§1.3#2τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ὁ Τίμαιος φυσιολογεῖ τὴν ψυχὴν κινεῖν τὸ σῶμα· τῷ γὰρ κινεῖσθαι αὐτὴν καὶ τὸ σῶμα κινεῖν διὰ τὸ συμπεπλέχθαι πρὸς αὐτό.
And in the same way, Timaeus also gives a physical account that the soul moves the body; for because it is itself moved, it also moves the body, because of its being interwoven with it.
συνεστηκυῖαν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων καὶ μεμερισμένην κατὰ τοὺς ἁρμονικούς ἀριθμούς, ὅπως αἴσθησίν τε σύμφυτον ἁρμονίας ἔχη καὶ τὸ πᾶν φέρηται συμφώνους φοράς, τὴν εὐθυωρίαν εἰς κύκλον κατέκαμψεν· καὶ διελὼν ἐκ τοῦ ἑνὸς δύο κύκλους δισσαχῇ συνημμένους πάλιν τὸν ἕνα διεῖλεν εἰς ἑπτὰ κύκλους, ὡς οὔσας τὰς τὸῦ οὐρανοῦ φορὰς τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς κινήσεις.
For, having constituted it out of the elements and divided it according to the harmonic numbers, in order that it might have both an innate perception of harmony and that the whole might be carried in harmonious movements, he bent its straight direction into a circle; and having divided the single one into two circles joined in a double way, he again divided the one into seven circles, treating the movements of the heaven as the motions of the soul.
πρῶτον μὲν οὖν οὐ καλῶς τὸ λέγειν τὴν ψυχὴν μέγεθος εἶναι· τὴν γὰρ τοῦ παντὸς δῆλον ὅτι τοιαύτην εἶναι βούλεται οἷόν ποτʼ ἐστὶν ὁ καλούμενος νοῦς (οὐ γὰρ δὴ οἷόν γʼ ἡ αἰσθητική, οὐδʼ οἷον ἡ ἐπιθυμητική· τούτων γὰρ ἡ κίνησις οὐ κυκλοφορία)·
First of all, then, it is not well said that the soul is a magnitude; for he clearly wishes the soul of the universe to be such as is that which is called intellect (for surely it is not like the sensitive, nor like the appetitive soul; for the motion of these is not circular transmission).
ὁ δὲ νοῦς εἷς καὶ συνεχὴς ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ νόησις· ἡ δὲ νόησις τὰ νοήματα· ταῦτα δὲ τῷ ἐφεξῆς ἕν, ὡς ὁ ἀριθμός, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ὡς τὸ μέγεθος· διόπερ οὐδʼ ὁ νοῦς οὕτω συνεχής, ἀλλʼ ἤτοι ἀμερὴς ἢ οὐχ ὡς μέγεθός τι συνεχής.
But the intellect is one and continuous, just as thinking is; and thinking is the thoughts; and these are one by succession, like number, but not like magnitude; wherefore neither is the intellect continuous in this way, but is either partless or not continuous as a magnitude is.
πῶς γὰρ δὴ καὶ νοήσει, μέγεθος ὤν;
For how indeed will it think, being a magnitude?
πότερον ὁτῳοῦν τῶν μορίων τῶν αὑτοῦ, μορίων δʼ ἤτοι κατὰ μέγεθος ἢ κατὰ στιγμήν, εἰ δεῖ καὶ τοῦτο μόριον εἰπεῖν;
Will it think with any one of its parts, and parts either in respect of magnitude or in respect of a point, if indeed one must call this also a part?
εἰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ στιγμήν, αὗται δʼ ἄπειροι, δῆλον ὡς οὐδέποτε διέξεισιν· εἰ δὲ κατὰ μέγεθος, πολλάκις ἢ ἀπειράκις νοήσει τὸ αὐτό.
If then in respect of a point, and these are infinite, it is clear that it will never traverse them; but if in respect of magnitude, it will think the same thing many times or infinitely many times.
φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ἅπαξ ἐνδεχόμενον.
But it appears to be possible to do so even once.
εἰ δʼ ἱκανὸν θιγεῖν ὁτῳοῦν τῶν μορίων, τί δεῖ κύκλῳ κινεῖσθαι, ἢ καὶ ὅλως μέγεθος ἔχειν;
And if it is sufficient to touch with any one of the parts, why must it move in a circle, or even have magnitude at all?
