§1.5#1Συμβαίνει δέ, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, τῇ μὲν ταὐτὸ λέγειν τοῖς σῶμά τι λεπτομερὲς αὐτὴν τιθεῖσι, τῇ δʼ, ὥσπερ Δημόκριτος κινεῖσθαί φησιν ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς, ἴδιον τὸ ἄτοπον.
But it happens, as we said, on the one hand that they say the same thing as those who posit it as a certain subtle body, and on the other hand, that a peculiar absurdity happens, just as Democritus says [the body] is moved by the soul.
εἴπερ γάρ ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ ἐν παντὶ τῷ αἰσθανομένῳ σώματι, ἀναγκαῖον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ δύο εἶναι σώματα, εἰ σῶμά τι ἡ ψυχή· τοῖς δʼ ἀριθμὸν λέγουσιν, ἐν τῇ μιᾷ στιγμῇ πολλὰς στιγμάς, ἢ πᾶν σῶμα ψυχὴν ἔχειν, εἰ μὴ διαφέρων τις ἀριθμὸς ἐγγίνεται καὶ ἄλλος τις τῶν ὑπαρχουσῶν ἐν τοῖς σώμασι στιγμῶν.
For if the soul is in every perceiving body, it is necessary that there are two bodies in the same place, if the soul is a certain body; and for those who say it is a number, either that many points are in a single point, or that every body has a soul, unless some different number and some other point than those already existing in the bodies enters into them.
συμβαίνει τε κινεῖσθαι τὸ ζῷον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ, καθάπερ καὶ Δημόκριτον αὐτὸ ἔφαμεν κινεῖν· τί γὰρ διαφέρει σφαίρας λέγειν μικρὰς ἢ μονάδας μεγάλας, ἢ ὅλως μονάδας φερομένας;
And it happens that the animal is moved by the number, just as we said Democritus also moves it; for what difference does it make whether we speak of small spheres or of large units, or in general of units being moved?
ἀμφοτέρως γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον κινεῖν τὸ ζῷον τῷ κινεῖσθαι ταύτας.
For in both ways it is necessary for the animal to be moved by the fact that these are moved.
τοῖς δὴ συμπλέξασιν εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ κίντησιν καὶ ἀριθμόν ταῦτά τε συμβαίνει καὶ πολλὰ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα· οὐ γὰρ μόνον ὁρισμὸν ψυχῆς ἀδύνατον τοιοῦτον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ συμβεβηκός.
To those, then, who have combined motion and number into the same thing, these things and many other such happen; for it is not only impossible for such a thing to be the definition of the soul, but also its accident.
δῆλον δʼ εἴ τις ἐπιχειρήσειεν ἐκ τοῦ λόγου τούτου τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰ ἔργα τῆς ψυχῆς ἀποδιδόναι, οἷον λογισμούς, αἰσθήσεις, ἡδονάς, λύπας, ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα· ὥσπερ γὰρ εἴπομεν πρότερον, οὐδὲ μαντεύσασθαι ῥᾴδιον ἐξ αὐτῶν.
And this is clear if one should attempt from this account to explain the affections and works of the soul, such as reasonings, perceptions, pleasures, pains, and all other such things; for as we said before, it is not even easy to conjecture from them.
τριῶν δὲ τρόπων παραδεδομένων καθʼ οὓς ὁρίζονται τὴν ψυχήν, οἱ μὲν τὸ κιντητικώτατον ἀπεφήναντο τῷ κινεῖν ἑαυτό, οἱ δὲ σῶμα τὸ λεπτομερέστατον ἢ τὸ ἀσωματώτατον τῶν ἄλλων.
But of the three ways handed down by which they define the soul, some declared that which is most capable of moving to be so by its moving itself, while others declared it to be the subtlest body or the most incorporeal of other things.
ταῦτα δὲ τίνας ἀπορίας τε καὶ ὑπεναντιώσεις ἔχει, διεληλύθαμεν σχεδόν.
What difficulties and contradictions these views hold we have nearly gone through.
λείπεται δʼ ἐπισκέψασθαι πῶς λέγεται τὸ ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων αὐτὴν εἶναι.
It remains to investigate how it is said to be from the elements.
λέγουσι μὲν γάρ, ἵνʼ αἰσθάνηταί τε τῶν ὄντων καὶ ἕκαστον γνωρίζῃ, ἀναγκαῖον δὲ συμβαίνειν πολλὰ καὶ ἀδύνατα τῷ λόγῳ.
