§1.2#1Ἐπισκοποῦντας δὲ περὶ ψυχῆς ἀναγκαῖον ἅμα, διαποροῦντας περὶ ὧν εὐπορεῖν δεῖ προελθόντας, τὰς τῶν προτέρων δόξας συμπαραλαμβάνειν ὅσοι τι περὶ αὐτῆς ἀπεφήναντο, ὅπως τὰ μὲν καλῶς εἰρημένα λάβωμεν, εἰ δέ τι μὴ καλῶς, τοῦτʼ εὐλαβηθῶμεν.
For those who investigate the soul, it is necessary at the same time, while raising difficulties about those matters in which one must find a clear path as we proceed, to take along with us the opinions of our predecessors who declared anything about it, so that we may adopt what has been well said, and if there is anything not well said, we may be on our guard against this.
ἀρχὴ δὲ τῆς ζητήσεως προθέσθαι τὰ μάλιστα δοκοῦνθʼ ὑπάρχειν αὐτῇ κατὰ φύσιν.
And the starting point of the inquiry is to set before ourselves what is thought to belong to it most of all by nature.
τὸ ἔμψυχον δὴ τοῦ ἀφύχου δυοῖν μάλιστα διαφέρειν δοκεῖ, κινήσει τε καὶ τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι.
For the animate seems to differ from the inanimate in two things most of all: motion and sensing.
παρειλήφαμεν δὲ καὶ παρὰ τῶν προγενεστέρων σχεδὸν δύο ταῦτα περὶ ψυχῆς· φασὶ γὰρ ἔνιοι καὶ μάλιστα καὶ πρώτως ψυχὴν εἶναι τὸ κινοῦν.
And we have also inherited these two from our predecessors regarding the soul; for some say that, most of all and primarily, the soul is that which moves.
οἰηθέντες δὲ τὸ μὴ κινούμενον αὐτὸ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι κινεῖν ἕτερον, τῶν κινουμένων τι τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπέλαβον εἶναι.
And thinking that what is not itself in motion cannot move another, they supposed the soul to be one of the things in motion.
ὅθεν Δημόκριτος μὲν πῦρ τι καὶ θερμόν φησιν αὐτὴν εἶναι· ἀπείρων γὰρ ὄντων σχημάτων καὶ ἀτόμων τὰ σφαιροειδῆ πῦρ καὶ ψυχὴν λέγει (οἶον ἐν τῷ ἀέρι τὰ καλούμενα ξύσματα, ἃ φαίνεται ἐν ταῖς διὰ τῶν θυρίδων ἀκτίσιν), ὧν τὴν μὲν πανσπερμίαν στοιχεῖα λέγει τῆς ὅλης φύσεως (ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ Λεύκιππος), τούτων δὲ τὰ σφαιροειδῆ ψυχήν, διὰ τὸ μάλιστα διὰ παντὸς δύνασθαι διαδύνειν τοὺς τοιούτους ῥυσμοὺς καὶ κινεῖν τὰ λοιπά, κινούμενα καὶ αὐτά, ὑπολαμβάνοντες τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι τὸ παρέχον τοῖς ζῴοις τὴν κίνησιν.
Hence Democritus says it is a certain fire and heat; for while the shapes and atoms are infinite, he says that the spherical ones are fire and soul (like the so-called dust particles in the air, which appear in the rays through the windows), of which the entire seed-assemblage he says is the elements of the whole nature (and Leucippus likewise), and of these the spherical ones are the soul, because such shapes are most of all able to penetrate through everything and to move the rest, being themselves in motion, as they suppose that the soul is that which provides motion to animals.
