§2.12Καθόλου δὲ περὶ πάσης αἰσθήσεως δεῖ λαβεῖν ὅτι ἡ μὲν αἴσθησίς ἐστι τὸ δεκτικὸν τῶν αἰσθητῶν εἰδῶν ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης, οἷον ὁ κηρὸς τοῦ δακτυλίου ἄνευ τοῦ σιδήρου καὶ τοῦ χρυσοῦ δέχεται τὸ σημεῖον, λαμβάνει δὲ τὸ χρυσοῦν ἢ τὸ χαλκοῦν σημεῖον, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ᾗ χρυσὸς ἢ χαλκός·
Generally, regarding every sense, it must be assumed that sense is that which is receptive of sensible forms without matter, just as wax receives the imprint of a ring without the iron or gold; that is, it receives the golden or bronze imprint, but not in so far as it is gold or bronze.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις ἑκάστου ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔχοντος χρῶμα ἢ χυμὸν ἢ ψόφον πάσχει, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ᾗ ἕκαστον ἐκείνων λέγεται, ἀλλʼ ᾗ τοιονδί, καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον.
Similarly, the sense of each object also is acted upon by that which has color or flavor or sound, not in so far as each of those is said to be (as a specific substance), but in so far as it is of such a quality, and in accordance with the proportion (logos).
αἰσθητήριον δὲ πρῶτον ἐν ὧ ἡ τοιαύτη δύναμις.
And the primary sense organ is that in which such a power resides.
ἔστι μὲν οὖν ταὐτόν, τὸ δʼ εἶναι ἕτερον· μέγεθος μὲν γὰρ ἄν· τι εἴη τὸ αἰσθανόμενον, οὐ μὴν τό γε αἰσθητικῷ εἶναι οὐδʼ ἡ αἴσθησις μέγεθός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ λόγος τις καὶ δύναμις ἐκείνου.
They are, therefore, the same, but their essence (being) is different; for that which perceives must be some magnitude, yet being a perceiver (its essence) or perception is certainly not a magnitude, but is rather a certain proportion (logos) and power of that magnitude.
φανερὸν δʼ ἐκ τούτων καὶ διὰ τί ποτε τῶν αἰσθητῶν αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ φθείρουσι τὰ αἰσθητήρια (ἐὰν γὰρ ᾖ ἰσχυροτέρα τοῦ αἰσθητηρίου ἡ κίνησις, λύεται ὁ λόγος—τοῦτο δʼ ἧν ἡ αἴσθησις—ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ συμφωνία καὶ ὁ τόνος κρουομένων σφόδρα τῶν χορδῶν), καὶ διὰ τί ποτε τὰ φυτὰ οὐκ αἰσθάνεται, ἔχοντά τι μόριον ψυχικὸν καὶ πάσχοντά τι ὑπὸ τῶν ἁπτῶν· καὶ γὰρ ψύχεται καὶ θερμαίνεται·
It is also clear from this why the excesses of sensible objects destroy the sense organs (for if the movement is too strong for the sense organ, the proportion is destroyed—which was the sense—just as concord and pitch are destroyed when the strings are struck too violently), and why plants do not perceive, though they have some portion of soul and are affected in some way by tangible things; for they are both cooled and heated.
αἴτιον γὰρ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν μεσότητα, μηδὲ τοιαύτην ἀρχὴν οἵαν τὰ εἴδη δέχεσθαι τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ἀλλὰ πάσχειν μετὰ τῆς ὕλης.
For the cause is their not having a mean, nor such a principle as to receive the forms of sensible objects, but rather they are affected along with the matter.
ἀπορήσειε δʼ ἄν τις εἰ πάθοι ἄν τι ὑπʼ ὀσμῆς τὸ ἀδύνατον ὀσφρανθῆναι, ἢ ὑπὸ χρώματος τὸ μὴ δυνάμενον ἰδεῖν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.
One might raise the difficulty whether anything could be affected by odor if it is incapable of smelling, or by color if it is unable to see; and likewise in the other cases.
εἰ δὲ τὸ ὀσφραντὸν ὀσμή, εἴ τι ποιεῖ, τὴν ὄσφρησιν ἡ ὀσμὴ ποιεῖ· ὥστε τῶν ἀδυνάτων ὀσφρανθῆναι οὐθὲν οἷόν τε πάσχειν ὑπʼ ὀσμῆς (ὁ δʼ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων)· οὐδὲ τῶν δυνατῶν, ἀλλʼ ἢ ᾖ αἰσθητικὸν ἕκαστον.
And if the object of smell is odor, if odor produces any effect, it produces it upon the sense of smell; so that none of those things incapable of smelling can possibly be affected by odor (and the same argument holds for the others), nor can those which are capable, except in so far as each is sensitive.
ἅμα δὲ δῆλον καὶ οὕτως· οὔτε γὰρ φῶς καὶ σκότος οὔτε ψόφος οὔτε ὀσμὴ οὐδὲν ποιεῖ τὰ σώματα, ἀλλʼ ἐν οἷς ἐστίν, οἷον ἀὴρ ὁ μετὰ βροντῆς διίστησι τὸ ξύλον.
At the same time, this is also clear as follows: for neither light and darkness, nor sound, nor odor produces any effect on bodies, but rather the things in which they are, as the air accompanied by thunder splits the wood.
ἀλλὰ τὰ ἁπτὰ καὶ οἱ χυμοὶ ποιοῦσιν· εἰ γὰρ μή, ὑπὸ τίνος ἂν πάσχοι τὰ ἄψυχα καὶ ἀλλοιοῖτο;
But tangibles and flavors do produce effects; for if not, by what would inanimate things be affected and altered?
ἆῤ οὖν κἀκεῖνα ποιήσει;
Will those others, then, also produce effects?
ἢ οὐ πᾶν σῶμα παθητικὸν ὑπ᾿ ὀσμῆς καὶ ψόφου, καὶ τὰ πάσχοντα ἀόριστα, καὶ οὐ μένει, οἷον ἀήρ (ὄζει γὰρ ὥσπερ παθών τι);
Or is it that not every body is susceptible to odor and sound, and those which are affected are indefinite and do not remain, like air (for it smells as though it has been affected in some way)?
τί οὖν ἐστι τὸ ὀσμᾶσθαι παρὰ τὸ πάσχειν τι;
What then is smelling, besides being affected in some way?
ἢ τὸ μὲν ὀσμᾶσθαι καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι, ὁ δʼ ἀὴρ παθὼν ταχέως αἰσθητὸς γίνεται;
Or is it that smelling is perceiving, whereas the air, having been affected, quickly becomes itself sensible?