§3.2#2εἰ δʼ ἡ φωνὴ συμφωνία τίς ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ φωνὴ καὶ ἡ ἀκοὴ ἔστιν ὡς ἕν ἐστι, λόγος δʼ ἡ συμφωνία, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν ἀκοὴν λόγον τινὰ εἶναι.
And if voice is a certain concord, and voice and hearing are in a way one, and concord is a proportion, it is necessary that hearing also be a certain proportion.
καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ φθείρει ἕκαστον ὑπερβάλλον, καὶ τὸ ὀξὺ καὶ τὸ βαρύ, τὴν ἀκοήν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν χυμοῖς τὴν γεῦσιν, καὶ ἐν χρώμασι τὴν ὄψιν τὸ σφόδρα λαμπρὸν ἢ ζοφερόν, καὶ ἐν ὀσφρήσει ἡ ἰσχυρὰ ὀσμή, καὶ γλυκεῖα καὶ πικρά, ὡς λόγου τινὸς ὄντος τῆς αἰσθήσεως.
And for this reason, each excess, both the high and the low, destroys hearing; and likewise in flavors taste, and in colors, the extremely bright or dark destroys sight, and in smell, the strong odor destroys smell, both sweet and bitter, since sense is a certain proportion.
διὸ καὶ ἡδέα μέν, ὅταν εἰλικρινῆ καὶ ἀμιγῆ ὄντα ἄγηται εἰς τὸν λόγον, οἷον τὸ ὀξὺ ἢ γλυκὺ ἢ ἁλμυρόν, ἡδέα γὰρ τότε· ὅλως δὲ μᾶλλον τὸ μικτόν, συμφωνία, ἢ τὸ ὀξὺ ἢ τὸ βαρύ· ἡ δʼ αἴσθησις ὁ λόγος· ὑπερβάλλοντα δὲ λύει ἢ φθείρει.
Wherefore also they are pleasant indeed, when, being pure and unmixed, they are brought into the proportion, such as the sour or sweet or salty, for they are pleasant then; but on the whole, the mixed, namely concord, is more pleasant than the high or the low alone; and sense is the proportion; but excesses dissolve or destroy it.
ἑκάστη μὲν οὖν αἴσθησις τοῦ ὑποκειμένου αἰσθητοῦ ἐστίν, ὑπάρχουσα ἐν τῷ αἰσθητηρίῳ ᾗ αἰσθητήριον, καὶ κρίνει τὰς τοῦ ὑποκειμένου αἰσθητοῦ διαφοράς, οἷον λευκὸν μὲν καὶ μέλαν ὄψις, γλυκὺ δὲ καὶ πικρόν γεῦσις.
Each sense, then, is of its underlying sensible object, existing in the sense organ qua sense organ, and judges the differences of the underlying sensible object, such as white and black by sight, and sweet and bitter by taste.
ὁμοίως δʼ ἔχει τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.
And this is likewise the case with the others.
ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ γλυκὺ καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν αἰσθητῶν πρὸς ἕκαστον κρίνομεν, τινὶ καὶ αἰσθανόμεθα ὅτι διαφέρει.
But since we also judge white and sweet and each of the sensible objects in comparison with each other, we must also perceive by something that they differ.
ἀνάγκη δὴ αἰσθήσει· αἰσθητὰ γάρ ἐστιν.
It must indeed be by sense; for they are sensible objects.
ᾗ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι ἡ σὰρξ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἔσχατον αἰσθητήριον· ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἄν ἦν ἁπτόμενον αὐτὸ κρίνειν τὸ κρῖνον.
By which it is also clear that the flesh is not the ultimate sense organ; for if it were, it would be necessary for that which judges to judge by touching the objects itself.
οὔτε δὴ κεχωρισμένοις ἐνδέχεται κρίνειν ὅτι ἕτερον τὸ γλυκὺ τοῦ λευκοῦ, ἀλλὰ δεῖ ἐνί τινι ἄμφω δῆλα εἶναι—οὕτω μὲν γὰρ κἂν εἰ τοῦ μὲν ἐγὼ τοῦ δὲ σὺ αἴσθοιο, δῆλον ἄν εἴη ὅτι ἕτερα ἀλλήλων, δεὶ δὲ τὸ ἒν λέγειν ὅτι ἕτερον· ἕτερον γὰρ τὸ γλυκὺ τοῦ λευκοῦ·
Nor indeed is it possible to judge by separated things that sweet is different from white, but both must be clear to some single thing—for in that way, even if I were to perceive one and you the other, it would be clear that they are different from each other, but the single thing must say that they are different; for sweet is different from white.
