§3.2#1Ἐπεὶ δʼ αἰσθανόμεθα ὅτι ὁρῶμεν καὶ ἀκούομεν, ἀνάγκη ἢ τῇ ὄψει αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅτι ὁρᾷ, ἢ ἑτέρᾳ.
Since we perceive that we see and hear, it is necessary either to perceive by sight that it sees, or by another sense.
ἀλλʼ ἡ αὐτὴ ἔσται τῆς ὄψεως καὶ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου χρώματος.
But if it is by another, the same sense will be of sight and of the underlying color.
ὥστε ἢ δύο τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἔσονται ἢ αὐτὴ αὑτῆς.
So that either there will be two of the same, or it will be of itself.
ἔτι δʼ εἰ καὶ ἑτέρα εἴη ἡ τῆς ὄψεως αἴσθησις, ἢ εἰς ἄπειρον εἶσιν ἢ αὐτή τις ἔσται αὑτῆς· ὥστʼ ἐπὶ τῆς πρώτης τοῦτο ποιητέον.
Further, even if the sense of sight were different, either it will go on to infinity or some sense will be of itself; so that we must assume this in the first case.
ἔχει δʼ ἀπορίαν· εἰ γὰρ τὸ τῇ ὄψει αἰσθάνεσθαί ἐστιν ὁρᾶν, ὁρᾶται δὲ χρῶμα ἢ τὸ ἔχον, εἰ ὄψεταί τις τὸ ὁρᾶν, καὶ χρῶμα ἕξει τὸ ὁρᾶν πρῶτον.
But there is a difficulty; for if indeed to perceive by sight is to see, and that which is seen is color or that which has color, if someone is to see that which sees, then that which sees will also primarily have color.
φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι οὐχ ἓν τὸ τῇ ὄψει αἰσθάνεσθαι· καὶ γὰρ ὅταν μὴ ὁρῶμεν, τῇ ὄψει κρίνομεν καὶ τὸ σκότος καὶ τὸ φῶς, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ὡσαύτως.
It is clear, then, that to perceive by sight is not a single thing; for even when we do not see, we judge both darkness and light by sight, though not in the same way.
ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὸ ὁρῶν ἔστιν ὡς κεχρωμάτισται· τὸ γὰρ αἰσθητήριον δεκτικὸν τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης ἕκαστον.
Furthermore, that which sees is also in a way colored; for each sense organ is receptive of the sensible object without its matter.
διὸ καὶ ἀπελθόντων τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἔνεισιν αἰσθήσεις καὶ φαντασίαι ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις.
Wherefore even when the sensible objects are gone, sensations and images remain in the sense organs.
ἡ δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἐνέργεια καὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἡ αὐτὴ μέν ἐστι καὶ μία, τὸ δʼ εἶναι οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ αὐταῖς· λέγω δʼ οἷον ὁ ψόφος ὁ κατʼ ἐνέργειαν καὶ ἡ ἀκοὴ ἡ κατʼ ἐνέργειαν· ἔστι γὰρ ἀκοὴν ἔχοντα μὴ ἀκούειν, καὶ τὸ ἔχον ψόφον οὐκ ἀοὶ ψοφεῖ· ὅταν δʼ ἐνεργῇ τὸ δυνάμενον ἀκούειν καὶ ψοφῇ τὸ δυνάμενον ψοφεῖν, τότε ἡ κατʼ ἐνέργειαν ἀκοὴ ἅμα γίνεται καὶ ὁ κατʼ ἐνέργειαν ψόφος, ὧν εἴποιεν ἄν τις τὸ μὲν εἶναι ἄκουσιν τὸ δὲ ψόφησιν.
But the activity of the sensible object and that of the sensation is the same and one, though their being is not the same; I mean, for example, actual sound and actual hearing; for it is possible to have hearing and not hear, and that which has sound does not always make a sound; but when that which is capable of hearing is active, and that which is capable of making a sound makes a sound, then actual hearing and actual sound occur at the same time, of which one might call the former hearing-activity and the latter sounding-activity.
