§2.2#1Ἐπεὶ δʼ ἐκ τῶν ἀσαφῶν μὲν φανερωτέρων δὲ γίνεται τό σαφὲς καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον γνωριμώτερον, πειρατέον πάλιν οὕτω γʼ ἐπελθεῖν περὶ αὐτῆς·
Since, however, what is clear and more knowable according to reason arises from what is obscure but more obvious, we must try again to approach the subject of the soul in this way.
οὐ γὰρ μόνον τὸ ὅτι δεῖ τόν ὁριστικόν λόγον δηλοῦν, ὥσπερ οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν ὅρων λέγουσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν ἐνυπάρχειν καὶ ἐμφαίνεσθαι.
For a defining formula must not only show the fact, as most definitions state, but the cause also must be inherent and manifest in it.
νῦν δʼ ὥσπερ συμπεράσμαθʼ οἱ λόγοι τῶν ὄρων εἰσίν·
But as it is, the formulae of definitions are like conclusions.
οἷον τί ἐστιν ὁ τετραγωνισμός;
For example, what is squaring?
τό ἴσον ἑτερομήκει ὀρθογώνιον εἶναι ἰσόπλευρον.
It is a rectangle with unequal sides being equal to an equilateral one.
ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ὄρος λόγος τοῦ συμπεράσματος·
But such a definition is a formula of the conclusion.
ὁ δὲ λέγων ὅτι ἐστὶν ὁ τετραγωνισμός μέσης εὕρεσις τοῦ πράγματος λέγει τὸ αἴτιον.
On the other hand, one who says that squaring is the finding of a mean proportional states the cause.
λέγομεν· οὖν, ἀρχὴν λαβόντες τῆς σκέψεως, διωρίσθαι τὸ ἔμψυχον τοῦ ἀψύχου τῷ ζῆν.
We say, then, making a fresh start for our inquiry, that the animate is distinguished from the inanimate by living.
πλεοναχῶς δὲ τοῦ ζῆν λεγομένου, κἄν ἕν τι τούτων ἐνυπάρχῃ μόνον, ζῆν αὐτό φαμεν, οἷον νοῦς, αἴσθησις, κίνησις καὶ στάσις ἡ κατὰ τόπον, ἔτι κίνησις ἡ κατὰ τροφὴν καὶ φθίσις τε καὶ αὔξησις.
And since 'living' is said in many ways, even if only one of these is present, we say it lives: for instance, intellect, perception, movement and rest in place, and furthermore, movement in respect of nutrition, both decay and growth.
διὸ καὶ τὰ φυόμενα πάντα δοκεῖ ζῆν· φαίνεται γὰρ ἐν αὑτοῖς ἔχοντα δύναμιν καὶ ἀρχὴν τοιαύτην, διʼ ἧς αὔξησίν τε καὶ φθίσιν λαμβάνουσι κατὰ τοὺς ἐναντίους τόπους·
Hence also all plants seem to live; for they are seen to possess in themselves such a power and principle through which they receive growth and decay in contrary directions.
οὐ γὰρ ἄνω μὲν αὔξεται, κάτω δʼ ὄ, ἀλλʼ ὁμοίως ἐπʼ ἄμφω καὶ πάντη, ὅσα ἀεὶ τρέφεταί τε καὶ ζῇ διὰ τέλους, ἕως ἄν δύνηται λαμβάνειν τροφήν.
For they do not grow upwards but not downwards, but equally in both directions and everywhere, as many as are continually nourished and live to the end, as long as they are able to receive food.
χωρίζεσθαι δὲ τοῦτο μὲν τῶν ἄλλων δυνατόν, τὰ δʼ ἄλλα τούτου ἀδύνατον ἐν τοῖς θνητοῖς.
And this can be separated from the others, but the others cannot be separated from this in mortal beings.
φανερὸν δʼ ἐπὶ τῶν φυομένων· οὐδεμία γὰρ αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχει δύναμις ἄλλη ψυχῆς.
This is clear in the case of plants; for they have no other power of the soul.
