§3.5Ἐπεὶ δʼ ἐν ἁπάσῃ τῇ φύσει ἐστὶ τὸ μὲν ὕλη ἑκάστῳ γένει (τοῦτο δὲ ὃ πάντα δυνάμει ἐκείνα), ἕτερον δὲ τὸ αἴτιον καὶ ποιητικόν, τῷ ποιεῖν πάντα, οἶον ἡ τέχνη πρὸς τὴν ὕλην πέπονθεν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὑπάρχειν ταύτας τὰς διαφοράς.
Since in all nature there is on the one hand that which is matter for each class (and this is what is potentially all of them), and on the other hand that which is the cause and productive, by virtue of making all things (just as art is related to its matter), it is necessary that these differences also exist in the soul.
καὶ ἔστιν ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος νοῦς τῷ πάντα γίνεσθαι, ὁ δὲ τῷ πάντα ποιεῖν, ὡς ἕξις τις, οἷον τὸ φῶς· τρόπον γάρ τινα καὶ τό φῶς ποιεῖ τὰ δυνάμει ὄντα χρώματα ἐνεργείᾳ χρώματα.
And there is an intellect of this kind by virtue of becoming all things, and another by virtue of making all things, like a certain state, such as light; for in a way light also makes potential colors actual colors.
καὶ οὗτος ὁ νοῦς χωριστός καὶ ἀπαθὴς καὶ ἀμιγής, τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὢν ἐνέργεια.
And this intellect is separable, unaffected, and unmixed, being in its essence actuality.
ἀεὶ γὰρ τιμιώτερον τό ποιοῦν τοῦ πάσχοντος καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς ὕλης.
For that which acts is always more honorable than that which is affected, and the principle is more honorable than the matter.
τὸ δʼ αὐτό ἐστιν ἡ κατʼ ἐνέργειαν ἐπιστήμη τῷ πράγματι· ἡ δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν χρόνῳ προτέρα ἐν τῷ ἑνί, ὅλως δὲ οὐδὲ χρόνῳ, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ὁτὲ μὲν νοεῖ ὁτὲ δʼ οὐ νοεῖ.
And actual knowledge is the same as the thing known; but potential knowledge is prior in time in the individual, though completely not even in time, but it does not think at one time and not think at another.
χωρισθεὶς δʼ ἐστὶ μόνον τοθʼ ὅπερ ἐστί, καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀΐδιον (οὐ μνημονεύομεν δέ, ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν ἀπαθές, ὁ δὲ παθητικὸς νοῦς φθαρτός)· καὶ ἄνευ τούτου οὐθὲν νοεῖ.
But when separated, it is only what it is, and this alone is immortal and eternal (and we do not remember, because this is unaffected, whereas the passive intellect is perishable); and without this, it thinks nothing.
§3.6Ἡ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἀδιαιρέτων νόησις ἐν τούτοις περὶ ἃ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ψεῦδος, ἐν οἷς δὲ καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ ἀληθές, σύνθεσίς τις ἤδη νοημάτων ὥσπερ ἓν ὄντων—καθάπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ἔφη “ᾗ πολλῶν μὲν κόρσαι ἀναύχενες ἐβλάστησανʼʼ, ἔπειτα συντίθεσθαι τῇ φίλίᾳ, οὕτω καὶ ταῦτα κεχωρισμένα συντίθεται, οἶον τὸ ἀσύμμετρον καὶ ἡ διάμετρος·
The thinking of undivided things, then, is among those things concerning which there is no falsehood; but where there is both falsehood and truth, there is already a certain combination of thoughts as if being one—just as Empedocles said, "where many necks grew without heads," and then they were combined by love, so also these things, being separated, are combined, as for instance the incommensurable and the diagonal.
ἄν δὲ γενομένων ἢ ἐσομένων, τὸν χρόνον προσεννοῶν καὶ συντιθείς.
But if it is about things that have happened or will be, one thinks of time in addition and combines it.
τό γὰρ ψεῦδος ἐν συνθέσει ἀεί καὶ γάρ ἄν τὸ λευκόν μὴ λευκὸν φῇ, τὸ λευκόν καὶ τό μὴ λευκόν συνέθηκεν.
For falsehood is always in a combination; for even if one says that what is white is not white, he has combined white and not-white.
ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ διαίρεσιν φάναι πάντα.
And it is also possible to call all this division.
ἀλλʼ οὖν ἔστι γε οὐ μόνον τὸ ψεῦδος ἢ ἀληθὲς ὅτι λευκὸς Κλέων ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτι ἦν ἢ ἔσται. τὸ δὲ ἓν ποιοῦν, τοῦτο ὁ νοῦς ἕκαστον.
But at any rate, there is truth or falsehood not only in "Cleon is white," but also in "he was" or "will be." And that which makes each one, this is the intellect.
