§2.2#2περὶ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τῆς θεωρητικῆς δυνάμεως οὐδέν πω φανερόν, ἀλλʼ ἔοικε ψυχῆς γένος ἕτερον εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἐνδέχεται χωρίζεσθαι, καθάπερ τὸ ἀΐδιον τοῦ φθαρτοῦ.
But concerning the intellect and the contemplative power nothing is yet clear, but it seems to be a different genus of soul, and this alone is capable of being separated, just as the eternal from the perishable.
τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς φανερόν ἐκ τούτων ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι χωριστά, καθάπερ τινές φασιν· τῷ δὲ λόγῳ ὅτι ἕτερα, φανερόν· αἰσθητικῷ γὰρ εἶναι καὶ δοξαστικῷ ἕτερον, εἴπερ καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι τοῦ δοξάζειν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον τῶν εἰρημένων.
But as for the remaining parts of the soul, it is clear from these things that they are not separable, as some say; but that they are different in definition is clear; for being sensitive is different from being opinative, since perceiving is also different from opining, and similarly also for each of the other mentioned parts.
ἔτι δʼ ἐνίοις μὲν τῶν ζῴων ἅπανθ’ ὑπάρχει ταῦτα, τισὶ δὲ τινὰ τούτων, ἑτέροις δὲ ἓν μόνον (τοῦτο δὲ ποιήσει διαφορὰν τῶν· ζῴων)· διὰ τίνα δʼ αἰτίαν, ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον.
Moreover, in some of the animals all of these are present, in some only some of them, and in others only one (and this will make the difference of animals); but for what cause, we must examine later.
παραπλήσιον δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις συμβέβηκεν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔχει πάσας, τὰ δὲ τινάς, τὰ δὲ μίαν τὴν ἀναγκαιοτάτην, ἁφήν.
And a similar thing has happened also concerning the senses; for some have all of them, others some, and others only one, the most necessary one, touch.
ἐπεὶ δὲ ᾧ ζῶμεν καὶ αἰσθανόμεθα διχῶς λέγεται, καθάπερ ᾧ ἐπιστάμεθα (λέγομεν δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐπιστήμην τὸ δὲ ψυχήν, ἑκατέρῳ γὰρ τούτων φαμὲν ἐπιστάσθαι), ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὑγιαίνομεν τὸ μὲν ὑγιείᾳ τὸ δὲ μορίῳ τινὶ τοῦ σώματος ἢ καὶ ὄλῳ, τούτων δʼ ἡ μὲν ἐπιστήμη τε καὶ ὑγίεια μορφὴ καὶ εἶδός τι καὶ λόγος καὶ οἷον ἐνέργεια τοῦ δεκτικοῦ, ἡ μὲν τοῦ ἐπιστημονικοῦ, ἡ δὲ τοῦ ὑγιαστοῦ (δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐν τῷ πάσχοντι καὶ διατιθεμένῳ ἡ τῶν ποιητικῶν ὑπάρχειν ἐνέργεια), ἡ ψυχὴ δὲ τοῦτο ᾧ ζῶμεν καὶ αἰσθανόμεθα καὶ διανοούμεθα πρώτως—ὥστε λόγος τις ἂν εἴη καὶ εἶδος, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ὕλη καὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον.
Since, however, that by which we live and perceive is spoken of in two ways, just as that by which we know (for we speak of one as knowledge and of the other as soul, since we say we know by each of these), and similarly also we are healthy, on the one hand by health, and on the other hand by some part of the body or even the whole; and of these, on the one hand, knowledge and health are a shape and a certain form and formula and, as it were, activity of what is receptive of them, the former of that which is capable of knowing, the latter of that which is capable of being healthy (for the activity of the productive things seems to exist in that which is acted upon and disposed); and, on the other hand, the soul is that by which we live and perceive and think primarily—so that it would be a certain formula and form, but not matter and the subject.
τριχῶς γὰρ λεγομένης τῆς οὐσίας, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, ὧν τὸ μὲν εἶδος, τὸ δὲ ὕλη, τὸ δὲ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, τούτων δʼ ἡ μὲν ὕλη δύναμις, τὸ δὲ εἶδος ἐντελέχεια, ἐπεὶ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἔμώνχον, οὐ τὸ σῶμά ἐστιν ἐντελέχεια ψυχῆς, ἀλλʼ αὕτη σώματός τινος.
For since substance is spoken of in three ways, as we said, of which one is form, another matter, and the third what is from both, and of these, matter is potentiality, while form is actuality, since what is from both is animate, the body is not the actuality of the soul, but the latter is the actuality of a certain body.
καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καλῶς ὑπολαμβάνουσιν οἷς δοκεῖ μήτʼ ἄνευ σώματος εἶναι μήτε σῶμά τι ἡ ψυχή· σῶμα μὲν γάρ οὐκ ἔστι, σώματος δέ τι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐν σώματι ὑπάρχει, καὶ ἐν σώματι τοιούτῳ, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ οἱ πρότερον εἰς σῶμα ἐνήρμοζον αὐτήν, οὐθὲν προσδιορίζοντες ἐν τίνι καὶ ποίῳ, καίπερ οὐδὲ φαινομένου τοῦ τυχόντος δέχεσθαι τὸ τυχόν.
And for this reason those conceive well to whom it seems that the soul is neither without a body nor is any kind of body; for it is not a body, but something of a body, and for this reason it is present in a body, and indeed in such a body, and not as the predecessors fitted it into a body, without further specifying in what and what kind of body, although it is not even seen that any chance thing receives any chance thing.
οὕτω δὲ γίνεται καὶ κατὰ λόγον· ἑκάστου γὰρ ἡ ἐντελέχεια ἐν τῷ δυνάμει ὑπάρχοντι καὶ τῇ οἰκείᾳ ὕλη πέφυκεν ἐγγίνεσθαι.
And in this way it also happens according to reason; for the actuality of each thing naturally comes to be in that which is potentially and in its appropriate matter.
ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐντελέχειά τίς ἐστι καὶ λόγος τοῦ δύναμιν ἔχοντος εἶναι τοιούτου, φανερόν· ἐκ τούτων.
That, therefore, it is a certain actuality and formula of that which has the potentiality to be such, is clear from these things.