§1.3#1Ἑπισκεπτέον δὲ πρῶτον μὲν περὶ κινήσεως· ἴσως γάρ οὐ μόνον ψεῦδός ἐστι τό τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτῆς τοιαύτην εἶναι οἵαν φασὶν οἱ λέγοντες ψυχὴν εἶναι τὸ κινοῦν ἑαυτὸ ἢ δυνάμενον κινεῖν, ἀλλʼ ἕν τι τῶν ἀδυνάτων τὸ ὑπάρχειν αὐτῇ κίνησιν.
First of all, we must investigate motion; for perhaps it is not only false that its essence is such as those say who declare the soul to be that which moves itself or is capable of causing motion, but it is one of the impossible things for motion to belong to it.
ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον τὸ κινοῦν καὶ αὐτὸ κινεῖσθαι, πρότερον εἴρηται.
That it is not necessary for that which causes motion to be itself in motion has been said before.
διχῶς δὲ κινουμένου παντός—ἢ γὰρ καθʼ ἕτερον ἢ καθʼ αὑτό καθʼ ἕτερον δὲ λέγομεν ὅσα κινείται τῷ ἐν κινουμένῳ εἶναι, οἷον πλωτῆρες· οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως κινοῦνται τῷ πλοίῳ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ καθ’ αὑτὸ κινεῖται, οἱ δὲ τῷ ἐν κινουμένῳ εἶναι·
And since everything that is moved is moved in two ways—for either in virtue of something else or in virtue of itself—and we say 'in virtue of something else' of all those that are moved by being in something that is moved, such as sailors; for they are not moved in the same way as the ship; for the ship is moved in virtue of itself, but they by being in something that is moved.
δῆλον δʼ ἐπὶ τῶν μορίων· οἰκεία μὲν γάρ ἐστι κίνησις ποδῶν βάδισις, αὕτη δὲ καὶ ἀνθρώπων· οὐχ ὑπάρχει δὲ τοῖς πλωτῆρσι τότε—διχῶς δὴ λεγομένου τοῦ κινεῖσθαι νῦν ἐπισκοποῦμεν περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς εἰ καθʼ αὑτὴν κινεῖται καὶ μετέχει κινήσεως.
This is clear in the case of parts; for walking is a proper motion of feet, and this is also of humans, but it does not belong to the sailors at that time—since, then, being moved is spoken of in two ways, we are now investigating concerning the soul, whether it is moved in virtue of itself and participates in motion.
τεσσάρων δὲ κινήσεων οὐσῶν, φορᾶς ἀλλοιώσεως φθίσεως αὐξήσεως, ἢ μίαν τούτων κινοῦτʼ ἂν ἢ πλείους ἢ πάσας.
And there being four motions—locomotion, alteration, decrease, and increase—it would be moved either by one of these, or by more, or by all.
εἰ δὲ κινεῖται μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, φύσει ἂν ὑπάρχοι κίνησις αὐτῇ· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ τόπος· πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ λεχθεῖσαι κινήσεις ἐν τόπῳ.
And if it is moved not accidentally, motion would belong to it by nature; and if this is so, place also would belong to it; for all the mentioned motions are in place.
εἰ δʼ ἐστὶν ἡ οὐσία τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ κινεῖν ἑαυτήν, οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αὐτῇ τὸ κινεῖσθαι ὑπάρξει, ὥσπερ τῷ λευκῷ ἢ τῷ τριπήχει· κινεῖται γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· ὧ γὰρ ὑπάρχουσιν, ἐκεῖνο κινεῖται, τὸ σῶμα.
And if the essence of the soul is to move itself, being moved will not belong to it accidentally, as to the white or to the three-cubit-long; for these also are moved, but accidentally; for that to which they belong, the body, is what is moved.
διὸ καὶ οὐκ ἔστι τόπος αὐτῶν· τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς ἔσται, εἴπερ φύσει κινήσεως μετέχει.
Wherefore also there is no place for them; but there will be for the soul, if indeed it participates in motion by nature.
ἔτι δʼ εἰ φύσει κινεῖται, κἂν βίᾳ κινηθείη· κἂν εἰ βίᾳ, καὶ φύσει.
Furthermore, if it is moved by nature, it could also be moved by force; and if by force, also by nature.
τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἔχει καὶ περὶ ἠρεμίας· εἰς ὃ γὰρ κινεῖται φύσει, καὶ ἠρεμεῖ ἐν τούτῳ φύσει· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰς ὃ κινεῖται βίᾳ, καὶ ἠρεμεῖ ἐν τούτῳ βίᾳ.
And it is the same way also concerning rest; for that into which it is moved by nature, in this it also rests by nature; and similarly, that into which it is moved by force, in this it also rests by force.
ποῖαι δὲ βίαιοι τῆς ψυχῆς κινήσεις ἔσονται καὶ ἠρεμίαι, οὐδὲ πλάττειν βουλομένοις ῥᾴδιον ἀποδοῦναι.
But what kind of forced motions and rests of the soul there will be is not easy to render, even for those who wish to construct fictions.
ἔτι δʼ εἰ μὲν ἄνω κινήσεται, πῦρ ἔσται, εἰ δὲ κάτω, γῆ· τούτων γὰρ τῶν σωμάτων αἱ κινήσεις αὗται.
