§1.4#1Καὶ ἄλλη δέ τις δόξα παραδέδοται περὶ ψυχῆς, πιθανὴ μὲν πολλοῖς οὐδεμιᾶς ἧττον τῶν λεγομένων, λόγον δʼ ὥσπερ εὐθύνοις δεδωκυῖα κἀν τοῖς ἐν κοινῷ γινομένοις λόγοις.
And another opinion has been handed down concerning the soul, which is to many no less plausible than any of those mentioned, and has given an account, as it were to auditors of accounts, even in discussions held in public.
ἁρμονίαν γάρ τινα αὐτὴν λέγουσι· καὶ γὰρ τὴν ἁρμονίαν κρᾶσιν καὶ σύνθεσιν ἐναντίων εἶναι, καὶ τὸ σῶμα συγκεῖσθαι ἐξ ἐναντίων.
For they say that the soul is a certain harmony; for indeed harmony is a mixture and combination of contraries, and the body is composed of contraries.
καίτοι γε ἡ μὲν ἁρμονία λόγος τίς ἐστι τῶν μιχθέντων ἢ σύνθεσις, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν οὐδέτερον οἷόν τʼ εἶναι τούτων.
And yet harmony is a certain ratio or combination of the mixed things, whereas the soul is capable of being neither of these.
ἔτι δὲ τὸ κινεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἁρμονίας, ψυχῇ δὲ τπάντες ἀπονέμουσι τοῦτο μάλισθʼ ὡς εἰπεῖν.
Moreover, to move does not belong to harmony, but to the soul everyone assigns this, so to speak, most of all.
ἁρμόζει δὲ μᾶλλον καθʼ ὑγιείας λέγειν ἁρμονίαν, καὶ ὅλως τῶν σωματικῶν ἀρετῶν, ἢ κατὰ ψυχῆς.
And it is more fitting to speak of harmony in the case of health, and generally of bodily virtues, than in the case of the soul.
φανερώτατον δʼ εἴ τις ἀποδιδόναι πειραθείη τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰ ἔργα τῆς ψυχῆς ἁρμονίᾳ τινί· χαλεπὸν γὰρ ἐφαρμόζειν.
And this would be most obvious if one were to try to attribute the passive states and works of the soul to some harmony; for it is difficult to fit them.
ἔτι δʼ εἰ λέγομεν τὴν ἁρμονίαν εἰς δύο ἀποβλέποντες, κυριώτατα μέν, τῶν μεγεθῶν ἐν τοῖς ἔχουσι κίνησιν καὶ θέσιν, τὴν· σύνθεσιν αὐτῶν, ἐπειδὰν οὕτω συναρμόζωσιν ὥστε μηδὲν συγγενὲς παραδέχεσθαι, ἐντεῦθεν δὲ καὶ τὸν τῶν μεμιγμένων λόγον, οὐδετέρως μὲν οὖν εὔλογον, ἡ δὲ σύνθεσις τῶν τοῦ σώματος μερῶν λίαν εὐεξέταστος.
Furthermore, if we speak of harmony looking to two things: most properly, of magnitudes in those things which have motion and position, their combination, when they are so fitted together that they admit nothing of the same kind between them, and derived from this, also the ratio of the mixed things; now in neither sense is it reasonable.
πολλαί τε γὰρ αἱ συνθέσεις τῶν μερῶν καὶ πολλαχῶς·
And the combination of the parts of the body is very easy to examine.
τίνος οὖν ἢ πῶς ὑπολαβεῖν τὸν νοῦν χρὴ σύνθεσιν εἶναι, ἢ καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικόν ἢ ὀρεκτικόν;
For the combinations of the parts are many and in many ways; of what, then, or how is one to suppose the intellect to be a combination, or even the sensitive or appetitive part?
ὁμοίως δὲ ἄτοπον καὶ τὸ τόν λόγον τῆς μίξεως εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν· οὐ γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχει λόγον ἡ μίξις τῶν στοιχείων· καθʼ ἥν σὰρξ καὶ καθʼ ἥν ὀστοῦν.
Similarly, it is also absurd that the soul is the ratio of the mixture; for the mixture of the elements does not have the same ratio for flesh and for bone.
συμβήσεται οὖν πολλάς τε ψυχὰς ἔχειν καὶ κατὰ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα, εἴπερ πάντα μὲν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων μεμιγμένων, ὁ δὲ τῆς μίξεως λόγος ἁρμονία καὶ ψυχή. (ἀπαιτήσειε δʼ ἄν τις τοῦτό γε καὶ παρʼ Ἐμπεδοκλέους· ἕκαστον γὰρ αὐτῶν λόγῳ τινί φησιν εἶναι· πότερον οὖν ὁ λόγος ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχή, ἢ μᾶλλον ἕτερόν τι οὖσα ἐγγίνεται τοῖς μέρεσιν;
It will follow, therefore, that one has many souls and throughout the whole body, if indeed all things are from the mixed elements, and the ratio of the mixture is harmony and soul. (And one might demand this also from Empedocles; for he says that each of them exists by some ratio; is it then the ratio that is the soul, or is it rather as being something different that it arises in the parts?
