§1.5#3(ἐπιζητήσειε δʼ ἄν τις καὶ διὰ τίνʼ αἰτίαν ἡ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι ψυχὴ τῆς ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις βελτίων ἐστὶ καὶ ἀθανατωτέρα. ) συμβαίνει δʼ ἀμφοτέριως ἄτοπον καὶ παράλογον· καὶ γὰρ τὸ λέγειν ζῷον τὸ πῦρ ἢ τὸν ἀέρα τῶν παραλογωτέρων ἐστί, καὶ τὸ μὴ λέγειν ζῷα ψυχῆς ἐνούσης ἄτοπον.
(And one might also inquire for what reason the soul in the air is better and more immortal than that in animals.) But in either case, an absurd and unreasonable thing happens; for, on the one hand, to say that fire or air is an animal is among the more unreasonable things, and, on the other hand, not to say that they are animals when a soul is in them is absurd.
ὑπολαβεῖν δʼ ἐοίκασιν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν ἐν τούτοις, ὅτι τὸ ὅλον τοῖς μορίοις ὁμοειδές· ὥστʼ ἀναγκαῖον αὐτοῖς λέγειν καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ὁμοειδῆ τοῖς μορίοις εἶναι, εἰ τῷ ἀπολαμβάνεσθαί τι τοῦ περιέχοντος ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις ἔμψυχα τὰ ζῷα γίνεται.
But they seem to assume that the soul is in these because the whole is of the same kind as its parts; so that it is necessary for them to say that the soul also is of the same kind as its parts, if animals become animate by some part of the surrounding environment being cut off and enclosed within them.
εἰ δʼ ὁ μὲν ἀὴρ διασπώμενος ὁμοειδής, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ἀνομοιομερής, τὸ μέν τι αὐτῆς ὑπάρξει δῆλον ὅτι, τὸ δʼ οὐχ ὑπάρξει.
But if, on the one hand, air when divided is of the same kind, but, on the other hand, the soul is of unlike parts, it is clear that some part of it will be present, but some other part will not.
ἀναγκαῖον οὖν αὐτὴν ἢ ὁμοιομερῆ εἶναι ἢ μὴ ἐνυπάρχειν ἐν ὁτῳοῦν μορίῳ τοῦ παντός.
Therefore, it is necessary either that it is of like parts, or that it does not exist in any part whatsoever of the universe.
φανερὸν οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὡς οὔτε τὸ γινώσκειν ὑπάρχει τῇ ψυχῇ διὰ τὸ ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων εἶναι, οὔτε τὸ κινεῖσθαι αὐτὴν καλῶς οὐδʼ ἀληθῶς λέγεται.
It is clear, then, from what has been said, that neither does recognizing belong to the soul because of its being from the elements, nor is it said well or truly that it is moved.
ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ γινώσκειν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαί τε καὶ τὸ δοξάζειν, ἔτι δὲ τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν καὶ βούλεσθαι καὶ ὅλως αἱ ὀρέξεις, γίνεται δὲ καὶ ἡ κατὰ τόπον κίνησις τοῖς ζῴοις ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς, ἔτι δʼ αὔξη τε καὶ ἀκμὴ καὶ φθίσις, πότερον ὅλῃ τῇ ψυχῇ τούτων ἕκαστον ὑπάρχει, καὶ πάση νοοῦμέν τε καὶ αἰσθανόμεθα καὶ κινούμεθα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον ποιοῦμέν τε καὶ πάσχομεν, ἢ μορίοις ἑτέροις ἕτερα;
But since recognizing, perceiving, and opining belong to the soul, and furthermore desiring, wishing, and in general appetites, and local movement also comes to be in animals by the soul, and furthermore growth, maturity, and decay, is it that each of these belongs to the whole soul, and we think, perceive, move, and do and suffer each of the other things with the whole of it, or do we do different things with different parts?
καὶ τὸ ζῆν δὴ πότερον ἔν τινι τούτων ἐστίν ἐνὶ ἢ καὶ ἐν πλείοσιν ἢ πᾶσιν, ἢ καὶ ἄλλο τι αἴτιον;
And indeed is living present in some one of these, or in several, or in all, or is there some other cause?
λέγουσι δή τινες μεριστὴν αὐτήν, καὶ ἄλλῳ μὲν νοεῖν ἄλλῳ δὲ ἐπιθυμεῖν.