εἰ δʼ ἀναγκαῖον νοῆσαι τῷ ὅλῳ κύκλῳ θιγόντα, τίς ἐστιν ἡ τοῖς μορίοις θίξις;
But if it is necessary to think by touching with the whole circle, what is the touch with the parts?
ἔτι δὲ πῶς νοήσει τὸ μεριστόν ἀμερεῖ ἢ τὸ ἀμερὲς μεριστῷ;
And further, how will it think that which is divisible with that which is indivisible, or that which is indivisible with that which is divisible?
ἀναγκαῖον δὲ τὸν νοῦν εἶναι τὸν κύκλον τοῦτον· νοῦ μὲν γὰρ κίντησις νόησις, κύκλου δὲ περιφορά· εἰ οὖν ἡ νόησις περιφορά, καὶ νοῦς ἂν εἴη ὁ κύκλος οὗ ἡ τοιαύτη περιφορὰ νόησις.
And it is necessary that the intellect is this circle; for the motion of the intellect is thinking, and that of the circle is rotation; if then thinking is rotation, the intellect would be the circle of which such rotation is thinking.
ἀεὶ δὲ δὴ τί νοήσει (δεῖ γάρ, εἴπερ ἀΐδιος ἡ περιφορά);
And what indeed will it always think (for it must do so, if indeed the rotation is eternal)?
τῶν μὲν γὰρ πρακτικῶν νοήσεων ἔστι πέρατα (πᾶσαι γὰρ ἑτέρου χάριν), αἱ δὲ θεωρητικαὶ τοῖς λόγοις ὁμοίως ὁρίζονται· λόγος δὲ πᾶς ὁρισμὸς ἢ ἀπόδειξις·
For of practical thinkings there are limits (for they are all for the sake of something else), while theoretical ones are similarly limited by arguments; and every argument is either a definition or a demonstration.
ἡ μὲν οὖν ἀπόδειξις καὶ ἀπʼ ἀρχῆς καὶ ἔχουσά πως τέλος, τὸν συλλογισμὸν ἢ τὸ συμπέρασμα (εἰ δὲ μὴ περατοῦνται, ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἀνακάμπτουσί γε πάλιν ἐπʼ ἀρχήν, προσλαμβάνουσαι δʼ ἀεὶ μέσον καὶ ἄκρον εὐθυποροῦσιν· ἡ δὲ περιφορὰ πάλιν ἐπʼ ἀρχὴν ἀνακάμπτει)· οἱ δʼ ὁρισμοὶ πάντες πεπερασμένοι.
Now demonstration is both from a starting point and has in a way an end, namely the syllogism or the conclusion (and even if they are not brought to a limit, at least they do not bend back again to the starting point, but always taking on a middle and an extreme term, they proceed in a straight line; whereas rotation bends back again to the starting point); and definitions are all finite.
ἔτι εἰ ἡ αὐτὴ περιφορὰ πολλάκις, δεήσει πολλάκις νοεῖν τὸ αὐτό, ἔτι δʼ ἡ νόησις ἔοικεν ἠρεμήσει τινὶ καὶ ἐπιστάσει μᾶλλον ἢ κινήσει·
Furthermore, if the same rotation is repeated many times, it will be necessary to think the same thing many times.
τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ὁ συλλογισμός.
And furthermore, thinking seems to resemble a certain resting and coming to a halt rather than motion; and in the same way also the syllogism.
ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ μακάριόν γε τὸ μὴ ῥᾴδιον ἀλλὰ βίαιον· εἰ δʼ ἐστὶν ἡ κίνησις αὐτῆς ᾗ οὐσία, παρὰ φύσιν ἂν κινοῖτο.
Moreover, that which is not easy but forced is not blessed; and if motion is its essence, it would be moved contrary to nature.
ἐπίπονον δὲ καὶ τὸ μεμῖχθαι τῷ σώματι μὴ δυνάμενον ἀπολυθῆναι, καὶ προσέτι φευκτόν, εἴπερ βέλτιον τῷ νῷ μὴ μετὰ σώματος εἶναι, καθάπερ εἴωθέ τε λέγεσθαι καὶ πολλοῖς συνδοκεῖ.
