§1.4#2ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἔοικεν ἐγγίνεσθαι οὐσία τις οὖσα, καὶ οὐ φθείρεσθαι.
But the intellect seems to arise in us as being a certain substance, and not to be destroyed.
μάλιστα γὰρ ἐφθείρετʼ ἂν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐν τῷ γήρᾳ ἀμαυρώσεως, νῦν δʼ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων συμβαίνει· εἰ γὰρ λάβοι ὁ πρεσβύτης ὄμμα τοιονδί, βλέποι ἂν ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ νέος.
For it would be destroyed most of all by the weakening in old age, but as it is, it happens just as in the case of the sense organs; for if the old man were to receive an eye of such a kind, he would see just as the young man does.
ὥστε τὸ γῆρας οὐ τῷ τὴν ψυχήν τι πεπονθέναι, ἀλλʼ ἐν ᾧ, καθάπερ ἐν μέθαις καὶ νόσοις.
So that old age occurs not because the soul has suffered something, but that in which it is, just as in drunkenness and diseases.
καὶ τὸ νοεῖν δὴ καὶ τὸ θεωρεῖν μαραίνεται ἄλλου τινὸς ἔσω φθειρομένου, αὐτὸ δὲ ἀπαθές ἐστιν.
And so indeed thinking and contemplating fade when something else within is destroyed, but the intellect itself is unaffected.
τὸ δὲ διανοεῖσθαι καὶ φιλεῖν ἢ μισεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκείνου πάθη, ἀλλὰ τουδὶ τοῦ ἔχοντος ἐκεῖνο, ᾗ ἐκεῖνο ἔχει.
But reasoning and loving or hating are not affections of that, but of this subject which has that, insofar as it has it.
διὸ καὶ τούτου φθειρομένου οὔτε μνημονεύει οὔτε φιλεῖ· οὐ γὰρ ἐκείνου ἦν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ κοινοῦ, ὃ ἀπόλωλεν· ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἴσως θειότερόν τι καὶ ἀπαθές ἐστιν.
Therefore, when this is destroyed, it neither remembers nor loves; for these were not of that intellect, but of the common subject which has perished; but the intellect is perhaps something more divine and is unaffected.
ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐχ οἷόν τε κινεῖσθαι τὴν ψυχήν, φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων· εἰ δʼ ὅλως μὴ κινεῖται, δῆλον ὡς οὐδʼ ὑφʼ ἑαυτῆς.
That, therefore, it is impossible for the soul to be moved is clear from these things; and if it is not moved at all, it is plain that it is not moved by itself either.
πολὺ δὲ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀλογώτατον τὸ λέγειν ἀριθμὸν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν κινοῦνθʼ ἑαυτόν· ὑπάρχει γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἀδύνατα πρῶτα μὲν τὰ ἐκ τοῦ κινεῖσθαι συμβαίνοντα, ἴδια δʼ ἐκ τοῦ λέγειν αὐτὴν ἀριθμόν.
And by far the most unreasonable of the mentioned views is to say that the soul is a number that moves itself; for they are beset, first, by the impossible consequences that follow from being moved, and particularly by those from calling it a number.
πῶς γὰρ χρὴ νοῆσαι μονάδα κινουμένην, καὶ ὑπὸ τίνος, καὶ πῶς, ἀμερῆ καὶ ἀδιάφορον οὖσαν;
For how is one to conceive a unit being moved, and by what, and how, since it is partless and undifferentiated?
ᾗ γάρ ἐστι κινητικὴ καὶ κινητή, διαφέρειν δεῖ.
For in respect of being that which moves and that which is moved, they must differ.
ἔτι δʼ ἐπεί φασι κινηθεῖσαν γραμμὴν ἐπίπεδον ποιεῖν, στιγμὴν δὲ γραμμήν, καὶ αἱ τῶν μονάδων κινήσεις γραμμαὶ ἔσονται· ἡ γὰρ στιγμὴ μονάς ἐστι θέσιν ἔχουσα, ὁ δʼ ἀριθμὸς τῆς ψυχῆς ἤδη πού ἐστι καὶ θέσιν ἔχει.