τὸ δʼ ἀδιαίρετον ἐπεὶ διχῶς, ἢ δυνάμει ἢ ἐνεργείᾳ, οὐθὲν κωλύει νοεῖν τὸ ἀδιαίρετον ὅταν νοῇ τὸ μῆκος (ἀδιαίρετον γὰρ ἐνεργείᾳ), καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ ἀδιαιρέτῳ· ὁμοίως γὰρ ὁ χρόνος διαιρετὸς καὶ ἀδιαίρετος τῷ μήκει.
But since the undivided is twofold, either potentially or actually, nothing prevents one from thinking the undivided when thinking a length (for it is actually undivided), and in an undivided time; for time is undivided and divided in the same way as length.
οὔκουν ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ἐν τῷ ἡμίσει τί ἐνόει ἑκατέρῳ· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν, ἄν μὴ διαιρεθῇ, ἀλλʼ ἢ δυνάμει.
Therefore, it is not possible to say what it was thinking in each half; for they do not exist unless they have been divided, except potentially.
χωρὶς δʼ ἑκάτερον νοῶν τῶν ἡμίσεων διαιρεῖ καὶ τὸν χρόνον ἅμα· τότε δʼ οἱονεὶ μήκη.
But in thinking each of the halves separately, it divides the time also simultaneously; and then they are, as it were, lengths.
εἰ δʼ ὡς ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, καὶ ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τῷ ἐπʼ ἀμφοῖν· κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δέ, καὶ οὐχ ᾗ ἐκεῖνα διαιρετὰ ὃ νοεῖ καὶ ἐν ᾦ χρόνῳ, ἀλλʼ ᾗ ἀδιαίρετα· ἔνεστι γὰρ κἀν τούτοις τι ἀδιαίρετον, ἀλλʼ ἴσως οὐ χωριστόν, ὃ ποιεῖ ἕνα τὸν χρόνον καὶ τὸ μῆκος.
But if it thinks them as made of both, it does so also in the time that spans both; but accidentally, and not in so far as those things and the time in which it thinks are divisible, but in so far as they are undivided; for there is indeed an undivided element in these also, though perhaps not separable, which makes the time and the length one.
καὶ τοῦθʼ ὁμοίως ἐν ἅπαντί ἐστι τῷ συνεχεῖ, καὶ χρόνῳ καὶ μήκει.
And this is likewise in every continuous thing, both in time and in length.
τὸ δὲ μὴ κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν ἀδιαίρετον ἀλλὰ τῷ εἴδει
νοεῖ ἐν ἀδιαιρέτῳ χρόνῳ καὶ ἀδιαιρέτῳ τῆς ψυχῆς.
But that which is not undivided according to quantity but in species, it thinks in an undivided time and with an undivided part of the soul.
ἡ δὲ στιγμὴ καὶ πᾶσα διαίρεσις, καὶ
τὸ οὕτως ἀδιαίρετον, δηλοῦται ὥσπερ ἡ στέρησις.
And the point and every division, and that which is undivided in this way, are made known like a privation.
καὶ ὅμοιος ὁ λόγος ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, οἷον πῶς τὸ κακὸν γνωρίζει ἢ τό μέλαν· τῷ ἐναντίῳ γάρ πως γνωρίζει.
And the account is similar for other things, as for instance, how it knows evil or black; for it knows it in a way by its contrary.
δεῖ δὲ δυνάμει εἶναι τὸ γνωρίζον καὶ ἐνεῖναι ἐν αὐτῷ.
But that which knows must be potentially the contrary and it must be in it.
εἰ δέ τινι μηδὲν ἔστιν ἐναντίον τῶν αἰτίων, αὐτό ἑαυτὸ γινώσκει καὶ ἐνέργειά ἐστι καὶ χωριστόν.
But if there is any of the causes which has no contrary, this knows itself and is an actuality and is separable.
ἔστι δʼ ἡ μὲν φάσις τι κατά τινος, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ ἀπόφασις, καὶ ἀληθὴς ἢ ψευδὴς πᾶσα· ὁ δὲ νοῦς οὐ πᾶς, ἀλλʼ ὁ τοῦ τί ἐστι κατὰ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ἀληθής, καὶ οὐ τὶ κατά τινος· ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ τό ὁρᾶν τοῦ δίου ἀληθές, εἰ δʼ ἄνθρωπος τὸ λευκὸν ἢ μή, οὐκ ἀληθὲς ἀεί, οὕτως ἔχει ὅσα ἄνευ ὕλης.
Now, assertion is the saying of something about something, just as negation is, and every such statement is true or false; but not every intellect is so, but that which is of the 'whatness' in respect of the essence is true, and is not the saying of something about something; but just as the seeing of its proper object is true, while whether the white thing is a man or not is not always true, so it is with things without matter.