λέγει ἄρα τὸ αὐτό ὥστε ὡς λέγει, οὕτω καὶ νοεῖ καὶ αἰσθάνεται-ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐχ οἷόν τε κεχωρισμένοις κρίνειν τὰ κεχωρισμένα, δῆλον· ὅτι δʼ οὐδ’ ἐν κεχωρισμένῳ χρόνῳ, ἐντεῦθεν.
Therefore the same thing says it; so that as it says, so it also thinks and perceives—that it is impossible, then, to judge separated things with separated things is clear; and that it is also impossible in separated times, is clear from what follows.
ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ λέγει ὅτι ἕτερον τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τό κακόν, οὕτω καὶ ὅτε θάτερον λέγει ὅτι ἕτερον καὶ θάτερον, οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς τὸ ὅτε (λέγω δʼ, οἷον νῦν λέγω ὅτι ἕτερον, οὐ μέντοι ὅτι νῦν· ἕτερον), ἀλλʼ οὕτω λέγει, καὶ νῦν καὶ ὅτι νῦν· ἄμα ἄρα.
For just as the same thing says that good and bad are different, so also when it says that one is different and the other is different, the 'when' is not accidental (I mean, for example, 'I say now that they are different, but not however that they are different now', but it says so both now and that they are different now; therefore, they are at the same time).
ὥστε ἀχώριστον καὶ ἐν ἀχωρίστῳ χρόνῳ.
So that it is undivided and in an undivided time.
ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀδύνατον ἄμα τὰς ἐναντίας κινήσεις κινεῖσθαι τὸ αὐτὸ ᾗ ἀδιαίρετον, καὶ ἐν ἀδιαιρέτῳ χρόνῳ.
But indeed it is impossible for the same thing, insofar as it is indivisible, to be moved with contrary motions at the same time, and in an indivisible time.
εἰ γὰρ γλυκύ, ὡδὶ κινεῖ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἢ τὴν νόησιν, τὸ δὲ πικρόν ἐναντίως, καὶ τὸ λευκὸν ἑτέρως.
For if sweet moves sense or thought in this way, and bitter in the contrary way, and white in another way.
ἄρʼ οὖν ἄμα μὲν καὶ ἀριθμῷ ἀδιαίρετον καὶ ἀχώριστον τὸ κρῖνον, τῷ εἶναι δὲ κεχωρισμένον;
Is it then at the same time both numerically indivisible and inseparable, the judging subject, but in its being divided?
ἔστι δή πως ὡς τὸ διαιρετὸν τῶν διῃρημένων αἰσθάνεται, ἔστι δʼ ὡς ᾗ ἀδιαίρετον· τῷ εἶναι μὲν γὰρ διαιρετόν, τόπῳ δὲ καὶ ἀριθμῷ ἀδιαίρετον.
In a way indeed, as that which is divided it perceives divided things, but in a way as that which is indivisible; for in its being it is divided, but in place and number it is indivisible.
ἢ οὐχ οἷόν τε;
Or is this not possible?
δυνάμει μὲν γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἀδιαίρετον τἀναντία, τῷ δʼ εἶναι οὔ, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἐνεργεῖσθαι διαιρετόν, καὶ οὐχ οἶόν τε ἄμα λευκόν καὶ μέλαν εἶναι, ὥστʼ οὐδὲ τὰ εἴδη πάσχειν αὐτῶν, εἰ τοιοῦτον ἡ αἴσθησις καὶ ἡ νόησις.
For potentially the same and indivisible thing can be contraries, but in its being it cannot, but is divided in being actualized, and it is impossible to be white and black at the same time, so that neither can it receive their forms, if sense and thought are of this nature.
ἀλλʼ ὤσπερ ἣν καλοῦσί τινες στιγμήν, ᾖ μία καὶ δύο, ταύτῃ ἀδιαίρετος> καὶ διαιρετή.
But like what some call a point, insofar as it is one and two, in this way it is <indivisible> and divisible.
ᾗ μὲν οὖν ἀδιαίρετον, ἓν τό κρῖνόν ἐστι καὶ ἄμα, ᾖ δὲ διαιρετόν ὑπάρχει, δὶς τῷ αὐτῷ χρῆται σημείῳ ἅμα·
Insofar, then, as it is indivisible, that which judges is one and at the same time, but insofar as it is divisible, it uses the same point twice at the same time.
μὲν οὖν δὶς χρῆται τῷ πέρατι, δύο κρίνει καὶ ἔστιν ὡς κεχωρισμένως· ᾖ δὲ ἐνί, ἓν καὶ ἅμα.
Insofar, then, as it uses the limit twice, it judges two things and in a way separately; but insofar as it uses it as one, it judges one and at the same time.
περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς ἀρχῆς ἢ φαμὲν τὸ ζῷον αἰσθητικόν εἶναι, διωv τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον.
Concerning, then, the principle by which we say that the animal is sensitive, let it be defined in this way.