διὸ καὶ τοῦ ζῆν ὄρον εἶναι τὴν ἀναπνοήν· συνάγοντος γὰρ τοῦ περιέχοντος τά σώματα καὶ ἐκθλίβοντος τῶν σχημάτων τὰ παρέχοντα τοῖς ζῴοις τὴν κίνησιν διὰ τὸ μηδʼ αὐτὰ ἠρεμεῖν μηδέποτε, βοήθειαν γίνεσθαι θύραθεν ἐπεισιόντων ἄλλων τοιούτων ἐν τῷ ἀναπνεῖν· κωλύειν γὰρ αὐτὰ καὶ τὰ ἐνυπάρχοντα ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις ἐκκρίνεσθαι, συνανείργοντα τὸ συνάγον καὶ πηγνύον· καὶ ζῆν δὲ ἕως ἂν δύνωνται τοῦτο ποιεῖν.
Which is also why they make respiration the definition of living; for when the surrounding air compresses the bodies and squeezes out those shapes which provide motion to animals because they themselves are never at rest, help comes from without when other such particles enter in during respiration; for they prevent those already present in the animals from being excreted, by helping to restrain the compressing and condensing force; and they live as long as they are able to do this.
ἔοικε δὲ καὶ τὸ παρὰ τῶν Πυθαγορείων λεγόμενον τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχειν διάνοιαν· ἔφασαν γάρ τινες αὐτῶν ψυχὴν εἶναι τὰ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι ξύσματα, οἱ δὲ τὸ ταῦτα κινοῦν.
And what is said by the Pythagoreans also seems to have the same meaning; for some of them said that the soul is the dust particles in the air, and others that it is what moves these.
περὶ δὲ τούτων εἴρηται ὅτι συνεχῶς φαίνεται κινούμενα, κἂν ᾖ νηνεμία παντελής.
And regarding these, it has been said that they appear to be in constant motion, even if there is a complete calm.
ἐπὶ ταὐτὸ δὲ φέρονται καὶ ὅσοι λέγουσι τὴν ψυχὴν τὸ αὐτὸ κινοῦν· ἐοίκασι γὰρ οὗτοι πάντες ὑπειληφέναι τὴν κίντησιν οἰκειότατον εἶναι τῇ ψυχῇ, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα κινεῖσθαι διὰ τὴν ψνχήν, ταύτην δʼ ὑφʼ ἑαυτῆς, διὰ τὸ μηθὲν ὁρᾶν κινοῦν ὃ μὴ καὶ αὐτὸ κινεῖται.
And those who say that the soul is that which moves itself also tend in the same direction; for all these seem to have assumed that motion is most characteristic of the soul, and that while all other things are moved by the soul, the soul is moved by itself, because they see nothing moving which is not also itself in motion.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας ψυχὴν εἶναι λέγει τὴν κινοῦσαν, καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος εἴρηκεν ὡς τὸ πᾶν ἐκίνησε νοῦς· οὐ μὴν παντελῶς γʼ ὥσπερ Δημόκριτος.
Likewise, Anaxagoras also says that the soul is that which moves, and so does anyone else who has said that mind moved the whole; not, however, altogether like Democritus.
ἐκεῖνος μὲν γὰρ ἁπλῶς ταὐτὸν ψυχὴν καὶ νοῦν· τὸ γὰρ ἀληθὲς εἶναι τὸ φαινόμενον, διὸ καλῶς ποιῆσαι τὸν Ὅμηρον ὡς “Ἕκτωρ κεῖτ’ ἀλλοφρονέων”. οὐ δὴ χρῆται τῷ νῷ ὡς δυνάμει τινὶ περὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ἀλλὰ ταὐτὸ λέγει ψυχὴν καὶ νοῦν.
For he simply identifies soul and mind; for he holds that what appears is true, and therefore that Homer did well to write that "Hector lay thinking other thoughts." He does not, then, use mind as a certain faculty concerned with truth, but says that soul and mind are the same.
Ἀναξαγόρας δʼ ἧττον διασαφεῖ περὶ αὐτῶν· πολλαχοῦ μὲν γὰρ τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ καλῶς καὶ ὀρθῶς τὸν νοῦν λέγει, ἑτέρωθι δὲ τοῦτον εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν· ἐν ἅπασι γὰρ ὑπάρχειν αὐτὸν τοῖς ζώοις, καὶ μεγάλοις καὶ μικροῖς, καὶ τιμίοις καὶ ἀτιμοτέροις.