Furthermore, if it is moved upward, it will be fire, and if downward, earth; for these are the motions of these bodies.
ὁ δʼ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ τῶν μεταξύ.
And the same argument holds also concerning the intermediate ones.
ἔτι δʼ ἐπεὶ φαίνεται κινοῦσα τὸ σῶμα, ταύτας εὔλογον κινεῖν τὰς κινήσεις ἃς καὶ αὐτὴ κινεῖται.
Furthermore, since it appears to move the body, it is reasonable that it causes those motions by which it is itself moved.
εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ ἀντιστρέψασιν εἰπεῖν ἀληθὲς ὅτι ἣν τὸ σῶμα κινεῖται, ταύτην καὶ αὐτή.
And if this is so, it is also true to say, converting the statement, that whichever motion the body is moved with, with this the soul also is moved.
τὸ δὲ σῶμα κινεῖται φορᾷ· ὥστε καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ μεταβάλλοι ἄν κατὰ τόπον ἢ ὅλη ἢ κατὰ μόρια μεθισταμένη.
But the body is moved by locomotion; so that the soul also would change in respect of place, shifting either as a whole or in respect of its parts.
εἰ δὲ τοῦτʼ ἐνδέχεται, καὶ ἐξελθοῦσαν εἰσιέναι πάλιν ἐνδέχοιτʼ ἄν· τούτῳ δʼ ἕποιτ’ ἂν τὸ ἀνίστασθαι τὰ τεθνεῶτα τῶν ζῴων.
And if this is possible, it would also be possible for it to enter again after having gone out; and from this it would follow that dead animals rise up again.
τὴν δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς κίνησιν κἂν ὑφ’ ἑτέρου κινοῖτο· ὠσθείη γὰρ ἂν βίᾳ τὸ ζῷον.
And as for accidental motion, it could be moved even by something else; for the animal might be pushed by force.
οὐ δεῖ δὲ ᾧ τὸ ὑφʼ ἑαυτοῦ κινεῖσθαι ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ, τοῦθʼ ὑπ’ ἄλλου κινεῖσθαι, πλὴν εἰ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸ καθʼ αὑτὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ διʼ αὑτό, τὸ μὲν διʼ ἄλλο εἶναι, τὸ δʼ ἑτέρου ἕνεκεν.
But that which has in its essence to be moved by itself ought not to be moved by another, except accidentally, just as that which is good in virtue of itself or because of itself ought not to be good in virtue of something else or for the sake of another.
τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν μάλιστα φαίη τις ἂν ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν κινεῖσθαι, εἴπερ κινεῖται.
And one might say that the soul is moved most of all by sensible objects, if indeed it is moved.
ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ εἰ κινεῖ γε αὐτὴ αὑτήν, καὶ αὐτὴ κινοῖτʼ ἄν, ὥστʼ εἰ πᾶσα κίνησις ἔκστασίς ἐστι τοῦ κινουμένου ᾗ κινεῖται, καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ἐξίσταιτʼ ἂν ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας, εἰ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἑαυτὴν κινεῖ ἀλλʼ ἐστὶν ἡ κίνησις τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῆς καθʼ αὐτήν.
But indeed, if it moves itself, it would also be itself moved, so that if every motion is a departure of that which is moved from its state insofar as it is moved, the soul also would depart from its essence, if it does not move itself accidentally but the motion belongs to its essence in virtue of itself.
ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ κινεῖν φασὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τὸ σῶμα ἐν ᾧ ἐστιν, ὡς αὐτὴ κινεῖται, οἶον Δημόκριτος, παραπλησίως λέγων Φιλίππῳ τῷ κωμῳδοδιδασκάλῳ· φησὶ γὰρ τὸν Δαίδαλον κινουμένην ποιῆσαι τὴν ξυλίνην Ἀφροδίτην, ἐγχέαντʼ ἄργυρον χυτόν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ Δμόκριτος λέγει· κινουμένας γάρ φησι τὰς ἀδιαιρέτους σφαίρας διὰ τὸ πεφυκέναι μηδέποτε μένειν συνεφέλκειν καὶ κινεῖν τὸ σῶμα πᾶν.
And some also say that the soul moves the body in which it is in the same way as it is itself moved, as Democritus says, speaking in a very similar way to Philippus the comic poet-trainer; for he says that Daedalus made the wooden Aphrodite capable of motion by pouring in liquid quicksilver; and Democritus speaks in a similar way; for he says that the indivisible spheres, because of their nature of never remaining still, drag along and move the entire body.
ἡμεῖς δʼ ἐρωτήσομεν εἰ καὶ ἠρέμμησιν ποιεῖ τοῦτʼ αὐτό· πῶς δὲ ποιήσει, χαλεπόν ἢ καὶ ἀδύνατον εἰπεῖν.
But we shall ask if this very same thing also causes rest; and how it will cause it, is difficult or even impossible to say.
ὅλως δʼ οὐχ οὕτω φαίνεται κινεῖν ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ ζῷον, ἀλλὰ διὰ προαιρέσεώς τινος καὶ νοήσεως.
And in general, the soul does not appear to move the animal in this way, but through some choice and thought.