§3.1Ὅτι δʼ οὐκ ἔστιν αἴσθησις ἑτέρα παρὰ τὰς πέντε (λέγω δὲ ταύτας ὄψιν, ἀκοήν, ὄσφρησιν, γεῦσιν, ἁφήν), ἐκ τῶνδε πιστεύσειεν ἄν τις.
\n That there is no other sense besides the five (and I mean by these sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch) one might believe from the following.
εἰ γὰρ παντὸς οὗ ἐστὶν αἴσθησις ἁφὴ καὶ νῦν αἴσθησιν ἔχομεν (πάντα γὰρ τὰ τοῦ ἁπτοῦ ᾖ ἁπτὸν πάθη τῇ ἁφῇ ἡμῖν αἰσθητά ἐστιν), ἀνάγκη τʼ, εἴπερ ἐκλείπει τις αἴσθησις, καὶ αἰσθητήριόν τι ἡμῖν ἐκλείπειν, καὶ ὅσων μὲν αὐτῶν ἁπτόμενοι αἰσθανόμεθα, τῇ ἁφῇ αἰσθητά ἐστιν, ἣν τυγχάνομεν ἔχοντες, ὅσα δὲ διὰ τῶν μεταξὺ καὶ μὴ αὐτῶν ἁπτόμενοι, τοῖς ἁπλοῖς, λέγω δʼ οἷον ἀέρι καὶ ὕδατι, ἔχει δʼ οὕτως ὥστʼ εἰ μὲν διʼ ἑνὸς πλείω αἰσθητὰ ἕτερα ὄντα ἀλλήλων τῷ γένει, ἀνάγκη τὸν ἔχοντα τὸ τοιοῦτον αἰσθητήριον ἀμφοῖν αἰσθητικὸν εἶναι (οἷον εἰ ἐξ ἀέρος ἐστὶ τὸ αἰσθητήριον, καὶ ἔστιν ὁ ἀὴρ καὶ ψόφου καὶ χρόας), εἰ δὲ πλείω τοῦ αὐτοῦ, οἷον χρόας καὶ ἀὴρ καὶ ὕδωρ (ἄμφω γὰρ διαφανῆ), καὶ ὁ τὸ ἕτερον αὐτῶν ἔχων μόνον αἰσθήσεται τοῦ διʼ ἀμφοῖν, τῶν δὲ ἁπλῶν ἐκ δύο τούτων αἰσθητήρια μόνον ἐστίν, ἐξ ἀέρος καὶ ὕδατος (ἡ μὲν γὰρ κόρη ὕδατος, ἡ δʼ ἀκοὴ ἀέρος, ἡ δʼ ὄσφρησις θατέρου τούτων), τὸ δὲ πῦρ ἢ οὐθενὸς ἢ κοινὸν πάντων (οὐθὲν γὰρ ἄνευ θερμότητος αἰσθητικόν), γῆ δὲ ἢ οὐθενός, ἢ ἐν τῇ ἁφῇ μάλιστα μέμικται ἰδίως, διὸ λείποιτ᾿ ἂν μηθὲν εἶναι αἰσθητήριον ἔξω ὕδατος καὶ ἀέρος, ταῦτα δὲ καὶ νῦν ἔχουσιν ἔνια ζῷα—πᾶσαι ἄρα αἱ αἰσθήσεις ἔχονται ὑπὸ τῶν μὴ ἀτελῶν μηδὲ πεπηρωμένων (φαίνεται γὰρ καὶ ἡ ἀσπάλαξ ὑπὸ τὸ δέρμα ἔχουσα ὀφθαλμούς)· ὥστʼ εἰ μή τι ἕτερον ἔστι σῶμα, καὶ πάθος ὃ μηθενός ἐστι τῶν ἐνταῦθα σωμάτων, οὐδεμία ἂν ἐκλείποι αἴσθησις. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τῶν κοινῶν οἷόν τʼ εἶναι αἰσθητήριόν τι ἴδιον, ὧν ἑκάστῃ αἰσθήσει αἰσθανόμεθα κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οἷον κινήσεως, στάσεως, σχήματος, μεγέθους, ἀριθμοῦ, ἑνός· ταῦτα γὰρ πάντα κινήσει αἰσθανόμεθα, οἷον μέγεθος κινήσει (ὥστε καὶ σχῆμα· μέγεθος γάρ τι τὸ σχῆμα), τὸ δʼ ἠρεμοῦν τῷ μὴ κινεῖσθαι, ὁ δʼ ἀριθμὸς τῇ ἀποφάσει τοῦ συνεχοῦς, καὶ τοῖς ἰδίοις· ἑκάστη γὰρ ἓν αἰσθάνεται αἴσθησις· ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι ἀδύνατον ὁτουοῦν ἰδίαν αἴσθησιν εἶναι τούτων, οἷον κινήσεως· οὕτω γὰρ ἔσται ὥσπερ νῦν τῇ ὄψει τὸ γλυκὺ αἰσθανόμεθα·
For if indeed, of everything of which touch is the sense, we now have the sense (for all the affections of the tangible in so far as it is tangible are perceptible to us by touch), and if it is necessary, if indeed some sense is lacking, that some sense organ must also be lacking to us, and all those things which we perceive by touching them are perceptible by touch, which we happen to have, while all those which we perceive through media and not by touching them, are perceived by means of the simple bodies, I mean, for example, air and water; and the situation is such that if indeed through one medium several sensible objects which are different from each other in genus are perceived, it is necessary that the possessor of such a sense organ must be sensitive to both (as, for example, if the sense organ is of air, and air is the medium of both sound and color); but if there are several media for the same object, as for color both air and water (for both are transparent), then even the one who possesses only one of these will perceive that which is perceived through both; but of the simple bodies, sense organs are made only from these two, from air and water (for the pupil is of water, while hearing is of air, and smell is of one of these two), while fire belongs to none or is common to all (for nothing is sensitive without heat), and earth belongs to none, or is especially mixed in a peculiar way in touch; wherefore it would remain that there is no sense organ outside water and air, and these indeed even now some animals possess;—therefore all the senses are possessed by those animals which are not incomplete or maimed (for it appears that even the mole has eyes under its skin); so that unless there is some other body, and some affection which belongs to none of the bodies in this world, no sense would be lacking.