§2.11#2ἀπορήσειε δʼ ἄν τις, εἰ πᾶν σῶμα βάθος ἔχει, τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶ τὸ τρίτον μέγεθος, ὧν δʼ ἐστὶ δύο σωμάτων μεταξὺ σῶμά τι, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ταῦτα ἀλλήλων ἅπτεσθαι, τὸ δʼ ὑγρὸν οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνευ σώματος, οὐδὲ τὸ διερόν, ἀλλʼ ἀναγκαῖον ὕδωρ εἶναι ἢ ἔχειν ὕδωρ, τὰ δὲ ἁπτόμενα ἀλλήλων ἐν τῷ ὕδατι, μὴ ξηρῶν τῶν ἄκρων ὄντων, ἀναγκαῖον ὕδωρ ἔχειν μεταξύ, οὗ ἀνάπλεα τὰ ἔσχατα, εἰ δὲ τοῦτʼ ἀληθές, ἀδύνατον ἅψασθαι ἄλλο ἄλλου ἐν ὕδατι, τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι (ὁμοίως γὰρ ἔχει ὁ ἀὴρ πρὸς τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ πρὸς τὰ ἐν τῷ ὕδατι, λανθάνει δὲ μᾶλλον ἡμᾶς, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ ὕδατι ζῷα, εἰ διερὸν διεροῦ ἅπτεται)—πότερον οὖν πάντων ὁμοίως ἐστὶν ἡ αἴσθησις, ἢ ἄλλων ἄλλως, καθάπερ νῦν δοκεῖ ἡ μὲν γεῦσις καὶ ἡ ἁφὴ τῷ ἅπτεσθαι, αἱ δʼ ἄλλαι ἄποθεν.
might raise a difficulty: if every body has depth, and this is the third dimension, and if there is some body between two bodies, these cannot touch each other; and since the wet is not without body, nor is the damp, but must be water or contain water, and since things touching one another in water, their extremities not being dry, must have water between them with which their extremities are covered, then, if this is true, it is impossible for one thing to touch another in water; and in the same way also in air (for the air is related to things in it as water is to things in water, though this escapes our notice more, just as it escapes the notice of animals in water, whether a wet thing touches a wet thing)—whether, then, the perception of all things is in a similar way, or of different things in different ways, just as now taste and touch seem to be by touching, and the others from a distance.
τὸ δʼ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ σκληρὸν καὶ τὸ μαλακὸν διʼ ἑτέρων αἰσθανόμεθα, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ψοφητικὸν καὶ τὸ ὁρατὸν καὶ τὸ ὀσφραντόν· ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν πόρρωθεν, τὰ δʼ ἐγγύθεν, διὸ λανθάνει· ἐπεὶ αἰσθανόμεθά γε πάντων διὰ τοῦ μέσου, ἀλλʼ ἐπὶ τούτων λανθάνει.
But this is not so; rather, we perceive even the hard and the soft through other things, just as we do that which makes a sound, the visible, and the object of smell; but the latter from afar, and the former from close by, which is why it escapes our notice; since we do perceive all things through the medium, but in these cases it escapes our notice.
καίτοι καθάπερ εἴπομεν καὶ πρότερον, κἂν εἰ διʼ ὑμένος αἰσθανοίμεθα τῶν ἁπτῶν· ἁπάντων λανθάνοντος ὅτι διείργει, ὁμοίως ἂν ἔχοιμεν ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν ἐν τῷ ὕδατι καὶ ἐν τῶ ἀέρι· δοκοῦμεν γὰρ νῦν αὐτῶν ἅπτεσθαι καὶ οὐδὲν εἶναι διὰ μέσου.
And yet, as we also said before, even if we were to perceive tangible things through a membrane, since it would escape our notice in all cases that it separates them, we should be in a similar state as we are now in water and in air; for we now seem to touch them and that there is nothing in between.
ἀλλὰ διαφέρει τὸ ἁπιὸν τῶν ὁρατῶν καὶ τῶν ψοφητικῶν, ὅτι ἐκείνων μὲν αἰσθανόμεθα τῷ τὸ μεταξὺ ποιεῖν τι ἡμᾶς, τῶν δὲ ἁπτῶν οὐχ ὑπὸ τοῦ μεταξὺ ἀλλʼ ἅμα τῷ μεταξύ, ὥσπερ ὁ διʼ ἀσπίδος πληγείς· οὐ γὰρ ἡ ἀσπὶς πληγείσα ἐπάταξεν, ἀλλʼ ἅμ᾿ ἄμφω συνέβη πληγῆναι.
But the tangible differs from the visible and from things that make a sound, in that we perceive the latter because the medium acts upon us in some way, whereas we perceive the tangibles not by the medium but simultaneously with the medium, like a person struck through a shield; for it is not that the shield, having been struck, hit the person, but it happened that both were struck simultaneously.
ὅλως δʼ ἔοικεν ἡ σὰρξ καὶ ἡ γλῶττα, ὡς ὁ ἀὴρ καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ πρὸς τὴν ὄψιν καὶ τὴν ἀκοὴν καὶ τὴν ὄσφρησιν ἔχουσιν, οὕτως ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ αἰσθητήριον ὥσπερ ἐκείνων ἕκαστον.
