§3.3#2περὶ δὲ τοῦ νοεῖν, ἐπεὶ ἕτερον τοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι, τούτου δὲ τὸ μὲν φαντασία δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ δὲ ὑπόληψις, περὶ φαντασίας διορίσαντας οὕτω περὶ θατέρου λεκτέον.
Regarding thinking, since it is different from perceiving, and of this one part seems to be imagination and the other judgment, we must first define imagination and then speak of the other.
εἰ δή ἐστιν ἡ φαντασία καθʼ ἣν λέγομεν φάντασμά τι ἡμῖν γίγνεσθαι καὶ μὴ εἴ τι κατὰ μεταφοράν λέγομεν, μία τις ἔστι τούτων δύναμις ἢ ἕξις καθʼ ἃς κρίνομεν καὶ ἀληθεύομεν ἢ ψευδόμεθα;
If, then, imagination is that according to which we say an image arises in us, and not if we use the term metaphorically, is it one of those faculties or states according to which we judge and speak truly or falsely?
τοιαῦται δʼ εἰσὶν αἴσθησις, δόξα, ἐπιστήμη, νοῦς.
Such are perception, opinion, knowledge, and intellect.
ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν αἴσθησις, δῆλον ἐκ τῶνδε.
That it is not perception, then, is clear from the following.
αἴσθησις μὲν γὰρ ἤτοι δύναμις ἢ ἐνέργεια, οἷον ὄψις καὶ ὅρασις, φαίνεται δέ τι καὶ μηδετέρου ὑπάρχοντος τούτων, οἶον τά ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις.
For perception is either a faculty or an activity, such as sight and seeing, but something appears to us even when neither of these is present, as in dreams.
εἰτα αἴσθησις μὲν ἀεὶ πάρεστι, φαντασία δʼ οὔ.
Furthermore, perception is always present, but imagination is not.
εἰ δὲ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ τὸ αὐτό, πᾶσιν ἄν ἐνδέχοιτο τοῖς θηρίοις φαντασίαν ὑπάρχειν· δοκεῖ δʼ οὔ, οἷον μύρμηκι ἢ μελίττῃ, καὶ σκώληκι.
And if they were the same in activity, it would be possible for imagination to belong to all beasts, but it seems not to, as for instance to the ant, the bee, or the worm.
εἶτα αἱ μὲν ἀληθεῖς ἀεί, αἱ δὲ φαντασίαι γίνονται αἱ πλείους ψευδεῖς.
Again, perceptions are always true, but most imaginations turn out to be false.
ἔπειτʼ οὐδὲ λέγομεν, ὅταν ἐνεργῶμεν ἀκριβῶς περὶ τὸ αἰσθητόν, ὅτι φαίνεται τοῦτο ἡμῖν ἄνθρωπος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὅταν μὴ ἐναργῶς αἰσθανώμεθα πότερον ἀληθὴς ἢ ψευδής.
Moreover, we do not say, when we are actively perceiving an object of perception precisely, that this appears to us as a man, but rather when we do not perceive it clearly, whether it is true or false.
καὶ ὅπερ δὴ ἐλέγομεν πρότερον, φαίνεται καὶ μύουσιν ὁράματα.
And as indeed we said before, visions appear even to those who have closed their eyes.
ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τῶν ἀεὶ ἀληθευουσῶν οὐδεμία ἔσται, οἷον ἐπιστήμη ἢ νοῦς· ἔστι γὰρ φαντασία καὶ ψευδής.
But further, it cannot be any of those states which are always true, such as knowledge or intellect; for imagination can also be false.
λείπεται ἄρα ἰδεῖν εἰ δόξα γίνεται γὰρ δόξα καὶ ἀληθὴς καὶ ψευδής.
It remains, then, to see whether it is opinion; for opinion becomes both true and false.
ἀλλὰ δόξῃ μὲν ἕπεται πίστις (οὐκ ἐνδέχεται γὰρ δοξάζοντα οἷς δοκεῖ μὴ πιστεύειν), τῶν δὲ θηρίων οὐθενὶ ὑπάρχει πίστις, φαντασία δὲ πολλοῖς.
