§3.12Τὴν μὲν οὖν θρετπτικὴν ψυχὴν ἀνάγκη πᾶν ἔχειν ὅτι περ ἂν ζῇ καὶ ψυχὴν ἔχῃ, ἀπὸ γενέσεως καὶ μέχρι φθορᾶς·
Therefore, it is necessary for everything that lives and has a soul to have the nutritive soul, from its generation until its destruction.
ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸ γενόμενον αὔξησιν ἔχειν καὶ ἀκμὴν καὶ φθίσιν, ταῦτα δʼ ἄνευ τροφῆς ἀδύνατον·
For that which has been generated must of necessity have growth, maturity, and decay, and these are impossible without nourishment.
ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἐνεῖναι τὴν θρεπτικὴν δύναμιν ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς φυομένοις καὶ φθίνουσιν.
Therefore, it is necessary that the nutritive power be present in all things that grow and decay.
αἴσθησιν δʼ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς ζῶσιν·
But sensation is not necessary in all living things.
οὔτε γὰρ ὅσων τὸ σῶμα ἁπλοῦν ἐνδέχεται ἁρὴν ἔχειν, οὔτε ὅσα μὴ δεκτικὰ τῶν εἰδῶν ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης.
For it is neither possible for those whose body is simple to have touch, nor for those that are not receptive of forms without matter.
τὸ δὲ ζῷον ἀναγκαῖον αἴσθησιν ἔχειν,
οὐδὲ ἄνευ ταύτης οἷόν τε οὐθὲν εἶναι ζῷον,
εἰ μηθὲν μάτην ποιεῖ ἡ φύσις.
But an animal must of necessity have sensation, and without this it is not possible for anything to be an animal, if nature does nothing in vain.
ἕνεκά του γὰρ πάντα ὑπάρχει τὰ φύσει, ἢ συμτπτώματα ἔσται τῶν ἕνεκά του.
For all things that exist by nature exist for the sake of something, or else will be coincidences of things that are for the sake of something.
εἰ οὖν πᾶν σῶμα πορευτικόν, μὴ ἔχον αἴσθησιν, φθείροιτο ἂν καὶ εἰς τέλος οὐκ ἂν ἔλθοι, ὅ ἐστι φύσεως ἔργον (πῶς γὰρ θρέψεται;
If, then, any body capable of locomotion should not have sensation, it would perish and would not reach its end, which is the work of nature. (For how will it nourish itself?
τοῖς μὲν γὰρ μονίμοις ὑπάρχει τοῦτο ὅθεν πεφύκασιν, οὐχ οἷόν τε δὲ σῶμα ἔχειν μὲν ψυχὴν καὶ νοῦν κριτικόν, αἴσθησιν δὲ μὴ ἔχειν, μὴ μόνιμον ὄν, γενητὸν δέ—ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ἀγένητον· διὰ τί γὰρ οὐχ ἕξει;
To stationary things, indeed, that from which they naturally grow is present; but it is not possible for a body that is not stationary, but is generated, to have a soul and a discerning intellect, and yet not to have sensation—nor, indeed, can it be ungenerated; for why should it not have it?
ἢ γὰρ τῇ ψυχῇ βέλτιον ἢ τῷ σώματι, νῦν δʼ οὐδέτερον· ἡ μὲν γὰρ οὐ μᾶλλον νοήσει, τὸ δʼ οὐθὲν ἔσται μᾶλλον δἰ ἐκεῖνο)—οὐθὲν ἄρα ἔχει ψυχὴν σῶμα μὴ μόνιμον ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως.
For either it would be better for the soul or for the body, but as it is, it is neither; for the former will not think any the better, and the latter will be no better off on that account.) Therefore, no body that is not stationary has a soul without having sensation.
ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴγε αἴσθησιν ἔχει, ἀνάγκη τὸ σῶμα εἶναι ἢ ἁπλοῦν ἢ μικτόν.
But indeed, if it has sensation, the body must of necessity be either simple or mixed.
οὐχ οἷόν τε δὲ ἁπλοῦν· ἁφὴν γὰρ οὐχ ἕξει, ἔστι δὲ ἀνάγκη ταύτην ἔχειν.
But it is not possible for it to be simple; for it will not have touch, and it is necessary to have this.
τοῦτο δὲ ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον.
And this is clear from the following.
ἐπεὶ γὰρ τὸ ζῷον σῶμα ἔμψυχόν ἐστι, σῶμα δὲ ἅπαν ἁπιόν, ἁπιὸν δὲ τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἁφῇ, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ τοῦ ζῴου σῶμα ἁπτικόν εἶναι, εἰ μέλλει σώεσθαι τὸ ζῷον.
For since the animal is an ensouled body, and every body is tangible, and the tangible is that which is perceptible by touch, it is necessary also for the animal's body to be capable of touch, if the animal is to be preserved.
αἱ γὰρ ἄλλαι αἰσθήσεις δἰ ἑτέρων αἰσθάνονται, οἷον ὄσφρησις ὄψις ἀκοή· ἁπτόμενον δέ, εἰ μὴ ἕξει αἴσθησιν, οὐ δυνήσεται τὰ μὲν φεύγειν τὰ δὲ λαβεῖν.
