§3.3#1Ἐπεὶ δὲ δύο διαφοραῖς ὁρίζονται μάλιστα τὴν ψυχήν, κινήσει τε τῇ κατὰ τόπον καὶ τῷ νοεῖν καὶ φρονεῖν καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι, δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν ὥσπερ αἰσθάνεσθαί τι εἶναι (ἐν ἀμφοτέροις γὰρ τούτοις κρίνει τι ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ γνωρίει τῶν ὄντων), καὶ οἵ γε ἀρχαῖοι τό φρονεῖν καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ταὐτόν εἶναί φασιν-ὥσπερ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς εἴρηκε πρὸς παρεόν γὰρ μῆτις ἀέξεται ἀνθρώποισιν” καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις “ὅθεν σφίσιν αἰεὶ καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν ἀλλοῖα παρίσταται”, τὸ δʼ αὐτὸ τούτοις βούλεται καὶ τὸ Ὁμήρου “τοῖος γὰρ νόος ἐστίν”, πάντες γὰρ οὗτοι τὸ νοεῖν σωματικὸν ὥσπερ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαί τε καὶ φρονεῖν τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατʼ ἀρχὰς λόγοις διωρίσαμεν (καίτοι ἔδει ἅμα καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἠπατῆσθαι αὐτοὺς λέγειν, οἰκειότερον γὰρ τοῖς ζῴοις, καὶ πλείω χρόνον ἐν τούτῳ διατελεῖ ἡ ψυχή· διὸ ἀνάγκη ἤτοι, ὥσπερ ἔνιοι λέγουσι, πάντα τὰ φαινόμενα εἶναι ἀληθῇ, ἢ τὴν τοῦ ἀνομοίου θίξιν ἀπάτην εἶναι, τοῦτο γὰρ ἐναντίον τῷ τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ γνωρίζειν· δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀπάτη καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη τῶν ἐναντίων ἡ αὐτὴ εἶναι)—ὄτι μὲν οὖν οὐ ταὐτόν ἐστι τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν, φανερόν.
Since people define the soul chiefly by two differences, namely by motion in respect of place, and by thinking, understanding, and perceiving, and since thinking and understanding seem to be a certain kind of perceiving (for in both of these the soul judges and recognizes something of what is), and the ancients indeed say that understanding and perceiving are the same—as also Empedocles has said, "for wisdom increases in men according to what is present," and in other passages, "whence also to think other things always presents itself to them," and the saying of Homer also intends the same as these, "for such is the mind," for all these assume thinking to be corporeal like perceiving, and that both perceiving and understanding are of the like by the like, as we also defined in our opening discussions (and yet they ought at the same time to have spoken about being deceived, for this is more proper to animals, and the soul continues in this state for a longer time; wherefore it is necessary either that, as some say, all appearances are true, or that error is a contact with the unlike, for this is contrary to recognizing the like by the like; but it seems that both error and knowledge concerning contraries are the same)—that perceiving and understanding, then, are not the same is clear.
τοῦ μὲν γὰρ πᾶσι μέτεστι, τοῦ δὲ ὀλίγοις τῶν ζῴων.
For the former belongs to all animals, but the latter only to a few.
ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ τὸ νοεῖν, ἐν ᾧ ἐστὶ τὸ ὀρθῶς καὶ τὸ μὴ ὀρθῶς, το μὲν ὀρθῶς φρόνησις καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ δόξα ἀληθής, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὀρθῶς τἀναντία τούτων— οὐδὲ τοῦτό ἐστι ταὐτὸ τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι·
Nor indeed is thinking—in which there is both right and not right, the right being wisdom, knowledge, and true opinion, and the not right the contraries of these—the same as perceiving.
ἡ μὲν γὰρ αἴσθησις τῶν ἰδίων ἀεὶ ἀληθής, καὶ πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει τοῖς ζῴοις, διανοεῖσθαι δʼ ἐνδέχεται καὶ ψευδῶς, καὶ οὐδενὶ ὑπάρχει ᾧ μὴ καὶ λόγος· φαντασία γὰρ ἕτερον καὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ διανοίας, αὕτη τε οὐ γίγνεται ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως, καὶ ἄνευ ταύτης οὐκ ἔστιν ὑπόληψις.
For perception of proper objects is always true, and belongs to all animals, but it is possible to think falsely, and this belongs to nothing which does not also possess reason; for imagination is different from both perception and discursive thought, and this does not occur without perception, and without this there is no judgment.
ὅτι δʼ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ αὐτὴ καὶ ὑπόληψις, φανερόν.
But that imagination is not the same as judgment either is clear.
τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ τὸ πάθος ἐφʼ ἡμῖν ἐστίν, ὅταν βουλώμεθα (πρὸ ὀμμάτων γὰρ ἕστι τι ποιήσασθαι, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς μνημονικοῖς τιθέμενοι καὶ εἰδωλοποιοῦντες), δοξάζειν δʼ οὐκ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν· ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἢ ψεύδεσθαι ἢ ἀληθεύειν.
For this state is up to us, when we wish (for it is possible to produce something before our eyes, just as those who lay out things in mnemonic systems and construct images), but to form opinions is not up to us; for we must either be wrong or be right.
ἔτι δὲ ὅταν μὲν δοξάσωμεν δεινόν τι ἢ φοβερόν, εὐθὺς συμπάσχομεν, ὁμοίως δὲ κἄν θαρραλέον· κατὰ δὲ τὴν φαντασίαν ὡσαύτως ἔχομεν ὥσπερ ἄν εἰ θεώμενοι ἐν γραφῇ τὰ δεινὰ ἢ θαρραλέα.
Moreover, when we form an opinion that something is terrible or fearful, we immediately feel it, and likewise if it is encouraging; but with regard to imagination, we are just as if we were viewing terrible or encouraging things in a picture.
εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς ὑπολήψεως διαφοραί, ἐπιστήμη καὶ δόξα καὶ φρόνησις καὶ τἀναντία τούτων, περὶ ὧν τῆς διαφορᾶς ἕτερος ἔστω λόγος.
There are also differences within judgment itself—knowledge, opinion, wisdom, and their contraries—concerning the difference of which let there be another discussion.