τὸ μὲν οὖν ζῆν διὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν ταύτην ὑπάρχει τοῖς ζῶσι, τὸ δὲ ζῷον διὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν πρώτως· καὶ γὰρ τὰ μὴ κινούμενα μηδʼ ἀλλάττοντα τόπον, ἔχοντα δʼ αἴσθησιν, ζῶα λέγομεν καὶ οὐ ζῆν μόνον.
Living, then, belongs to living things because of this principle, but being an animal belongs to them primarily because of perception; for even things that do not move or change their place, but possess perception, we call animals and not merely living.
αἰσθήσεως δὲ πρῶτον ὑπάρχει πᾶσιν ἁφή.
And of perception, touch is the first to belong to all.
ὥσπερ δὲ τὸ θρεπτικὸν δύναται χωρίζεσθαι τῆς ἁφῆς καὶ πάσης αἰσθήσεως, οὕτως ἡ ἁφὴ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων.
And just as the nutritive faculty can be separated from touch and all perception, so touch can be separated from the other perceptions.
θρεπτικὸν δὲ λέγομεν τὸ τοιοῦτον μόριον τῆς ψυχῆς οὗ καὶ τὰ φυόμενα μετέχει· τὰ δὲ ζῷα πάντα φαίνεται τὴν ἁπτικὴν αἴσθησιν ἔχοντα·
We call that part of the soul 'nutritive' of which plants also participate; and all animals are seen to possess the sense of touch.
διʼ ἣν δʼ αἰτίαν ἑκάτερον τούτων συμβέβηκεν, ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν.
But we shall state the cause of each of these occurrences later.
νῦν δʼ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω μόνον, ὅτι ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχὴ τῶν· εἰρημένων τούτων ἀρχὴ καὶ τούτοις ὥρισται, θρεπτικῷ, αἰσθητικῷ, διανοητικῷ, κινήσει.
For now let it be said only this much, that the soul is the principle of these mentioned things and is defined by them: namely, the nutritive, the perceptive, the intellective, and movement.
πότερον δὲ τούτων ἕκαστόν ἐστι ψυχὴ ἢ μόριον ψυχῆς, καὶ εἰ μόριον, πότερον οὕτως ὥστʼ εἶναι χωριστὸν· λόγῳ μόνον ἢ καὶ τόπῳ, περὶ μὲν τινῶν τούτων οὐ χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν, ἔνια δὲ ἀπορίαν ἔχει.
But whether each of these is a soul or a part of a soul, and if a part, whether it is separable only in definition or also in place—concerning some of these it is not difficult to see, but some present a difficulty.
ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν φυτῶν ἔνια διαιρούμενα φαίνεται ζῶντα καὶ χωριζμενα ἀπʼ ἀλλήλων, ὡς οὔσης τῆς ἐν αὐτοῖς ψυχῆς ἐντελεχείᾳ μὲν μιᾶς ἐν ἑκάστῳ φυτῷ, δυνάμει δὲ πλειόνων, οὕτως ὁρῶμεν καὶ περὶ ἑτέρας διαφορὰς τῆς ψυχῆς συμβαῖνον ἐπὶ τῶν ἐντόμων ἐν τοῖς διατεμνομένοις·
For just as in the case of plants, some when divided are seen to live and to be separated from one another, showing that the soul in them is actually one in each plant, but potentially many; so we see it happening also concerning other differences of the soul in the case of insects that are cut in pieces.
καὶ γὰρ αἴσθησιν ἑκάτερον τῶν μερῶν ἔχει καὶ κίνησιν τὴν κατὰ τόπον, εἰ δʼ αἴσθησιν, καὶ φαντασίαν καὶ ὄρεξιν· ὅπου μὲν γὰρ αἴσθησις, καὶ λύπη τε καὶ ἡδονή, ὅπου δὲ ταῦτα, ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ ἐπιθυμία.
For each of the parts has perception and movement in place, and if perception, then also imagination and desire; for where there is perception, there is also pain and pleasure, and where these are, there is of necessity also appetite.