§3.11Σκεπτέον δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀτελῶν τί τό κινοῦν ἐστίν, οἷς ἁφῇ μόνον ὑπάρχει αἴσθησις, πότερον ἐνδέχεται φαντασίαν ὑπάρχειν τούτοις, ἢ οὔ, καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν.
We must also consider concerning incomplete animals—namely, those in which only touch belongs as a sense—what it is that moves them, and whether it is possible for imagination and appetite to belong to them, or not.
φαίνεται γὰρ λύπη καὶ ἡδονὴ ἐνοῦσα, εἰ δὲ ταῦτα, καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν ἀνάγκη.
For pain and pleasure appear to be present in them, and if these are present, appetite must also of necessity be present.
φαντασία δὲ πῶς ἂν ἐνείη;
But how could imagination be present?
ἢ ὥσπερ καὶ κινεῖται ἀορίστως, καὶ ταῦτ᾿ ἔνεστι μέν, ἀορίστως δʼ ἔνεστιν.
Or, just as they are also moved in an indefinite way, do these also indeed belong to them, but belong in an indefinite way?
ἡ μὲν οὖν αἰσθητικὴ φαντασία, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις ὑπάρχει, ἡ δὲ βουλευτικὴ ἐν τοῖς λογιστικοῖς (πότερον γὰρ πράξει τόδε ἢ τόδε, λογισμοῦ ἤδη ἐστὶν ἔργον· καὶ ἀνάγκη ἑνὶ μετρεῖν· τὸ μεῖον γὰρ διώκει· ὥστε δύναται ἓν ἐκ πλειόνων φαντασμάτων ποιεῖν).
Therefore, while sensitive imagination, as has been said, belongs also to the other animals, deliberative imagination belongs to those that have the capacity for calculation (for whether one will do this or that is already a function of calculation; and it is necessary to measure by a single standard, for one pursues the [greater] good, so that one is able to make one image out of several images).
καὶ αἴτιον τοῦτο τοῦ δόξαν μὴ δοκεῖν ἔχειν, ὅτι τὴν ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ οὐκ ἔχει.
And this is the cause of their not appearing to have belief, because they do not have that belief which is from syllogism.
διὸ τὸ βουλευτικὸν οὐκ ἔχει ἡ ὄρεξις·
Therefore, appetite does not have the deliberative quality.
νικᾷ δʼ ἐνίοτε καὶ κινεῖ ὁτὲ μὲν αὕτη ἐκείνην, ὁτὲ δʼ ἐκείνη ταύτην, ὥσπερ σφαῖρα σφαῖραν, ἡ ὄρεξις τὴν ὄρεξιν, ὅταν ἀκρασία γένηται· φύσει δὲ ἀεὶ ἡ ἄνω ἀρχικωτέρα καὶ κινεῖ· ὥστε τρεῖς φορὰς ἤδη κινεῖσθαι.
But sometimes one appetite overcomes and moves the other, and sometimes the other the former, like a sphere moving a sphere, when incontinence occurs; but by nature the upper one is always more ruling and moves, so that already three movements are produced.
τὸ δʼ ἐπιστημονικὸν οὐ κινεῖται, ἀλλὰ μένει.
But the scientific faculty is not moved, but remains at rest.
ἐπεὶ δʼ ἡ μὲν. καθόλου ὑπόληψις καὶ λόγος, ἡ δὲ τοῦ καθʼ ἕκαστον (ἡ μὲν γὰρ λέγει ὅτι δεῖ τὸν τοιοῦτον τὸ τοιόνδε πράττειν, ἡ δὲ ὅτι τόδε τοίνυν τοιόνδε, κἀγὼ δὲ τοιόσδε), ἢ δὴ αὕτη κινεῖ ἡ δόξα, οὐχ ἡ καθόλου, ἢ ἄμφω, ἀλλʼ ἡ μὲν ἠρεμοῦσα μᾶλλον, ἡ δʼ οὔ.
Since, then, the one judgment or reason is universal, while the other is of the particular (for the former says that such a person ought to do such a deed, while the latter says that this present thing is of such a kind, and I am such a person), it is indeed this [particular] belief that moves, not the universal one, or both do, but the one remains more at rest, while the other does not.