§3.4Περὶ δὲ τοῦ μορίου τοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς ᾧ γινώσκει τε ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ φρονεῖ, εἴτε χωριστοῦ ὄντος εἴτε καὶ μὴ χωριστοῦ κατά μέγεθος ἀλλὰ κατὰ λόγον, σκεπτέον τίνʼ ἔχει διαφοράν, καὶ πῶς ποτὲ γίνεται τὸ νοεῖν.
Regarding the part of the soul by which the soul knows and understands, whether it is separable or not separable in magnitude but only in definition, we must consider what difference it has, and how thinking ever comes about.
εἰ δή ἐστι τὸ νοεῖν ὥσπερ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἢ πάσχειν τι ἄν εἴη ὑπὸ τοῦ νοητοῦ ἤ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον.
If, then, thinking is like perceiving, it would either be a process of being affected by the object of thought, or something else of this kind.
ἀπαθὲς ἄρα δεῖ εἶναι, δεκτικὸν δὲ τοῦ εἴδους καὶ δυνάμει τοιοῦτον ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦτο, καὶ ὁμοίως ἔχειν, ὥσπερ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν πρὸς τὰ αἰσθητά, οὕτω τὸν νοῦν πρὸς τὰ νοητά.
It must, then, be unaffected, but receptive of the form, and potentially such as the form is, without being that form itself, and the intellect must be related to the objects of thought in the same way as the sensitive faculty is to the objects of sense.
ἀνάγκη ἄρα, ἐπεὶ πάντα νοεῖ, ἀμιγῆ εἶναι, ὥσπερ φησὶν Ἀναξαγόρας, ἵνα κρατῇ, τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶν ἵνα γνωρίζῃ· παρεμφαινόμενον γὰρ κωλύει τὸ ἀλλότριον καὶ ἀντιφράττει·
Therefore, since it thinks all things, it must be unmixed, as Anaxagoras says, in order that it may "rule"—that is, in order that it may know; for the co-presence of what is foreign hinders and blocks it.
ὥστε μηδʼ αὐτοῦ εἶναι φύσιν μηδεμίαν ἀλλʼ ἢ ταύτην, ὅτι δυνατός.
Consequently, it can have no nature of its own other than this: that it is potential.
ὁ ἄρα καλούμενος τῆς ψυχῆς νοῦς (λέγω δὲ νοῦν ᾧ διανοεῖται καὶ ὑπολαμβάνει ἡ ψυχή) οὐθέν ἐστιν ἐνεργείᾳ τῶν ὄντων πρίν νοεῖν.
What is called, then, the intellect of the soul (I mean by intellect that by which the soul thinks and judges) is actually none of existing things before it thinks.
διὸ οὐδὲ μεμίχθαι εὔλογον αὐτὸν τῷ σώματι· ποιός τις γὰρ ἄν γίγνοιτο, ἢ ψυχρὸς ἢ θερμός, ἢ κἄν ὄργανόν τι εἴη, ὥσπερ τῷ αἰσθητικῷ· νῦν δʼ οὐθὲν ἔστιν.
Therefore, it is not reasonable to think that it is mixed with the body; for then it would acquire some quality, either cold or hot, or it would even have an organ, just as the sensitive faculty does; but as it is, there is none.
καὶ εὗ δὴ οἱ λέγοντες τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι τόπον εἰδῶν, πλὴν ὅτι οὔτε ὅλη ἀλλʼ ἡ νοητική, οὔτε ἐντελεχείᾳ ἀλλὰ δυνάμει τὰ εἴδη.
And those who say that the soul is the place of forms speak well, except that it is not the whole soul but only the intellective part, and the forms are there not in actuality but in potentiality.
ὅτι δʼ οὐχ ὁμοία ἡ ἀπάθεια τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ καὶ τοῦ νοητικοῦ, φανερόν ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων καὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως.
But that the unaffectedness of the sensitive faculty and of the intellective faculty is not similar is clear from the sense-organs and sensation.
