§1.2#2ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ κινητικὸν ἐδόκει ἡ ψυχὴ εἶναι καὶ γνωριστικὸν οὕτως, ἕνιοι συνέπλεξαν ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, ἀποφηνάμενοι τὴν ψυχὴν ἀριθμόν κινοῦνθʼ ἑαυτόν.
Since the soul seemed to be both capable of causing motion and capable of knowing in this way, some combined the two, declaring the soul to be a number that moves itself.
διαφέρονται δὲ περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν, τίνες καὶ πόσαι, μάλιστα μὲν οἱ σωματικὰς ποιοῦντες τοῖς ἀσωμάτους, τούτοις δʼ οἱ μίξαντες καὶ ἀπʼ ἀμφοῖν τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀποφηνάμενοι.
But they differ about the principles, what they are and how many, especially those who make them bodily and those who make them bodiless, and compared to these, those who mixed them and declared the principles to be from both.
διαφέρονται δὲ καὶ περὶ τοῦ πλήθους· οἱ μὲν γὰρ μίαν οἱ δὲ πλείους λέγουσιν.
They also differ about their number; for some say there is one, and others say more than one.
ἑπομένως δὲ τούτοις καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀποδιδόασιν· τὸ γὰρ κινητικὸν τὴν φύσιν τῶν πρώτων ὑπειλήφασιν, οὐκ ἀλόγως.
And in accordance with these, they also define the soul; for they have assumed that which is capable of causing motion to be by nature among the first things, not without reason.
ὅθειν ἔδοξέ τισι πῦρ εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο λεπτομερέστατόν τε καὶ μάλιστα τῶν στοιχείων ἀσώματον, ἔτι δὲ κινεῖταί τε καὶ κινεῖ τὰ ἄλλα πρώτως.
Hence it seemed to some to be fire; for this is the most subtle in its parts and the most bodiless of the elements, and furthermore it both is moved and moves other things primarily.
Δημόκριτος δὲ καὶ γλαφυρωτέρως εἴρηκεν ἀποφαινόμενος διὰ τί τούτων ἑκάτερον· ψυχὴν μὲν γὰρ εἶναι ταὐτὸ καὶ νοῦν, τοῦτο δʼ εἶναι τῶν πρώτων καὶ ἀδιαιρέτων σωμάτων, κινητικὸν δὲ διὰ μικρομέρειαν καὶ τὸ σχῆμα· τῶν δὲ σχημάτων εὐκινητότατον τὸ σφαιροειδὲς λέγει· τοιοῦτον δʼ εἶναι τόν τε νοῦν καὶ τὸ πῦρ.
And Democritus has spoken even more elegantly, declaring why each of these is so; for he says that soul and mind are the same, and that this is of the primary and indivisible bodies, and is capable of causing motion because of the smallness of its parts and its shape; and of shapes he says that the spherical is the most easily moved; and both mind and fire are of this kind.
Ἀναξαγόρας δʼ ἔοικε μὲν ἕτερον λέγειν ψυχήν τε καὶ νοῦν, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν καὶ πρότερον, χρῆται δʼ ἀμφοῖν ὡς μιᾷ φύσει, πλὴν ἀρχήν γε τὸν νοῦν τίθεται μάλιστα πάντων· μόνον γοῦν φησὶν αὐτὸν τῶν ὄντων ἀπλοῦν εἶναι καὶ ἀμιγῆ τε καὶ καθαρόν.
And Anaxagoras seems to say that soul and mind are different, as we said also before, but he uses both as a single nature, except that he poses mind as a principle most of all; at least he says that it alone of all things is simple and unmixed and pure.