But opinion is followed by belief (for it is not possible for one who holds an opinion not to believe what seems to him to be so), and while belief belongs to none of the beasts, imagination belongs to many of them.
φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι οὐδὲ δόξα μετʼ αἰσθήσεως, οὐδὲ διʼ αἰσθήσεως, οὐδὲ συμπλοκὴ δόξης καὶ αἰσθήσεως φαντασία ἂν εἴη, διά τε ταῦτα καὶ διότι οὐκ ἄλλου τινὸς ἔσται ἡ δόξα, ἀλλʼ ἐκείνου, εἴπερ ἔστιν, οὗ καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις· λέγω δʼ, ἐκ τῆς τοῦ λευκοῦ δόξης καὶ αἰσθήσεως ἡ συμπλοκὴ φαντασία ἔσται οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐκ τῆς δόξης μὲν τῆς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, αἰσθήσεως δὲ τῆς τοῦ λευκοῦ·
It is clear, then, directly from this, that imagination cannot be opinion combined with perception, nor opinion through perception, nor a blend of opinion and perception, both for these reasons and because the opinion, if it exists, will not be of anything else, but of that very thing of which there is also perception; I mean, the blend of the opinion of white and the perception of white will be imagination—for surely it is not from the opinion of the good and the perception of the white.
τὸ οὖν φαίνεσθαι ἔσται τὸ δοξάζειν ὅπερ αἰσθάνεται, μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός.
Therefore, to appear will be to form an opinion of that very thing which one perceives, not accidentally.
φαίνεται δέ γε καὶ ψευδῇ, περὶ ὧν ἅμα ὑπόληψιν ἀληθῇ ἔχει, οἶον φαίνεται μὲν ὁ ἥλιος ποδιαῖος, πιστεύεται δʼ εἶναι μείζων τῆς οἰκουμένης·
But things appear falsely even when one has a true judgment about them at the same time; for example, the sun appears to be a foot across, but is believed to be larger than the inhabited world.
συμβαίνει οὖν ἤτοι ἀποβεβληκέναι τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀληθῆ δόξαν, ἣν εἶχε, σωζομένου τοῦ πράγματος, μὴ ἐπιλαθόμενον μηδὲ μεταπεισθέντα, ἢ εἰ ἔτι ἔχει, ἀνάγκη τὴν αὐτὴν ἀληθῇ εἶναι καὶ ψευδῆ.
It happens, then, either that one has lost his own true opinion, which he had, while the object remains unchanged, without having forgotten it or been persuaded otherwise, or, if he still has it, the same opinion must be both true and false.
ἀλλὰ φευδὴς ἐγένετο, ὅτε λάθοι μεταπεσὸν τὸ πρᾶγμα.
But it became false only when the object changed without his noticing.
οὔτʼ ἄρα ἕν τι τούτων ἐστὶν οὔτʼ ἐκ τούτων ἡ φαντασία.
Therefore, imagination is neither one of these nor composed of them.
ἀλλʼ ἐπειδή ἐστι κινηθέντος τουδὶ κινεῖσθαι ἕτερον ὑπὸ τούτου, ἡ δὲ φαντασία κίνησίς τις δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ οὐκ ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως γίνεσθαι ἀλλʼ αἰσθανομένοις καὶ ὦν αἴσθησις ἔστιν, ἔστι δὲ γίνεσθαι κίνησιν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐνεργείας τῆς αἰσθήσεως, καὶ ταύτην ὁμοίαν ἀνάγκη εἶναι τῇ αἰσθήσει, εἴη ἄν αὕτή ἡ κίνησις οὔτε ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως ἐνδεχομένη οὔτε μὴ αἰσθανομένοις ὑπάρχειν, καὶ πολλὰ κατʼ αὐτὴν καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν τὸ ἔχον, καὶ εἶναι καὶ ἀληθῇ καὶ ψευδῇ.