ἡ μὲν γὰρ αἴσθησις οὐ δύναται αἰσθάνεσθαι ἐκ τοῦ σφόδρα αἰσθητοῦ, οἶον ψόφου ἐκ τῶν μεγάλων ψόφων, οὐδʼ ἐκ τῶν ἰσχυρῶν χρωμάτων καὶ ὀσμῶν οὔτε ὁρᾶν οὔτε ὀσμᾶσθαι· ἀλλʼ ὁ νοῦς ὅταν τι νοήσῃ σφόδρα νοητόν, οὐχ ἧττον νοεῖ τὰ ὑποδεέστερα, ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον· τὸ μὲν γάρ αἰσθητικόν οὐκ ἄνευ σώματος, ὁ δὲ χωριστός.
For the senses cannot perceive from a very intense object of sense, as for example, sound from loud sounds, nor can they see or smell from strong colors and odors; but when the intellect thinks something highly intelligible, it thinks the lesser objects no less, but rather more; for the sensitive faculty is not without a body, whereas the intellect is separable.
ὅταν δʼ οὕτως ἕκαστα γένηται ὡς ὁ ἐπιστήμων λέγεται ὁ κατʼ ἐνέργειαν (τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει ὅταν δύνηται ἐνεργεῖν διʼ αὐτοῦ), ἔστι μὲν καὶ τότε δυνάμει πως, οὐ μὴν ὁμοίως καὶ πρὶν μαθεῖν ἢ εὑρεῖν· καὶ αὐτὸς διʼ αὐτοῦ τότε δύναται νοεῖν.
And when the intellect has become each of its objects in the way that one who actually possesses knowledge is said to do (and this happens when he is able to exercise his activity by himself), even then it is still potentially in a way, yet not in the same way as before learning or discovering; and it is then able to think by itself.
ἐπεὶ δʼ ἄλλο ἐστὶ τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τὸ μεγέθει εἶναι, καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ ὕδατι εἶναι (οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἐφʼ ἑτέρων πολλῶν, ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἐπὶ πάντων· ἐπʼ ἐνίων γάρ ταὐτόν ἐστι), τό σαρκὶ εἶναι καὶ σάρκα ἢ ἄλλῳ ἢ ἄλλως ἔχοντι κρίνει· ἡ γὰρ σὰρξ οὐκ ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης, ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ τὸ σιμόν, τόδε ἐν τῷδε.
But since magnitude and the essence of magnitude are different, and water and the essence of water are different (and so also in the case of many other things, though not of all, for in some they are the same), we judge the essence of flesh and flesh either by different faculties or by the same faculty in different states; for flesh is not without matter, but like the snub, it is a this in a this.
τῷ μὲν οὖν αἰσθητικῷ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν κρίνει, καὶ ὥν λόγος τις ἡ σάρξ· ἄλλῳ δέ, ἤτοι χωριστῷ ἢ ὡς ἡ κεκλασμένη ἔχει πρός αὑτὴς·
Therefore, it is with the sensitive faculty that we judge hot and cold, and those things of which flesh is a certain ratio; but it is with another faculty, either separable or as a bent line is related to itself when it is straightened out, that we judge the essence of flesh.
ὅταν ἐκταθῇ, τὸ σαρκὶ εἶναι κρίνει. πάλιν δʼ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν ἀφαιρέσει ὄντων τὸ εὐθὺ ὡς τὸ σιμόν· μετὰ συνεχοῦς γάρ· τὸ δὲ τί ἦν εἶναι, εἰ ἔστιν ἕτερον τὸ εὐθεῖ εἶναι καὶ τὸ εὐθύ, ἄλλο ἔστω γὰρ δυάς.
Again, in the case of things that exist in abstraction, the straight is like the snub; for it is accompanied by the continuous; but its essence—if the essence of straight and the straight are different—must be judged by something else; for let it be a dyad.