Indeed, some say that it is divisible, and that we think with one part and desire with another.
τί οὖν δή ποτε συνέχει τὴν ψυχήν, εἰ μεριστὴ πέφυκεν;
What is it then that holds the soul together, if it is by nature divisible?
οὐ γὰρ δὴ τό γε σῶμα· δοκεῖ γὰρ τοὐναντίον μᾶλλον ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ σῶμα συνέχειν· ἐξελθούσης γοῦν διαπνεῖται καὶ σήπεται.
For it is surely not the body; for on the contrary the soul seems rather to hold the body together; at any rate, when it has departed, the body is dispersed by wind and rots.
εἰ οὖν ἕτερόν τι μίαν αὐτὴν ποιεί, ἐκεῖνο μάλιστʼ ἄν εἴη ψυχή.
If, then, something else makes it one, that would most of all be the soul.
δεήσει δὲ πάλιν κἀκεῖνο ζητεῖν πότερον ἓν ἢ πολυμερές.
But it will be necessary again to inquire of that also whether it is one or of many parts.
εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἕν, διὰ τί οὐκ εὐθέως καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ἕν;
For if it is one, why not immediately say that the soul also is one?
εἰ δὲ μεριστόν, πάλιν ὁ λόγος ζητήσει τί τὸ συνέχον ἐκεῖνο, καὶ οὕτω δὴ πρόεισιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἄπειρον.
But if it is divisible, again the argument will inquire what that which holds it together is, and thus indeed it will go on to infinity.
ἀπορήσειε δʼ ἄν τις καὶ περὶ τῶν μορίων αὐτῆς, τίνʼ ἔχει δύναμιν ἕκαστον ἐν τῷ σώματι.
One might also raise a difficulty concerning its parts, as to what power each has in the body.
εἰ γὰρ ἡ ὅλη ψυχὴ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα συνέχει, προσήκει καὶ τῶν μορίων ἕκαστον συνέχειν τι τοῦ σώματος.
For if the whole soul holds together the whole body, it is fitting that each of the parts also holds together some part of the body.
τοῦτο δʼ ἔοικεν ἀδυνάτῳ· ποῖον γὰρ μόριον ἢ πῶς ὁ νοῦς συνέξει, χαλεπὸν καὶ πλάσαι.
But this seems impossible; for what sort of part or how the intellect will hold it together is difficult even to imagine.
φαίνεται δὲ καὶ τὰ φυτὰ διαιρούμενα ζῆν καὶ τῶν ζῴων ἔνια τῶν ἐντόμων, ὡς τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχοντα ψυχὴν τῷ εἴδει, εἰ καὶ μὴ ἀριθμῷ· ἑκάτερον γὰρ τῶν μορίων αἴσθησιν ἔχει καὶ κινεῖται κατὰ τόπον ἐπί τινα χρόνον.
But plants also appear to live when divided, and some of the animals among insects, as having a soul which is the same in species, even if not in number; for each of the parts has perception and moves locally for some time.
εἰ δὲ μὴ διατελοῦσιν, οὐθὲν ἄτοπον· ὄργανα γὰρ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὥστε σώζειν τὴν φύσιν.
And if they do not continue to do so, there is nothing absurd; for they do not have organs so as to preserve their nature.
ἀλλʼ οὐδὲν ἧττον ἐν ἑκατέρῳ τῶν μορίων ἅπαντ’ ἐνυπάρχει τὰ μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ ὁμοειδῆ ἐστιν ἀλλήλοις καὶ τῇ ὅλη, ἀλλήλων μὲν ὡς οὐ χωριστὰ ὄντα, τῆς δʼ ὅλης ψυχῆς ὡς οὐ διαιρετῆς οὔσης.
But nonetheless in each of the parts all the parts of the soul are present, and they are of the same kind as one another and as the whole, being inseparable from one another as they are, and from the whole soul as it is indivisible.
ἔοικε δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς ἀρχὴ ψυχή τις εἶναι· μόνης γὰρ ταύτης κοινωνεῖ καὶ ζῷα καὶ φυτά· καὶ αὕτη μὲν χωρίζεται τῆς αἰσθητικῆς ἀρχῆς, αἴσθησιν δʼ οὐθὲν ἄνευ ταύτης ἔχει.
And the principle in plants also seems to be a certain soul; for animals and plants share in this alone; and while this is separated from the perceptive principle, nothing has perception without this.