For the other senses perceive through other media, as for instance smell, sight, and hearing; but if the animal, when in contact, is not to have sensation, it will not be able to avoid some things and take others.
εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἀδύνατον ἔσται σώζεσθαι τὸ ζῷον.
And if so, it will be impossible for the animal to be preserved.
διὸ καὶ ἡ γεῦσίς ἐστιν ὥσπερ ἁφή τις· τροφῆς γάρ ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ τροφὴ τό σῶμα τὸ ἁπιόν.
Therefore, taste also is a kind of touch; for it is of nourishment, and nourishment is tangible body.
φόρος δὲ καὶ χρῶμα καὶ ὀσμὴ οὐ τρέφει, οὐδὲ ποιεῖ οὔτ᾿ αὔξτησιν οὔτε φθίσιν· ὥστε καὶ τὴν γεῦσιν ἀνάγκη ἁρὴν εἶναί τινα, διὰ τὸ τοῦ ἁπτοῦ καὶ θρεπτικοῦ αἴσθησιν εἶναι·
But sound, color, and smell do not nourish, nor do they produce either growth or decay; so that taste too must of necessity be a kind of touch, because it is the sensation of that which is tangible and nutritive.
αὗται μὲν οὖν ἀναγκαῖαι τῷ ζῴῳ, καὶ φανερὸν ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τε ἄνευ ἁφῆς εἶναι ζῷον, αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι τοῦ τε εὖ ἕνεκα καὶ γένει ζῴων ἤδη οὐ τῷ τυχόντι· ἀλλὰ τισίν, οἷον τῷ πορευτικῷ, ἀνάγκη ὑπάρχειν· εἰ γὰρ μέλλει σώζεσθαι, οὐ μόνον δεῖ ἁπτόμενον αἰσθάνεσθαι ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄποθεν.
These, then, are necessary to the animal, and it is clear that it is not possible for an animal to exist without touch; while the other senses are for the sake of well-being, and belong already not to any chance animal, but to certain kinds of animals, such as the locomotive, in which they must of necessity be present; for if it is to be preserved, it must not only perceive when in contact, but also from a distance.
τοῦτο δʼ ἂν εἴη, εἰ διὰ τοῦ μεταξὺ αἰσθητικὸν εἴη τῷ ἐκεῖνο μὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ πάσχειν καὶ κινεῖσθαι, αὐτὸ δʼ ὑπ᾿ ἐκείνου.
And this would be the case if it were capable of perceiving through a medium, by that medium being acted upon and moved by the sensible object, and the animal itself by that medium.
ὥσπερ γὰρ τό κινοῦν κατὰ τόπον μέχρι του μεταβάλλειν ποιεῖ, καὶ τὸ ὦσαν ἕτερον ποιεῖ ὥστε ὠθεῖν, καὶ ἔστι διὰ μέσου ἡ κίνησις, καὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον κινοῦν ὠθεῖ οὐκ ὠθούμενον, τὸ δʼ ἔσχατον μόνον ὠθείται οὐκ ὦσαν, τὸ δὲ μέσον ἄμφω, πολλὰ δὲ τὰ μέσα, οὕτω καὶ ἐπʼ ἀλλοιώσεως, πλὴν ὅτι μένοντα ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τόπῳ ἀλλοιοῦται, οἷον εἰ εἰς κηρὸν βάψειέ τις, μέχρι τούτου ἐκινήθη, ἕως ἔβαψεν· λίθος δὲ οὐδέν, ἀλλʼ ὕδωρ μέχρι πόρρω· ὁ δʼ ἀὴρ ἐπὶ πλείστον κινεῖται καὶ ποιεῖ καὶ πάσχει, ἐὰν μένῃ καὶ εἷς ᾖ.
For just as that which causes local motion produces change up to a certain point, and that which has pushed makes another push, and the movement is through a medium, and the first mover pushes without being pushed, and the last is only pushed without pushing, while the medium does both, and there may be many media, so also it is in the case of alteration, except that the things altered undergo alteration while remaining in the same place; for instance, if one were to dip something into wax, the wax was moved up to the point where he dipped it; a stone, however, is not moved at all, but water is moved to a great distance; and air is moved to the greatest distance and both acts and is acted upon, provided it remains and is one.
διὸ καὶ περὶ ἀνακλάσεως βέλτιον ἢ τὴν ὄψιν ἐξιοῦσαν ἀνακλᾶσθαι τὸν ἀέρα πάσχειν ὑπὸ τοῦ σχήματος καὶ χρώματος, μέχρι περ οὗ ἂν εἷς.
Therefore, concerning reflection also, it is better, rather than saying that sight goes out and is reflected, to say that the air is acted upon by the shape and color, as far as it is one.
ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ λείου ἐστὶν εἷς· διὸ πάλιν οὗτος τὴν ὄψιν κινεῖ, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ τὸ ἐν τῷ κηρῷ σημεῖον διεδίδοτο μέχρι τοῦ πέρατος.
And on a smooth surface the air is one; therefore this in turn moves sight, just as if the mark in the wax were transmitted through to the limit.