§1.5#2ἀλλʼ ἀδύνατον ἐκ τῶν τοῦ ποσοῦ στοιχείων οὐσίαν εἶναι καὶ μὴ ποσόν.
But it is impossible that from the elements of quantity a substance should come to be, and not a quantity.
τοῖς δὴ λέγουσιν ἐκ πάντων ταῦτά τε καὶ τοιαῦθʼ ἕτερα συμβαίνει.
To those, then, who say it is from all things, these and other such difficulties happen.
ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ φάναι μὲν ἀπαθὲς εἶναι τὸ ὅμοιον ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου, αἰσθάνεσθαι δὲ τὸ ὅμοιον τοῦ ὁμοίου καὶ γινώσκειν τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον· τὸ δʼ αἰσθάνεσθαι πάσχειν τι καὶ κινεῖσθαι τιθέασιν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ νοεῖν τε καὶ γινώσκειν.
And it is also absurd to say, on the one hand, that like is unaffected by like, and on the other hand, that like perceives like and recognizes like by like; for they assume that perceiving is a certain being affected and being moved, and likewise also with thinking and recognizing.
πολλὰς δʼ ἀπορίας καὶ δυσχερείας ἔχοντος τοῦ λέγειν, καθάπερ Ἑμπεδοκλῆς, ὡς τοῖς σωματικοῖς στοιχείοις ἕκαστα γνωρίζεται, καὶ πρὸς τὸ ὅμοιον, μαρτυρεῖ τὸ νῦν λεχθέν·
And that this saying—just as Empedocles says, that each thing is recognized by bodily elements, and in relation to like—holds many difficulties and troubles, the thing now said bears witness.
ὅσα γάρ ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς τῶν ζῴων σώμασιν ἁπλῶς γῆς, οἷον ὀστᾶ νεῦρα τρίχες, οὐθενὸς αἰσθάνεσθαι δοκεῖ, ὥστʼ οὐδὲ τῶν ὁμοίων· καίτοι προσῆκεν.
For whatever things in the bodies of animals are simply of earth, such as bones, sinews, and hairs, seem to perceive nothing, so that they do not even perceive their likes; and yet they ought to have.
ἔτι δʼ ἑκάστῃ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἄγνοια πλείων ἢ σύνεσις ὑπάρξει· γνώσεται μὲν γὰρ ἓν ἑκάστη, πολλὰ δʼ ἀγνοήσει· πάντα γὰρ τἆλλα.
Furthermore, more ignorance than understanding will belong to each of the principles; for each will recognize one thing, but will be ignorant of many, namely all the others.
συμβαίνει δʼ Ἐμπεδοκλεῖ γε καὶ ἀφρονέστατον εἶναι τὸν θεόν· μόνος γὰρ τῶν στοιχείων ἓν οὐ γνωριεῖ, τὸ νεῖκος, τὰ δὲ θνητὰ πάντα· ἐκ πάντων γὰρ ἕκαστον.
And it happens to Empedocles at least that God is the most foolish; for he alone of the elements will not recognize one, Strife, whereas mortal beings recognize all, since each is from all.
ὅλως τε διὰ τίνʼ αἰτίαν οὐχ ἅπαντα ψυχὴν ἔχει τὰ ὄντα, ἐπειδὴ πᾶν ἤτοι στοιχεῖον ἢ ἐκ στοιχείου ἑνὸς ἢ πλειόνων ἢ πάντων;
And in general, for what reason do not all existing things have a soul, since everything is either an element or from one element or several or all?
ἀναγκαῖον γάρ ἐστιν ἕν τι γινώσκειν ἢ τινὰ ἢ πάντα.
For it is necessary that they recognize either some one thing, or some things, or all.
ἀπορήσειε δʼ ἄν· τις καὶ τί ποτʼ ἐστὶ τὸ ἑνοποιοῦν αὐτά· ὕλῃ γὰρ ἔοικε τά γε στοιχεῖα, κυριώτατον δʼ ἐκεῖνο τὸ συνέχον, ὅ τί ποτʼ ἐστίν·
One might also raise a difficulty as to what it is that unifies them; for the elements seem like matter, but that which holds them together, whatever it is, is most sovereign.
τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς εἶναί τι κρεῖττον καὶ ἄρχον ἀδύνατον· ἀδυνατώτερον δʼ ἔτι τοῦ νοῦ· εὔλογον γὰρ τοῦτον εἶναι προγενέστατον καὶ κύριον κατὰ φύσιν, τὰ δὲ στοιχεῖά φασι πρῶτα τῶν ὄντων εἶνσι.