\nBut surely there cannot be any special sense organ for the common sensibles, which we perceive by each sense accidentally, such as motion, rest, shape, magnitude, number, and one; for all these we perceive by motion, as magnitude by motion (wherefore also shape, for shape is a certain magnitude), and that which is at rest by not being moved, and number by the negation of continuity, and by the special sensibles; for each sense perceives one thing; so that it is clear that it is impossible for there to be a special sense for any of these, such as motion; for in that case it will be just as we now perceive sweetness by sight.
τοῦτο δ᾿ ὅτι ἀμφοῖν ἔχοντες τυγχάνομεν αἴσθησιν, ᾗ ὅταν συμπέσωσιν ἅμα γνωρίζομεν (εἰ δὲ μή, οὐδαμῶς ἂν ἀλλʼ ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ᾐσθανόμεθα, οἷον τὸν Κλέωνος υἱὸν οὐχ ὅτι Κλέωνος υἱός, ἀλλʼ ὅτι λευκός, τούτῳ δὲ συμβέβηκεν υἱῷ Κλέωνος εἶναι).
And this happens because we happen to have perception of both, by which, when they coincide, we recognize them at the same time (otherwise, we would perceive them in no other way than accidentally, as we perceive the son of Cleon not because he is the son of Cleon, but because he is white, and it is accidental to this white thing to be the son of Cleon).
τῶν δὲ κοινῶν ἤδη ἔχομεν αἴσθησιν κοινήν, οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οὐκ ἄῤ ἐστὶν ἰδία· οὐδαμῶς γὰρ ἂν ᾐσθανόμεθα ἀλλʼ ἢ οὕτως ὥσπερ εἴρηται.
But of the common sensibles we already have a common perception, not accidentally; therefore there is no special sense; for otherwise we would perceive them in no other way than as has been said.
τὰ δʼ ἀλλήλων ἴδια κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἰσθάνονται αἱ αἰσθήσεις, οὐχ ᾗ αὐταί, ἀλλʼ ᾗ μία, ὅταν ἅμα γένηται ἡ αἴσθησις ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, οἷον χολῆς ὅτι πικρὰ καὶ ξανθή (οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἑτέρας γε τὸ εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἄμφω ἕν)· διὸ καὶ ἀπατᾶται, καὶ ἐὰν ᾖ ξανθόν, χολὴν οἴεται εἷναι. ζητήσειε δʼ ἄν τις τίνος ἕνεκα πλείους ἔχομεν αἰσθήσεις, ἀλλʼ οὐ μίαν μόνην.
But the senses perceive the special objects of each other accidentally, not in so far as they are themselves, but in so far as they are one, when perception occurs at the same time in the same object, as that bile is bitter and yellow (for it is surely not the part of another sense to say that both are one); wherefore also one is deceived, and if something is yellow, one thinks it is bile.\nOne might ask for what reason we have several senses, and not only one.
ἢ ὅπως ἧττον λανθάνῃ τὰ ἀκολουθοῦντα καὶ κοινά, οἶον κίνησις καὶ μέγεθος καὶ ἀριθμός;
Is it in order that the accompanying and common sensibles, such as motion, magnitude, and number, may be less likely to escape our notice?
εἰ γὰρ ἦν ἡ ὄψις μόνη, καὶ αὕτη λευκοῦ, ἐλάνθανεν ἂν μᾶλλον καὶ ἐδόκει ταὐτὸν εἶναι πάντα διὰ τὸ ἀκολουθεῖν ἀλλήλοις ἅμα χρῶμα καὶ μέγεθος.
For if sight were the only sense, and this was of white, they would more likely have escaped our notice and all things would have seemed to be the same, because color and magnitude accompany each other at the same time.
νῦν δʼ ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν ἑτέρῳ αἰσθητῷ τὰ κοινὰ ὑπάρχει, δῆλον ποιεῖ ὅτι ἄλλο τι ἕκαστον αὐτῶν.
But now, since the common sensibles are present also in another sensible object, it makes it clear that each of them is something different.