ἀποδίδωσι δʼ ἄμφω τῇ αὐτῇ ἀρχῇ, τό τε γινώσκειν καὶ τὸ κινεῖν, λέγων νοῦν κινήσαι τὸ πᾶν. (ἔοικε δὲ καὶ Θαλῆς ἐξ ὧν ἀπομνημονεύουσι κινητικόν τι τὴν ψυχὴν· ὑπολαβεῖν, εἴπερ τὴν λίθον ἔφη ψυχὴν ἔχειν, ὅτι τὸν σίδηρον κινεῖ. ) Διογένης δʼ ὥσπερ καὶ ἕτεροί τινες ἀέρα, τοῦτον οἰηθεὶς πάντων λεπτομερέστατον εἶναι καὶ ἀρχήν· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο γινώσκειν τε καὶ κινεῖν τὴν ψυχήν, ᾗ μὲν πρῶτόν ἐστι, καὶ ἐκ τούτου τὰ λοιπά, γινώσκειν, ᾗ δὲ λεπτότατον, κινητικὸν εἶναι.
And he attributes both to the same principle, both knowing and causing motion, saying that mind moved the whole. (And Thales also, from what they record of him, seems to have assumed the soul to be something capable of causing motion, if indeed he said that the magnet has a soul because it moves iron.) And Diogenes, just like some others, says it is air, thinking this to be the most subtle of all in its parts and a principle; and that because of this, the soul both knows and causes motion—knowing insofar as it is primary, and from this the rest of things, and capable of causing motion insofar as it is most subtle.
καὶ Ἡράκλειτος δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναί φησι ψυχήν, εἴπερ τὴν ἀναθυμίασιν, ἐξ ἡς τἆλλα συνίστησιν· καὶ ἀσωματώτατόν τε καὶ ῥέον ἀεί· τὸ δὲ κινούμενον κινουμένῳ γινώσκεσθαι.
And Heraclitus also says that the principle is the soul, if indeed it is the vapor from which he constitutes other things; and it is both most bodiless and always flowing; and that what is in motion is known by what is in motion.
ἐν κινήσει δʼ εἶναι τὰ ὄντα κἀκεῖνος ᾤετο καὶ οἱ πολλοί.
And he, as well as the majority, thought that existing things are in motion.
παραπλησίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ Ἀλκμαίων ἔοικεν ὑπολαβεῖν περὶ ψυχῆς· φησὶ γὰρ αὐτὴν ἀθάνατον εἶναι διὰ τὸ ἐοικέναι τοῖς ἀθανάτοις· τοῦτο δʼ ὑπάρχειν αὐτῇ ὡς ἀεὶ κινουμένῃ· κινεῖσθαι γὰρ καὶ τὰ θεία πάντα συνεχῶς ἀεί, σελήνην, ἥλιον, τοὺς ἀστέρας καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ὅλον.
And Alcmaeon seems to have assumed in a similar way to these concerning the soul; for he says it is immortal because of its being like the immortal things; and that this belongs to it in virtue of its being always in motion; for all divine things are also in constant motion always, the moon, the sun, the stars, and the whole heaven.
τῶν δὲ φορτικωτέρων καὶ ὕδωρ τινὲς ἀπεφήναντο, καθάπερ Ἵππων· πεισθῆναι δʼ ἐοίκασιν ἐκ τῆς γονῆς, ὅτι πάντων ὑγρά.
And among the more vulgar, some also declared it to be water, as did Hippon; and they seem to have been persuaded by seed, because it is in all cases moist.
καὶ γὰρ ἐλέγχει τοὺς αἶμα φάσκοντας τὴν ψυχήν, ὅτι ἡ γονὴ οὐχ οἷμα· ταύτην δʼ εἶναι τὴν πρώτην ψυχήν.
For he also refutes those who say that the soul is blood, by pointing out that seed is not blood; and that this is the primary soul.
ἕτεροι δʼ αἷμα, καθάπερ Κριτίας, τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ψυχῆς οἰκειότατον ὑπολαμβάνοντες, τοῦτο δʼ ὑπάρχειν διὰ τὴν τοῦ αἵματος φύσιν.
And others say it is blood, as did Critias, assuming that sensing is most characteristic of the soul, and that this belongs to it because of the nature of blood.