And further, since they say that a line when moved produces a plane, and a point a line, the motions of the units will also be lines; for a point is a unit having position, and the number of the soul is already somewhere and has position.
ἔτι δʼ ἀριθμοῦ μὲν ἐὰν ἀφέλῃ τις ἀριθμὸν ἢ μονάδα, λείπεται ἄλλος ἀριθμός· τὰ δὲ φυτὰ καὶ τῶν ζῴων πολλὰ διαιρούμενα ζῇ καὶ δοκεῖ τὴν αὐτὴν ψυχὴν ἔχειν τῷ εἴδει.
Furthermore, if one subtracts a number or a unit from a number, another number is left; but plants and many of the animals live when divided, and seem to have the same soul in species.
δόξειε δʼ ἂν οὐθὲν διαφέρειν μονάδας λέγειν ἢ σωμάτια μικρά· καὶ γὰρ ἐκ τῶν Δημοκρίτου σφαιρίων ἐὰν γένωνται στιγμαί, μόνον δὲ μένῃ τὸ ποσόν, ἔσται τι ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ μὲν κινοῦν τὸ δὲ κινούμενον, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ συνεχεῖ· οὐ γὰρ διὰ τὸ μεγέθει διαφέρειν ἢ μικρότητι συμβαίνει τὸ λεχθέν, ἀλλʼ ὅτι ποσόν· διὸ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναί τι τὸ κινῆσον τὰς μονάδας.
And it would seem to make no difference whether one speaks of units or of small bodies; for even if points are made from the spheres of Democritus, and only the quantity remains, there will be something in it which moves and something which is moved, as in a continuous body; for what has been said happens not because of difference in magnitude or smallness, but because it is a quantity; hence it is necessary that there be something that will move the units.
εἰ δʼ ἐν τῷ ζῴῳ τὸ κινοῦν ἡ ψυχή, καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀριθμῷ, ὥστε οὐ τὸ κινοῦν καὶ τὸ κινούμενον ἡ ψυχή, ἀλλὰ τὸ κινοῦν μόνον.
But if in the animal that which moves is the soul, so also in the number, so that the soul is not both that which moves and that which is moved, but that which moves alone.
ἐνδέχεται δὲ δὴ πῶς μονάδα ταύτην εἶναι;
But how indeed is it possible for this to be a unit?
δεῖ γὰρ ὑπάρχειν τινὰ αὐτῇ διαφορὰν πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας, στιγμῆς δὲ μοναδικῆς τίς ἂν εἴη διαφορὰ πλὴν θέσις;
For there must be some difference belonging to it in relation to the others, and what difference could there be for a monadic point except position?
εἰ μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν ἕτεραι αἱ ἐν τῷ σώματι μονάδες καὶ αἱ στιγμαί, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἔσονται αἱ μονάδες· καθέξει γὰρ χώραν στιγμῆς.
If, then, the units and the points in the body are different, the units will be in the same place; for a unit will occupy the place of a point.
καίτοι τί κωλύει ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ εἶναι, εἰ δύο, καὶ ἀπείρους;
And yet what prevents them from being in the same place, if two, also infinitely many?
ὧν γὰρ ὁ τόπος ἀδιαίρετος, καὶ αὐτά.
For those things whose place is indivisible are themselves indivisible too.
εἰ δʼ αἱ ἐν τῷ σώματι στιγμαὶ ὁ ἀριθμός ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς, ἢ εἰ ὁ τῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι στιγμῶν ἀριθμὸς ἡ ψυχή, διὰ τί οὐ πάντα ψυχὴν ἔχουσι τὰ σώματα;
But if the points in the body are the number of the soul, or if the number of the points in the body is the soul, why do not all bodies have a soul?
στιγμαὶ γὰρ ἐν ἅπασι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι καὶ ἄπειροι.
For points seem to be in all, and infinitely many.
ἔτι δὲ πῶς οἷόν τε χωρίζεσθαι τὰς στιγμὰς καὶ ἀπολύεσθαι τῶν σωμάτων, εἴ γε μὴ διαιροῦνται αἱ γραμμαὶ εἰς στιγμάς;
Moreover, how is it possible for the points to be separated and released from bodies, if indeed lines are not divided into points?