§2.1Τὰ μὲν δὴ ὑπὸ τῶν πρότερον παραδεδομένα περὶ ψυχῆς εἰρήσθω· πάλιν δʼ ὥσπερ ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς ἐπανίωμεν, πειρώμενοι διορίσαι τί ἐστι ψυχὴ καὶ τίς ἂν εἴη κοινότατος λόγος αὐτῆς.
Let what has been handed down by our predecessors concerning the soul be regarded as said; and let us return again as if from the beginning, attempting to determine what the soul is and what would be its most common definition.
λέγομεν δὴ γένος ἕν τι τῶν ὄντων τὴν οὐσίαν, ταύτης δὲ τὸ μὲν ὡς ὕλην, ὃ καθ’ αὑτὸ οὐκ ἔστι τόδε τι, ἕτερον δὲ μορφὴν καὶ εἶδος, καθʼ ἣν ἤδη λέγεται τόδε τι, καὶ τρίτον τὸ ἐκ τούτων.
Now we say that substance is one class of the things that are, and of this, one is as matter, which of itself is not a 'this', another is shape and form, in virtue of which it is already called a 'this', and third is what is from these.
ἔστι δʼ ἡ μὲν ὕλη δύναμις, τὸ δʼ εἶδος ἐντελέχεια, καὶ τοῦτο διχῶς, τὸ μὲν ὡς ἐπιστήμη, τὸ δʼ ὡς τὸ θεωρεῖν.
And matter is potentiality, while form is actuality, and this in two ways: one as knowledge, the other as contemplating.
οὐσίαι δὲ μάλιστʼ εἶναι δοκοῦσι τὰ σώματα, καὶ τούτων τὰ φυσικά· ταῦτα γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχαί.
And substances seem most of all to be bodies, and of these especially natural bodies; for these are the principles of the others.
τῶν δὲ φυσικῶν τὰ μὲν ἔχει ζωήν, τὰ δʼ οὐκ ἔχει· ζωὴν δὲ λέγομεν τὴν διʼ αὑτοῦ τροφήν τε καὶ αὔξησιν καὶ φθίσιν.
And of natural bodies, some have life, and some do not; and we mean by life self-nourishment, growth, and decay.
ὥστε πᾶν σῶμα φυσικὸν μετέχον ζωῆς οὐσία ἂν εἴη, οὐσία δʼ οὕτως ὡς συνθέτη.
So that every natural body sharing in life would be a substance, and a substance in the sense of being composite.
ἐπεὶ δʼ ἐστὶ καὶ σῶμα τοιόνδε, ζωὴν γὰρ ἔχον, οὐκ ἂν εἴη σῶμα ἡ ψυχή· οὐ γάρ ἐστι τῶν καθʼ ὑποκειμένου τὸ σῶμα, μᾶλλον δʼ ὡς ὑποκείμενον καὶ ὕλη.
But since it is also a body of a certain kind, namely one having life, the soul would not be a body; for the body is not among the things predicated of a subject, but is rather as a subject and matter.
ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα τὴν ψυχὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι ὡς εἶδος σώματος φυσικοῦ δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχοντος.
Therefore, it is necessary that the soul is a substance in the sense of the form of a natural body having life potentially.
ἡ δʼ οὐσία ἐντελέχεια.
And substance is actuality.
τοιούτου ἄρα σώματος ἐντελέχεια.
Therefore, it is the actuality of such a body.
αὕτη δὲ λέγεται διχῶς, ἡ μὲν ὡς ἐπιστήμη, ἡ δʼ ὡς τὸ θεωρεῖν.
And this is said in two ways, the one as knowledge, the other as contemplating.
φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι ὡς ἐπιστήμη· ἐν γὰρ τῷ ὑπάρχειν τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ ὕπνος καὶ ἐγρήγορσίς ἐστιν, ἀνάλογον δʼ ἡ μὲν ἐγρήγορσις τῷ θεωρεῖν, ὁ δʼ ὕπνος τῷ ἔχειν καὶ μὴ ἐνεργεῖν· προτέρα δὲ τῇ γενέσει ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἡ ἐπιστήμη.
It is clear, then, that it is as knowledge; for both sleep and waking exist in the presence of the soul, and waking is analogous to contemplating, while sleep is analogous to having and not active; and in the same individual, knowledge is prior in generation.
διὸ ἡ ψυχή ἐστιν ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη σώματος φυσικοῦ δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχοντος.
Therefore, the soul is the first actuality of a natural body having life potentially.
τοιοῦτον δὲ ὃ ἄν ᾖ ὀργανικόν.
And such would be whatever is organic.
ὄργανα δὲ καὶ τὰ τῶν φυτῶν μέρη, ἀλλὰ παντελῶς ἀπλᾶ, οἶον τὸ φύλλον περικαρπίου σκέπασμα, τὸ δὲ περικάρπιον καρποῦ· αἱ δὲ ῥίζαι τῷ στόματι ἀνάλογον· ἄμφω γὰρ ἕλκει τὴν τροφήν.
And the parts of plants are also organs, though completely simple ones: for instance, the leaf is a shelter for the pericarp, and the pericarp for the fruit; while the roots are analogous to the mouth, for both draw in nourishment.
εἰ δή τι κοινὸν ἐπὶ πάσης ψυχῆς δεῖ λέγειν, εἴη ἂν ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη σώματος φυσικοῦ ὀργανικοῦ.
If, then, we must say something common to every soul, it would be: the first actuality of a natural organic body.