In general, the flesh and the tongue seem to be related to the sense organ as air and water are related to sight, hearing, and smell, each of them in their respective cases.
αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητηρίου ἁπτομένου οὔτʼ ἐκεῖ οὔτʼ ἐνταῦθα γένοιτʼ ἂν αἴσθησις, οἷον εἴ τις σῶμά τι λευκὸν ἐπὶ τοῦ ὄμματος θείη τὸ ἔσχατον.
But if the sense organ itself touches the object, no perception would occur either there or here, as if someone were to place a white body upon the outer surface of the eye.
ᾗ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι ἐντὸς τὸ τοῦ ἁπτοῦ αἰσθητικόν.
Whereby it is also clear that the sensory capacity for the tangible is inside.
οὕτω γὰρ ἂν συμβαίνοι ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων· ἐπιτιθεμένων γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ αἰσθητήριον οὐκ αἰσθάνεται, ἐπὶ δὲ τὴν σάρκα ἐπιτιθεμένων αἰσθάνεται· ὥστε τὸ μεταξὺ τοῦ ἁπτικοῦ ἡ σάρξ.
For thus would happen what also happens in the case of the other senses: when objects are placed upon the sense organ, it does not perceive, but when they are placed upon the flesh, it does perceive; so that the flesh is the medium for the faculty of touch.
ἁπταὶ μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν αἱ διαφοραὶ τοῦ σώματος ᾖ σῶμα· λέγω δὲ διαφορὰς αἳ τὰ στοιχεῖα διορίζουσι, θερμὸν ψυχρόν, ξηρὸν ὑγρόν, περὶ ὧν εἰρήκαμεν πρότερον ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῶν στοιχείων.
Tangible, then, are the differences of body as body; I mean by differences those which define the elements, hot and cold, dry and wet, concerning which we have spoken before in our works on the elements.
τὸ δὲ αἰσθητήριον αὐτῶν τὸ ἁπτικόν, καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἡ καλουμένη ἁφὴ ὑπάρχει αἴσθησις πρώτῳ, τὸ δυνάμει τοιοῦτόν ἐστι μόριον· τὸ γὰρ αἰσθάνεσθαι πάσχειν τι ἐστίν· ὥστε τὸ ποιοῦν, οἷον αὐτὸ ἐνεργείᾳ, τοιοῦτον ἐκεῖνο ποιεῖ, δυνάμει ὄν.
And their sense organ, the tactile organ, and that in which the sense called touch primarily resides, is the part which is potentially such; for perceiving is a sort of suffering; so that what acts, being such in actuality, makes that which is potentially such like itself.
διὸ τοῦ ὁμοίως θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ, ἢ σκληροῦ καὶ μαλακοῦ, οὐκ αἰσθανόμεθα, ἀλλὰ τῶν ὑπερβολῶν, ὡς τῆς αἰσθήσεως οἶον μεσότητός τινος οὔσης τῆς ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἐναντιώσεως.
That is why we do not perceive what is equally hot and cold, or hard and soft, but only the excesses, as the sense is a sort of mean of the opposition in the objects of sense.
καὶ διὰ τοῦτο κρίνει τὰ αἰσθητά.
And because of this, it judges the objects of sense.
τὸ γὰρ μέσον κριτικόν· γίνεται γὰρ πρὸς ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν θάτερον τῶν ἄκρων· καὶ δεῖ ὥσπερ τὸ μέλλον αἰσθήσεσθαι λευκοῦ καὶ μέλανος μηδέτερον αὐτῶν εἶναι ἐνεργείᾳ, δυνάμει δʼ ἄμφω (οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων), καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἁφῆς μήτε θερμὸν μήτε ψυχρόν.
For the mean is critical; for it becomes to each of them the other of the two extremes; and just as that which is to perceive white and black must be neither of them in actuality, but both potentially (and likewise in the other cases), so too in the case of touch, it must be neither hot nor cold.
ἔτι δʼ ὥσπερ ὁρατοῦ καὶ ἀοράτου ἦν πως ἡ ὄψις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ αἱ λοιπαὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων, οὅτω καὶ ἡ ἁφὴ τοῦ ἁπτοῦ καὶ ἀνάπτου·
Furthermore, just as sight was in a way of the visible and the invisible, and likewise the remaining senses of their opposites, so too touch is of the tangible and the intangible.
ἄναπτον δʼ ἐστὶ τό τε μικρὰν ἔχον πάμπαν διαφορὰν τῶν ἁπτῶν, οἷον πέπονθεν ὁ ἀήρ, καὶ τῶν ἁπτῶν αἱ ὑπερβολαί, ὥσπερ τὰ φθαρτικά.
And the intangible is both that which has an extremely small difference of the tangibles, as is the case with air, and the excesses of the tangibles, like those which are destructive.
καθʼ ἑκάστην μὲν οὖν τῶν αἰσθήσεων εἴρηται τύπῳ.
Let this, then, be our sketch of each of the senses.