ἑτέρῳ ἄρα ἢ ἑτέρως ἔχοντι κρίνει.
It judges, therefore, by something else or by the same faculty in a different state.
ὅλως ἄρα ὡς χωριστὰ τὰ πράγματα τῆς ὕλης, οὕτω καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸν νοῦν.
In general, then, as things are separable from matter, so also are the things concerning the intellect.
ἀπορήσειε δʼ ἄν τις, εἰ ὁ νοῦς ἁπλοῦν ἐστὶ καὶ ἀπαθὲς καὶ μηθενὶ μηθὲν ἔχει κοινόν, ὥσπερ φησὶν Ἀναξαγόρας, πῶς νοήσει, εἰ τὸ νοεῖν πάσχειν τί ἐστιν (ᾖ γάρ τι κοινὸν ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχει, τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν δοκεῖ τὸ δὲ πάσχειν), ἔτι δʼ εἰ νοητὸς καὶ αὐτός;
One might raise the question: if the intellect is simple and unaffected and has nothing in common with anything else, as Anaxagoras says, how will it think, if thinking is a process of being affected? (For in so far as there is something in common between two things, one seems to act and the other to be affected); and further, is the intellect itself an object of thought?
ἢ γὰρ τοῖς ἄλλοις νοῦς ὑπάρξει, εἰ μὴ κατʼ ἄλλο αὐτὸς νοητός, ἓν δέ τι τὸ νοητὸν εἴδει, ἢ μεμιγμένον τι ἕξει, ὃ ποιεῖ νοητόν αὐτὸν ὥσπερ τἆλλα.
For either intellect will belong to all other things, if it is not by virtue of something else that it is itself an object of thought, and if the object of thought is one in species, or else it will have some mixed element in it which makes it an object of thought just like other things.
ἢ τὸ μὲν πάσχειν κατὰ κοινόν τι διῄρηται πρότερον, ὅτι δυνάμει πώς ἐστι τὰ νοητὰ ὁ νοῦς, ἀλλʼ ἐντελεχείᾳ οὐδέν, πρὶν ἄν νοῇ·
Or is the being affected in virtue of something in common distinguished before, to the effect that the intellect is in a way potentially the objects of thought, but is actually nothing before it thinks?
δυνάμει δʼ οὕτως ὥσπερ ἐν γραμματείῳ ᾧ μηθὲν ἐνυπάρχει ἐντελεχείᾳ γεγραμμένον· ὅπερ συμβαίνει ἐπὶ τοῦ νοῦ.
It is potential in the same way as on a writing tablet on which nothing is actually written; which is indeed what happens in the case of the intellect.
καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ νοητός ἐστιν ὥσπερ τὰ νοητά.
And the intellect itself is an object of thought just as the objects of thought are.
ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἄνευ ὕλης τὸ αὐτό ἐστι τὸ νοοῦν καὶ τὸ νοούμενον· ἡ γὰρ ἐπιστήμη ἡ θεωρητικὴ καὶ τὸ οὕτως ἐπιστητὸν τὸ αὐτό ἐστιν.
For in the case of things without matter, that which thinks and that which is thought are the same; for theoretical knowledge and that which is thus known are the same.
τοῦ δὲ μὴ ἀεὶ νοεῖν τὸ αἴτιον ἐπισκεπτέον.
But we must consider the cause of its not thinking always.
ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἔχουσιν ὕλην δυνάμει ἕκαστον ἔστι τῶν νοητῶν.
In things that have matter, each of the objects of thought is present only potentially.
ὥστʼ ἐκείνοις μὲν οὐχ ὑπάρξει νοῦς (ἄνευ γὰρ ὕλης δύναμις ὁ νοῦς τῶν τοιούτων), ἐκείνῳ δὲ τό νοητὸν ὑπάρξει.
Consequently, intellect will not belong to them (for intellect is a potentiality for such things without matter), but they will have the object of thought present in them.