But it is impossible for anything to be superior to and ruling over the soul, and still more impossible to be superior to the intellect; for it is reasonable that this is oldest and sovereign by nature, but they say that the elements are first of existing things.
πάντες δὲ καὶ οἱ διὰ τὸ γνωρίζειν καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι τὰ ὄντα τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων λέγοντες αὐτήν, καὶ οἱ τὸ κινητικώτατον, οὐ περὶ πάσης λέγουσι ψυχῆς.
But all those who say that the soul is from the elements because of recognizing and perceiving existing things, and those who say it is that which is most capable of moving, do not speak of every soul.
οὔτε γὰρ τὰ αἰσθανόμενα πάντα κινητικά (φαίνεται γάρ εἶναί τινα μόνιμα τῶν ζῴων κατὰ τόπον· καίτοι δοκεῖ γε ταύτην μόνην τῶν κινήσεων κινεῖν ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ ζῷον), ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὅσοι τὸν νοῦν καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων ποιοῦσιν·
For not all perceiving things are capable of moving, since there appear to be some stationary animals in respect to place, although the soul is thought to move the animal with this movement alone of movements.
φαίνεται γὰρ τά τε φυτὰ ζῆν οὐ μετέχοντα αἰσθήσεως, καὶ τῶν ζῴων πολλὰ διάνοιαν οὐκ ἔχειν.
And likewise also with those who make intellect and the perceptive part from the elements; for plants appear to live without sharing in perception, and many animals do not have thought.
εἰ δέ τις καὶ ταῦτα παραχωρήσειε καὶ θείη τὸν νοῦν μέρος τι τῆς ψυχῆς, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικόν, οὐδʼ ἂν οὕτω λέγοιεν καθόλου περὶ πάσης ψυχῆς οὐδὲ περὶ ὅλης οὐδεμιᾶς. (τοῦτο δὲ πέπονθε καὶ ὁ ἐν τοῖς Ὀρφικοῖς καλουμένοις ἔπεσι λόγος· φησὶ γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τοῦ ὅλου εἰσιέναι ἀναπνεόντων, φερομένην ὑπό τῶν ἀνέμων, οὐχ οἶόν τε δὲ τοῖς φυτοῖς τοῦτο συμβαίνειν οὐδὲ τῶν ζῴων ἐνίοις, εἴπερ μὴ πάντα ἀναπνέουσιν· τοῦτο δὲ λέληθε τοὺς οὕτως ὑπειληφότας. ) εἴ τε δεῖ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων ποιεῖν, οὐθὲν δεῖ ἐξ ἁπάντων· ἱκανὸν γὰρ θάτερον μέρος τῆς ἐναντιώσεως ἑαυτό τε κρίνειν καὶ τὸ ἀντικείμενον.
But even if one should concede these things and posit intellect to be a certain part of the soul, and likewise also the perceptive part, not even so would they speak universally of every soul, nor of any single whole soul. (And the account in the so-called Orphic poems has also suffered this; for it says that the soul enters from the whole into breathing things, being carried by the winds, but it is not possible for this to happen to plants, nor to some animals, if indeed not all breathe; and this has escaped the notice of those who have assumed so.) And even if one must make the soul from the elements, there is no need to make it from all; for one part of the contrariety is sufficient to judge both itself and its opposite.
καὶ γὰρ τῷ εὐθεῖ καὶ αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ καμπύλον γινώσκομεν· κριτὴς γὰρ ἀμφοῖν ὁ κανών, τὸ δὲ καμπύλον οὔθʼ ἑαυτοῦ οὔτε τοῦ εὐθέος.
For indeed by the straight we recognize both itself and the crooked; for the rule is the judge of both, but the crooked is judge of neither itself nor the straight.
καὶ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ δέ τινες αὐτὴν μεμῖχθαί φασιν, ὅθεν ἴσως καὶ Θαλῆς ᾠήθη πάντα πλήρη θεῶν· εἶναι.
And some say that it is mingled in the whole, whence perhaps Thales also thought that all things are full of gods.
τοῦτο δʼ ἔχει τινὰς ἀπορίας· διὰ τίνα γὰρ αἰτίαν ἐν μὲν τῷ ἀέρι ἢ τῷ πυρὶ οὖσα ἡ ψυχὴ οὐ ποιεῖ ζῷον, ἐν δὲ τοῖς μικτοῖς, καὶ ταῦτα βελτίων ἐν τούτοις εἶναι δοκοῦσα;
But this has some difficulties; for what reason, when it is in the air or fire, does the soul not make an animal, but does so in mixed things, and that too though it is thought to be better in the former?