And to be mixed with the body without being able to be released is painful, and furthermore to be avoided, if indeed it is better for the intellect not to be with a body, as is customary to be said and seems so to many.
ἄδηλος δὲ καὶ τοῦ κύκλῳ φέρεσθαι τὸν οὐρανὸν ἡ αἰτία· οὔτε γὰρ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ οὐσία αἰτία τοῦ κύκλῳ φέρεσθαι, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς οὕτω κινεῖται, οὔτε τὸ σῶμα αἴτιον, ἀλλʼ ἡ ψυχὴ μᾶλλον ἐκείνῳ.
And the cause of the heaven's being carried in a circle is also obscure; for neither is the essence of the soul the cause of its being carried in a circle—rather, it is moved in this way accidentally—nor is the body the cause, but rather the soul is the cause for the body.
ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδʼ ὅτι βέλτιον λέγεται· καίτοι γʼ ἐχρῆν διὰ τοῦτο τὸν θεὸν· κύκλῳ ποιεῖν φέρεσθαι τὴν ψυχήν, ὅτι βέλτιον αὐτῇ τὸ κινεῖσθαι τοῦ μένειν, κινεῖσθαι δʼ οὕτως ἢ ἄλλως.
Moreover, neither is it said that it is because it is better; and yet for this reason God ought to have made the soul be carried in a circle, because to be moved was better for it than to remain at rest, and to be moved in this way rather than in another.
ἐπεὶ δʼ ἐστὶν ἡ τοιαύτη σκέψις ἑτέρων λόγων οἰκειοτέρα, ταύτην μὲν ἀφῶμεν τὸ νῦν.
But since such an inquiry is more appropriate for other discussions, let us dismiss this for the present.
ἐκεῖνο δὲ ἄτοπον συμβαίνει καὶ τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τοῖς πλείστοις τῶν περὶ ψυχῆς· συνάπτουσι γὰρ καὶ τιθέασιν εἰς σῶμα τὴν ψυχήν, οὐθὲν προσδιορίσαντες διὰ τίν’ αἰτίαν καὶ πῶς ἔχοντος τοῦ σώματος.
But this absurdity happens both to this account and to most of those concerning the soul; for they connect and place the soul into a body, without further specifying for what cause and with the body being in what state.
καίτοι δόξειεν ἄν τοῦτʼ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι· διὰ γάρ τὴν κοινωνίαν τὸ μὲν ποιεῖ τὸ δὲ πάσχει καὶ τὸ μὲν κινεῖται τὸ δὲ κινεῖ, τούτων δʼ οὐθὲν ὑπάρχει πρὸς ἄλληλα τοῖς τυχοῦσιν.
And yet this would seem to be necessary; for because of their community, the one acts and the other is acted upon, and the one is moved and the other moves, and none of these relations obtain between arbitrary things in relation to one another.
οἱ δὲ μόνον ἐπιχειροῦσι λέγειν ποῖόν τι ἡ ψυχή, περὶ δὲ τοῦ δεξομένου σώματος οὐθὲν ἔτι προσδιορίζουσιν, ὥσπερ ἐνδεχόμενον κατὰ τοὺς Πυθαγορικοὺς μύθους τὴν τυχοῦσαν ψυχὴν εἰς τὸ τυχὸν ἐνδύεσθαι σῶμα· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἕκαστον ἴδιον ἔχειν εἶδος καὶ μορφήν.
But they only attempt to say what kind of thing the soul is, but concerning the receiving body they specify nothing further, as though it were possible, according to the Pythagorean myths, for any arbitrary soul to enter into any arbitrary body; for each seems to have its own form and shape.
παραπλήσιον δὲ λέγουσιν ὥσπερ εἴ τις φαίη τὴν τεκτονικὴν εἰς αὐλοὺς ἐνδύεσθαι· δεῖ γὰρ τὴν μὲν τέχνην χρῆσθαι τοῖς ὀργάνοις, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν τῷ σώματι.
And they speak in a very similar way as if one were to say that the craft of carpentry enters into flutes; for indeed the craft must use its instruments, and the soul must use its body.