εἰ δή ἐστιν ἡ κίνησις καὶ ἡ ποίησις ἐν τῷ ποιουμένῳ, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸν ψόφον καὶ τὴν ἀκοὴν τὴν κατʼ ἐνέργειαν ἐν τῇ κατὰ δύναμιν εἶναι· ἡ γὰρ τοῦ ποιητικοῦ καὶ κινητικοῦ ἐνέργεια ἐν τῷ πάσχοντι ἐγγίνεται· διὸ οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὸ κινοῦν κινεῖσθαι.
If indeed motion and action are in that which is acted upon, it is necessary that both actual sound and actual hearing are in that which is potential; for the activity of the active and motive is produced in the passive; wherefore it is not necessary for that which moves to be moved.
ἡ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ψοφητικοῦ ἐνέργειά ἐστι ψόφος ἢ ψόφησις, ἡ δὲ τοῦ ἀκουστικοῦ ἀκοὴ ἢ ἄκουσις· διττὸν γὰρ ἡ ἀκοή, καὶ διττὸν ὁ ψόφος.
Therefore the activity of that which is capable of sounding is sound or sounding-activity, and that of that which is capable of hearing is hearing or hearing-activity; for hearing is twofold, and sound is twofold.
ὁ δʼ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων καὶ αἰσθητῶν.
And the same account applies to the other senses and sensible objects.
ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ ἡ ποίησις καὶ ἡ πάθησις ἐν τῷ πάσχοντι ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι, οὕτω καὶ ἡ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἐνέργεια καὶ ἡ τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ ἐν τῷ αἰσθητικῷ.
For just as action and passion are in the passive and not in the active, so also the activity of the sensible object and that of the sensitive power are in the sensitive subject.
ἀλλʼ ἐπʼ ἐνίων μὲν ὠνόμασται, οἷον ἡ ψόφησις καὶ ἡ ἄκουσις, ἐπʼ ἐνίων δʼ ἀνώνυμον θάτερον· ὅρασις γὰρ λέγεται ἡ τῆς ὄψεως ἐνέργεια, ἡ δὲ τοῦ χρώματος ἀνώνυμος, καὶ γεῦσις ἡ τοῦ γευστικοῦ, ἡ δὲ τοῦ χυμοῦ ἀνώνυμος.
But in some cases they have been named, as sounding-activity and hearing-activity, but in others one of the two is nameless; for the activity of sight is called seeing-activity, but that of color is nameless, and taste-activity is that of the gustatory power, but that of flavor is nameless.
ἐπεὶ δὲ μία μέν ἐστιν ἐνέργεια ἡ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ καὶ τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ, τὸ δʼ εἶναι ἕτερον, ἀνάγκη ἅμα φθείρεσθαι καὶ σώζεσθαι τὴν οὕτω λεγομένην ἀκοὴν καὶ ψόφον, καὶ χυμὸν δὴ καὶ γεῦσιν, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὁμοίως· τὰ δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν λεγόμενα οὐκ ἀνάγκη·
Since indeed the activity of the sensible object and that of the sensitive power is one, but their being is different, it is necessary that what are thus called hearing and sound, and indeed flavor and taste, and the others likewise, perish and are preserved at the same time; but those called potential are not necessarily so.
ἀλλʼ οἱ πρότερον φυσιολόγοι τοῦτο οὐ καλῶς ἔλεγον, οὐθὲν οἰόμενοι οὔτε λευκὸν οὔτε μέλαν εἶναι ἄνευ ὄψεως, οὐδὲ χυμὸν ἄνευ γεύσεως.
But the earlier natural philosophers did not speak well on this point, thinking that there is neither white nor black without sight, nor flavor without taste.
τῇ μὲν γὰρ ἔλεγον ὀρθῶς, τῇ δʼ οὐκ ὀρθῶς· διχῶς γὰρ λεγομένης τῆς αἰσθήσεως καὶ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ, τῶν μὲν κατὰ δύναμιν τῶν δὲ κατʼ ἐνέργειαν, ἐπὶ τούτων μὲν συμβαίνει τὸ λεχθέν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἑτέρων οὐ συμβαίνει.
For in one way they spoke correctly, but in another way not correctly; for since sense and sensible object are spoken of in two ways, some as potential and others as actual, in the latter case what was said happens, but in the other case it does not happen.
ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνοι ἁπλῶς ἔλεγον περὶ τῶν λεγομένων οὐχ ἁπλῶς.
But they spoke simply about things which are not spoken of simply.