For they say this, indeed, so that it may perceive things that are and recognize each, but it necessarily happens that many impossible consequences result from this account.
τίθενται γὰρ γνωρίζειν τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ τὴν ψυχὴν τὰ πράγματα τιθέντες.
For they posit that like is recognized by like, as if they were positing the soul to be the things themselves.
οὐκ ἔστι δὲ μόνα ταῦτα, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἕτερα, μᾶλλον δʼ ἴσως ἄπειρα τὸν ἀριθμὸν τὰ ἐκ τούτων.
But these are not the only things, but there are many other things, or rather perhaps infinitely many in number, which are composed of these.
ἐξ ὧν μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἕκαστον τούτων, ἔστω γινώσκειν τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι· ἀλλὰ τὸ σύνολον τίνι γνωριεῖ ἢ αἰσθήσεται, οἷον τί θεὸς ἢ ἄνθρωπος ἢ σὰρξ ἢ ὀστοῦν;
Let it be assumed, then, that the soul knows and perceives that from which each of these is composed; but by what will it recognize or perceive the whole compound, such as what a god is, or a man, or flesh, or bone?
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄλλο ὃτιοῦν τῶν συνθέτων· οὐ γὰρ ὁπωσοῦν ἔχοντα τὰ στοιχεῖα τούτων ἕκαστον, ἀλλὰ λόγῳ τινὶ καὶ συνθέσει, καθάπερ φησὶ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τὸ ὀστοῦν· ἡ δὲ χθὼν ἐπίηρος ἐν εὐστέρνοις χοάνοισιν
τὼ δύο τῶν ὀκτώ μερέων λάχε νήστιδος αἴγλης,
τέσσαρα δʼ Ἡφαίστοιο· τὰ δʼ ὀστέα λευκὰ γένοντο. οὐδὲν οὖν ὄφελος ἐνεῖναι τὰ στοιχεῖα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, εἰ μὴ καὶ οἱ λόγοι ἐνέσονται καὶ ἡ σύνθεσις· γνωριεῖ γὰρ ἕκαστον τὸ ὅμοιον, τὸ δʼ ὀστοῦν ἢ τὸν ἄνθρωπον οὐθέν, εἰ μὴ καὶ ταῦτʼ ἐνέσται.
And likewise also any other of the composite things; for each of these elements does not exist just in any way, but in a certain ratio and composition, just as Empedocles also says of the bone: "And pleasant earth in her broad-bosomed melting-pots obtained two parts of the eight from the fasting light, and four of Hephaestus; and white bones were made." There is therefore no benefit in the elements being in the soul, unless the ratios and the composition also are in it; for each element will recognize its like, but none will recognize the bone or the man, unless these also are in it.
τοῦτο δʼ ὅτι ἀδύνατον, οὐθὲν δεῖ λέγειν· τίς γὰρ ἄν ἀπορήσειεν εἰ ἔνεστιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ λίθος ἢ ἄνθρωπος;
But that this is impossible, there is no need to say; for who would doubt whether a stone or a man is in the soul?
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀγαθόν· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων.
And likewise also with the good and the not-good; and in the same way also concerning other things.
ἔτι δὲ πολλαχῶς λεγομένου τοῦ ὄντος (σημαίνει γὰρ τὸ μὲν τόδε τι, τὸ δὲ ποσόν ἢ ποιὸν ἢ καί τινα ἄλλην τῶν διαιρεθεισῶν κατηγοριῶν) πότερον ἐξ ἀπάντων ἔσται ἡ ψυχὴ ἢ οὔ;
Furthermore, since being is spoken of in many ways (for it signifies now a 'this', now a quantity, or a quality, or some other of the divided categories), will the soul be from all of them or not?
ἀλλʼ οὐ δοκεῖ κοινὰ πάντων εἶναι στοιχεῖα.
But there do not seem to be elements common to all.
ἆρʼ οὖν ὅσα τῶν οὐσιῶν, ἐκ τούτων μόνον;
Is it, then, from those of substances alone?
πῶς οὖν γινώσκει καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον;
How then does it recognize also each of the other things?
ἢ φήσουσιν ἑκάστου γένους εἶναι στοιχεῖα καὶ ἀρχὰς ἰδίας, ἐξ ὧν τὴν ψυχὴν συνεστάναι;
Or will they say that there are elements and proper principles of each genus, from which the soul is composed?
ἔσται ἄρα ποσὸν καὶ ποιὸν καὶ οὐσία.
The soul will therefore be a quantity and a quality and a substance.