which the concave is — so it thinks of mathematical things, which are not separate, as separate when it thinks of them.
ὅλως δὲ ὁ νοῦς ἐστὶν ὁ κατʼ ἐνέργειαν τὰ πράγματα.
In general, the intellect is the things in actuality.
ἆρα δ’ ἐνδέχεται τῶν κεχωρισμένων τι νοεῖν ὄντα αὐτόν μὴ κεχωρισμένον μεγέθους, ἢ οὔ, σκεπτέον ὕστερον.
But whether it is possible for it, being itself not separate from magnitude, to think of any of the separate things, or not, must be considered later.