πάντα γὰρ τὰ στοιχεῖα κριτὴν εἴληφε, πλὴν τῆς γῆς· ταύτην δʼ οὐθεὶς ἀποπέφανται, πλὴν εἴ τις αὐτὴν εἴρηκεν ἐκ πάντων εἶναι τῶν στοιχείων ἢ πάντα.
For all the elements have found a judge, except earth; and no one has declared the soul to be this, unless someone has said it is from all the elements or is all of them.
ὁρίζονται δὴ πάντες τὴν ψυχὴν τρισὶν ὡς εἰπεῖν, κινήσει, αἰσθήσει, τῷ ἀσωμάτῳ· τούτων δʼ ἕκαστον ἀνάγεται πρὸς τὰς ἀρχάς.
Thus all define the soul by three things, so to speak: motion, sensing, and the bodiless; and each of these is referred back to the principles.
διὸ καὶ οἱ τῷ γινώσκειν ὁριζόμενοι αὐτὴν ἢ στοιχεῖον ἢ ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων ποιοῦσι, λέγοντες παραπλησίως ἀλλήλοις, πλὴν ἑνός· φασὶ γὰρ γινώσκεσθαι τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ· ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἡ ψυχὴ πάντα γινώσκει, συνιστᾶσιν αὐτὴν ἐκ πασῶν τῶν ἀρχῶν.
Wherefore those who define it by knowing also make it either an element or out of the elements, speaking in a similar way to one another, except for one; for they say that like is known by like; and since the soul knows all things, they constitute it from all the principles.
ὅσοι μὲν οὖν μίαν τινὰ λέγουσιν αἰτίαν καὶ στοιχεῖον ἔν, καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἓν τιθέασιν, οἶον πῦρ ἢ ἀέρα· οἱ δὲ πλείους λέγοντες τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν πλείω ποιοῦσιν.
Those, therefore, who say there is some one cause and one element, also pose the soul as some one thing, such as fire or air; while those who say there are more than one principle also make the soul more than one.
Ἀναξαγόρας δὲ μόνος ἀπαθῆ φησιν εἶναι τὸν νοῦν, καὶ κοινόν οὐθὲν οὐθενὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔχειν.
But Anaxagoras alone says that mind is unaffected, and has nothing in common with any of the other things.
τοιοῦτος δʼ ὢν πῶς γνωριεῖ καὶ διὰ τίνʼ αἰτίαν, οὔτʼ ἐκεῖνος εἴρηκεν οὔτʼ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων συμφανές ἐστιν.
But being of this kind, how it will know and through what cause, neither has he said nor is it manifest from what has been said.
ὅσοι δʼ ἐναντιώσεις ποιοῦσιν ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς, καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων συνιστᾶσιν· οἱ δὲ θάτερον τῶν ἐναντίων, οἷον θερμόν ἢ ψυχρὸν ἤ τι τοιοῦτον ἄλλο, καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ὁμοίως ἕν τι τούτων τιθέασιν.
And those who make oppositions among the principles also constitute the soul from opposites; while those who make one of the opposites, such as hot or cold or some other such thing, also pose the soul likewise as some one of these.
διὸ καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἀκολουθοῦσιν, οἱ μὲν τὸ θερμὸν λέγοντες, ὅτι διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ ζῆν ὠνόμασται, οἱ δὲ τὸ ψυχρόν, διὰ τὴν ἀναπνοὴν καὶ τὴν κατάφυξιν καλεῖσθαι ψυχήν.
Wherefore they also follow the names, those who say it is the hot saying that because of this living is also so named, and those who say it is the cold saying that because of respiration and cooling it is called soul.
τὰ μὲν οὖν παραδεδομένα περὶ ψυχῆς, καὶ διʼ ἃς αἰτίας λέγουσιν οὕτω, ταῦτʼ ἐστίν.
These, then, are the traditions handed down concerning the soul, and the causes because of which they speak thus.