διὸ καὶ οὐ δεῖ ζητεῖν εἰ ἓν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ σῶμα, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸν κηρὸν καὶ τὸ σχῆμα, οὐδʼ ὅλως τὴν ἑκάστου ὕλην καὶ τὸ οὗ ἡ ὕλη· τὸ γὰρ ἓν καὶ τὸ εἶναι ἐπεὶ πλεοναχῶς λέγεται, τὸ κυρίως ἡ ἐντελέχειά ἐστιν.
Hence we do not even need to inquire whether the soul and the body are one, just as we do not need to inquire concerning the wax and the shape, nor in general the matter of each thing and that of which it is the matter; for since 'one' and 'to be' are said in many ways, the primary sense is the actuality.
καθόλου μὲν οὖν εἴρηται τί ἐστιν ἡ ψυχή· οὐσία γὰρ ἡ κατὰ τὸν λόγον.
In general, then, it has been said what the soul is; for it is substance according to definition.
τοῦτο δὲ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι τῷ τοιῳδὶ σώματι, καθάπερ εἴ τι τῶν ὀργάνων φυσικὸν ἦν σῶμα, οἶον πέλεκυς· ἦν μὲν γὰρ ἂν τὸ πελέκει εἶναι ἡ οὐσία αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦτο· χωρισθείσης δὲ ταύτης οὐκ ἂν ἔτι πέλεκυς ἦν, ἀλλʼ ἢ ὁμωνύμως, νῦν δʼ ἔστι πέλεκυς.
And this is the essence of a body of such a kind, just as if one of our tools were a natural body, for instance, an axe; for to be an axe would be its substance, and this would be its soul; and if this were separated, it would no longer be an axe, except homonymously; but as it is, it is an axe.
οὐ γὰρ τοιούτου σώματος τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ ὁ λόγος ἡ ψυχή, ἀλλὰ φυσικοῦ τοιουδὶ ἔχοντος ἀρχὴν κινήσεως καὶ στάσεως ἐν ἑαυτῷ.
For the soul is not the essence and definition of such a body, but of a natural body of such a kind as having a principle of movement and rest in itself.
θεωρεῖν δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μερῶν δεῖ τὸ λεχθέν.
And we must also contemplate what has been said in the case of parts.
εἰ γὰρ ἦν ὁ ὀφθαλμὸς ζῷον, ψυχὴ ἂν ἦν αὐτοῦ ἡ ὄψις· αὕτη γὰρ οὐσία ὀφθαλμοῦ ἡ κατὰ τὸν λόγον.
For if the eye were an animal, sight would be its soul; for this is the substance of the eye according to definition.
ὁ δʼ ὀφθαλμὸς ὕλη ὄψεως, ἧς ἀπολειπούσης οὐκέτʼ ὀφθαλμός, πλὴν ὁμωνύμως, καθάπερ ὁ λίθινος καὶ ὁ γεγραμμένος.
But the eye is the matter of sight, and when this has departed, it is no longer an eye, except homonymously, just like a stone eye or a painted one.
δεῖ δὴ λαβεῖν τὸ ἐπὶ μέρους ἐφʼ ὅλου τοῦ ζῶντος σώματος· ἀνάλογον γὰρ ἔχει ὡς τὸ μέρος πρὸς τὸ μέρος, οὕτως ἡ ὅλη αἴσθησις πρὸς τὸ ὅλον σῶμα τὸ αἰσθητικόν, ᾗ τοιοῦτον.
Now we must apply what holds of the part to the whole living body; for as the part is to the part, so analogously is the whole perception to the whole perceptive body as such.
ἔστι δὲ οὐ τὸ ἀποβεβληκὸς τὴν ψυχὴν τὸ δυνάμει ὂν ὥστε ζῆν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔχον· τὸ δὲ σπέρμα καὶ ὁ καρπὸς τὸ δυνάμει τοιονδὶ σῶμα.
But it is not that which has cast off the soul that is potentially alive, but that which has it; while the seed and the fruit are potentially such a body.
ὡς μὲν οὖν ἡ τμῆσις καὶ ἡ ὅρασις, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ἐγρήγορσις ἐντελέχεια, ὡς δʼ ἡ ὄψις καὶ ἡ δύναμις τοῦ ὀργάνου, ἡ ψυχή· τὸ δὲ σῶμα τὸ δυνάμει ὄν·
As cutting and seeing, then, are actuality, so too is waking; but as sight and the capacity of the tool, so is the soul; and the body is that which is potentially.
ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ ὀφθαλμὸς ἡ κόρη καὶ ἡ ὄφις, κἀκεῖ ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ σῶμα ζῷον.
But just as the pupil and sight make up the eye, so in that case the soul and body make up the animal.
ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ ψυχὴ χωριστὴ τοῦ σώματος, ἢ μέρη τινὰ αὐτῆς, εἰ μεριστὴ πέφυκεν, οὐκ ἄδηλον· ἐνίων γὰρ ἡ ἐντελέχεια τῶν μερῶν ἐστὶν αὐτῶν.
That, therefore, the soul is not separable from the body, or certain parts of it, if it is by nature divisible, is not unclear; for in some cases the actuality is of the parts themselves.
οὐ μὴν ἀλλʼ ἔνιά γε οὐθὲν κωλύει, διὰ τό μηθενὸς εἶναι σώματος ἐντελεχείας.
Yet there is nothing to prevent some parts at least from being separable, because of their being the actuality of no body.
ἔτι δὲ ἄδηλον εἰ οὕτως ἐντελέχεια τοῦ σώματος ἡ ψυχὴ ἢ ὥσπερ πλωτὴρ πλοίου.
Moreover, it is still unclear whether the soul is the actuality of the body in this way, or as the sailor is of the ship.
τύπῳ μὲν οὖν ταύτη διωρίσθω καὶ ὑπογεγράφθω περὶ ψυχῆς.
Let this, then, serve as a rough definition and outline concerning the soul.