But since it is possible, when this thing is moved, for another to be moved by it, and since imagination seems to be a certain motion and not to occur without perception, but rather to those who perceive and concerning things of which there is perception, and since it is possible for motion to be produced by the activity of perception, and this motion must be similar to the perception, this motion would be impossible without perception, and could not belong to those who do not perceive, and the possessor of it would do and suffer many things in accordance with it, and it would be both true and false.
τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει διὰ τάδε·
And this happens for the following reasons.
ἡ αἴσθησις τῶν μὲν ἰδίων ἀληθής ἐστιν ἢ ὅτι ὀλίγιστον ἔχουσα τὸ ψεῦδος.
Perception of proper objects is true, or has the least possible falsehood.
δεύτερον δὲ τοῦ συμβεβηκέναι ταῦτα· καὶ
ἐνταῦθα ἤδη ἐνδέχεται διαψεύεοθαι· δὅτι μὲν γὰρ λευκόν, οὐ ψεύδεται, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο τὸ λευκόν ἢ ἄλλο τι, ψεύδεται.
Second is perception of what is accidental to these, and here already it is possible to be deceived; for that it is white, it does not lie, but whether this white thing is this or something else, it lies.
τρίτον δὲ τῶν κοινῶν καὶ ἑπομένων τοῖς συμβεβηκόσιν οἷς ὑπάρχει τὰ ἴδια (λέγω δʼ οἷον κίνησις καὶ μέγεθος)· περὶ ἃ μάλιστα ἤδη ἔστιν ἀπατηθῆναι κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν.
Third is perception of common objects, which follow upon the accidentals to which the proper objects belong (I mean, for example, motion and magnitude), concerning which it is most possible to be deceived by perception.
ἡ δὲ κίνησις ἡ ὑπὸ τῆς ἐνεργείας τῆς αἰσθήσεως γινομένη διοίσει, ἡ ἀπὸ τούτων τῶν τριῶν αἰσθήσεων.
But the motion produced by the activity of perception will differ according as it arises from these three kinds of perception.
καὶ ἡ μὲν πρώτη παρούσης τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἀληθής, αἱ δʼ ἕτεραι καὶ παρούσης καὶ ἀπούσης εἶεν ἄν ψευδεῖς, καὶ μάλιστα ὅταν πόρρω τὸ αἰσθητὸν ᾖ.
And while the first is true when perception is present, the others may be false both when it is present and when it is absent, and especially when the object of perception is far away.
εἰ οὖν μηθὲν μὲν ἄλλο ἔχει τὰ εἰρημένα ἢ φαντασία, τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶ τὸ λεχθέν, ἡ φαντασία ἄν εἴη κίνησις ὑπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως τῆς κατʼ ἐνέργειαν γιγνομένη.
If, then, nothing else has the aforementioned characteristics except imagination, and this is what has been said, imagination would be a motion produced by perception in its actual exercise.
ἐπεὶ δʼ ἡ ὄψις μάλιστα αἴσθησίς ἐστι, καὶ τὸ ὄνομα ἀπὸ τοῦ φάους εἴληφεν, ὅτι ἄνευ φωτὸς οὐκ ἔστιν ἰδεῖν.
And since sight is the perception par excellence, it has also taken its name from light, because without light it is not possible to see.
καὶ διὰ τὸ ἐμμένειν καὶ ὁμοίας εἶναι ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι, πολλὰ κατʼ αὐτὰς πράττει τὰ ζῷα, τὰ μὲν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν νοῦν, οἶον τὰ θηρία, τὰ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἐπικαλύπτεσθαι τὸν νοῦν ἐνίοτε πάθει ἢ νόσοις ἢ ὕπνῳ, οἶον οἱ ἄνθρωποι.
And because imaginations remain and are similar to perceptions, animals do many things in accordance with them, some because they do not possess intellect, as beasts, and others because their intellect is sometimes clouded by passion, disease, or sleep, as humans.
περὶ μὲν οὖν φαντασίας, τί ἐστι καὶ διὰ τί ἐστιν, εἰρήσθω ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον.
Concerning imagination, then, what it is and why it exists, let so much be said.