ἔτι δὲ πότερον ἡ φιλία τῆς τυχούσης αἰτία μίξεως ἢ τῆς κατὰ τόν λόγον, καὶ αὕτη πότερον ὁ λόγος ἐστὶν ἢ παρὰ τὸν λόγον ἕτερόν τι; ) ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἔχει τοιαύτας ἀπορίας.
And further, is friendship the cause of any arbitrary mixture, or of that which is according to the ratio, and is this friendship itself the ratio, or something else besides the ratio?) These things, then, have such difficulties.
εἰ δʼ ἐστίν ἕτερον ἡ ψνχὴ τῆς μίξεως, τί δή ποτε ἅμα τὸ σαρκὶ εἶναι ἀναιρεῖται καὶ τό τοῖς ἄλλοις μορίοις τοῦ ζῴου;
But if the soul is different from the mixture, why indeed is the being-flesh destroyed at the same time as that of the other parts of the animal?
πρός δὲ τούτοις εἴπερ μὴ ἕκαστον τῶν μορίων ψνχὴν ἔχει, εἰ μὴ ἔστιν ἡ ψυχὴ ὁ λόγος τῆς μίξεως, τί ἐστιν ὅ φθείρεται τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπολιπούσης;
In addition to these, if indeed each of the parts does not have a soul, if the soul is not the ratio of the mixture, what is it that is destroyed when the soul leaves?
ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὔθʼ ἁρμονίαν οἷόν τʼ εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν οὔτε κύκλῳ περιφέρεσθαι, δῆλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων.
That, therefore, the soul can be neither harmony nor carried in a circle, is clear from what has been said.
κατὰ συμβεβηκός δὲ κινεῖσθαι, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, ἔστι καὶ κι· νεῖν ἑαυτήν, οἶον κινεῖσθαι μὲν ἐν ᾧ ἐστι, τοῦτο δὲ κινεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς· ἄλλως δʼ οὐχ οἷόν τε κινεῖσθαι κατὰ τόπον αὐτήν.
But that it is moved accidentally, as we said, and moves itself, is possible—for instance, that in which it is may be moved, and this may be moved by the soul; but in no other way is it possible for it to be moved locally.
εὐλογώτερον δʼ ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις περὶ αὐτῆς ὡς κινουμένης, εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀποβλέψας.
But one might more reasonably raise a difficulty about it as being moved, looking to such things as follow.
φαμὲν γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν λυπεῖσθαι χαίρειν, θαρρεῖν φοβεῖσθαι, ἔτι δὲ ὀργίζεσθαί τε καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ διανοεῖσθαι· ταῦτα δὲ πάντα κινήσεις εἶναι δοκοῦσιν.
For we say that the soul is pained, rejoices, is bold, fears, and further is angry, perceives, and thinks; and all these seem to be motions.
ὅθεν οἰηθείη τις ἂν αὐτὴν κινεῖσθαι· τὸ δʼ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀναγκαῖον.
From which one might think that it is moved; but this is not necessary.
εἰ γὰρ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἢ χαίρειν ἢ διανοεῖσθαι κινήσεις εἰσί, καὶ ἕκαστον κινεῖσθαι τούτων, τὸ δὲ κινεῖσθαί ἐστιν ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς, οἷον τὸ ὀργίζεσθαι ἢ φοβεῖσθαι τὸ τὴν καρδίαν ὡδὶ κινεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ διανοεῖσθαι ἢ τὸ τοῦτο ἴσως ἢ ἕτερόν τι, τούτων δὲ συμβαίνει τὰ μὲν κατὰ φορὰν τινῶν κινουμένων, τὰ δὲ κατʼ ἀλλοίωσιν (ποῖα δὲ καὶ πῶς, ἕτερός ἐστι λόγος)— τὸ δὴ λέγειν ὀργίζεσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν ὅμοιον κἂν εἴ τις λέγοι τὴν ψυχὴν ὑφαίνειν ἢ οἰκοδομεῖν· βέλτιον γὰρ ἴσως μὴ λέγειν τὴν ψυχὴν ἐλεεῖν ἢ μανθάνειν ἢ διανοεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἄνθρωπον τῇ ψυχῇ· τοῦτο δὲ μὴ ὡς ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῆς κινήσεως οὔσης, ἀλλʼ ὁτὲ μὲν μέχρι ἐκείνης, ὁτὲ δʼ ἀπʼ ἐκείνης, οἷον ἡ μὲν αἴσθησις ἀπὸ τωνδί, ἡ δʼ ἀνάμνησις ἀπʼ ἐκείνης ἐπὶ τὰς ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις κινήσεις ἢ μονάς.
For even if, as much as you please, being pained or rejoicing or thinking are motions, and each of these is to be moved, and the being moved is by the soul (for instance, being angry or fearing is for the heart to be moved thus, and thinking is perhaps this or something else, and of these some occur by the locomotion of certain things being moved, and others by alteration—what kind and how they do so is another discussion)—then to say that the soul is angry is similar as if one were to say that the soul weaves or builds; for it is perhaps better not to say that the soul pities or learns or thinks, but the human being with the soul; and this not as though the motion is in the soul, but sometimes reaching to it, and sometimes from it, as perception is from these things, and recollection is from the soul to the motions or rests in the sense organs.