But Anaxagoras is less clear about them; for in many places he says that mind is the cause of what is well and rightly done, but elsewhere he says that this is the soul; for he says it belongs to all animals, both great and small, both honored and less honored.
οὐ φαίνεται δʼ ὅ γε κατὰ φρόνησιν λεγόμενος νοῦς πᾶσιν ὁμοίως ὑπάρχειν τοῖς ζῴοις, ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πᾶσιν.
But mind in the sense of practical wisdom does not seem to belong to all animals alike, nor even to all humans.
ὅσοι μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι τὸ ἔμψυχον ἀπέβλεψαν, οὗτοι τὸ κινητικώτατον ὑπέλαβον τὴν ψυχήν· ὅσοι δʼ ἐπὶ τὸ γινώσκειν καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι τῶν ὄντων, οὗτοι δὲ λεγουσι τὴν ψυχὴν τὰς ἀρχάς, οἱ μὲν πλείους ποιοῦντες, ταύτας, οἱ δὲ μίαν, ταύτην, ὥσπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς μὲν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων πάντων, εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἕκαστον ψυχὴν τούτων, λέγων· οὕτως
γαίῃ μὲν γὰρ γαῖαν ὀπώπαμεν, ὕδατι δʼ ὅδωρ,
αἰθέρι δʼ αἰθέρα δῖαν, ἀτὰρ πυρὶ πῦρ ἀΐδηλον,
στοργῇ δὲ στοργήν, νεῖκος δέ τε νείκεῖ λυγρῷ. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ Πλάτων ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων ποιεῖ· γινώσκεσθαι γὰρ τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον, τὰ δὲ πράγματα ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν·
Those, therefore, who looked to the fact that the animate is in motion, assumed the soul to be that which is most capable of causing motion; but those who looked to its knowing and sensing of what exists, say that the soul is the principles, those who make more than one making these the soul, and those who make one making this the soul, just as Empedocles makes it out of all the elements, saying that each of these is also the soul, thus: "For by earth we see earth, and by water, water, and by air, divine air, but by fire, destructive fire, and by love, love, and strife by grim strife." In the same way, Plato also in the Timaeus makes the soul out of the elements; for he says that like is known by like, and that things are from the principles.
εἶναι. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς Περὶ φιλοσοφίας λεγομένοις διωρίσθη, αὐτὸ μὲν τὸ ζῷον ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς τοῦ ἑνὸς ἰδέας καὶ τοῦ πρώτου μήκους καὶ πλάτους καὶ βάθους, τὰ δʼ ἄλλα ὁμοιοτρόπως· ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἄλλως, νοῦν μὲν τὸ ἕν, ἐπιστήμην δὲ τὰ δύο (μοναχῶς γὰρ ἐφʼ ἕν), τὸν δὲ τοῦ ἐπιπέδου ἀριθμὸν δόξαν, αἴσθησιν δὲ τὸν τοῦ στερεοῦ.
And likewise, it was also defined in the lectures "On Philosophy" that the animal itself is from the idea of the One itself and the primary length and width and depth, and other things in a similar way; and further in another way, that mind is the One, knowledge is the two (for it goes in a single way to the one), the number of the plane is opinion, and sensing is that of the solid.
οἱ μὲν γάρ ἀριθμοὶ τὰ εἴδη αὐτὰ καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐλέγοντο, εἰσὶ δʼ ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων, κρίνεται δὲ τὰ πράγματα τὰ μὲν νῷ, τὰ δʼ ἐπιστήμῃ, τὰ δὲ δόξῃ, τὰ δʼ αἰσθήσει· εἴδη δʼ οἱ ἀριθμοὶ οὗτοι τῶν πραγμάτων.
For the numbers were said to be the forms themselves and the principles, and they are from the elements, and things are judged, some by mind, some by knowledge, some by opinion, and some by sensing; and these numbers are the forms of things.