§1.1#2ἀπορίαν δʼ ἔχει καὶ τὰ πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς, πότερόν ἐστι πάντα κοινὰ καὶ τοῦ ἔχοντος ἢ ἔστι τι καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἴδιον αὐτῆς· τοῦτο γὰρ λαβεῖν μὲν ἀναγκαῖον, οὐ ῥᾴδιον δέ.
The affections of the soul also present a difficulty: whether they are all shared also by that which has the soul, or whether there is something peculiar to the soul itself; for to grasp this is necessary, but not easy.
φαίνεται δὲ τῶν μὲν πλείστων οὐθὲν ἄνευ τοῦ σώματος πάσχειν οὐδὲ ποιεῖν, οἷον ὀργίζεσθαι, θαρρεῖν, ἐπιθυμεῖν, ὅλως αἰσθάνεσθαι, μάλιστα δʼ ἔοικεν ἰδίῳ τὸ νοεῖν·
In most cases, it appears that the soul neither experiences nor active without the body, as in being angry, being confident, desiring, and in general sensing; though thinking seems most of all peculiar to it.
εἰ δʼ ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦτο φαντασία τις ἢ μὴ ἄνευ φαντασίας, οὐκ ἐνδέχοιτʼ ἄν οὐδὲ τοῦτʼ ἄνευ σώματος εἶναι.
But if this too is a kind of imagination, or not without imagination, then not even this could exist without the body.
εἰ μὲν οὖν ἔστι τι τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἔργων ἢ παθημάτων ἴδιον, ἐνδέχοιτʼ ἄν αὐτὴν χωρίζεσθαι· εἰ δὲ μηθέν ἐστιν ἴδιον αὐτῆς, οὐκ ἄν εἴη χωριστή, ἀλλὰ καθάπερ τῷ εὐθεῖ, ᾖ εὐθύ, πολλὰ συμβαίνει, οἶον ἅπτεσθαι τῆς χαλκῆς σφαίρας κατὰ στιγμήν, οὐ μέντοι γʼ ἅψέται οὕτω χωρισθὲν τὸ εὐθύ· ἀχώριστον γάρ, εἴπερ ἀεὶ μετὰ σώματός τινός ἐστιν.
If, therefore, there is any of the functions or affections of the soul that is peculiar to it, it would be possible for it to be separated; but if nothing is peculiar to it, it would not be separable, but just as many properties belong to the straight line, qua straight—such as touching a bronze sphere at a point, although the straight line once separated will not touch it in this way, for it is inseparable, since it is always with some body.
ἔοικε δὲ καὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς πάθη πάντα εἶναι μετὰ σώματος, θυμός, πραότης, φόβος, ἔλεος, θάρσος, ἔτι χαρὰ καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν τε καὶ μισεῖν· ἅμα γὰρ τούτοις πάσχει τι τὸ σῶμα.
It seems that all the affections of the soul are also with a body—anger, gentleness, fear, pity, confidence, and further joy, loving, and hating; for along with these the body experiences something.
μηνύει δὲ τὸ ποτὲ μὲν ἰσχυρῶν καὶ ἐναργῶν παθημάτων συμβαινόντων μηδὲν παροξύνεσθαι ἢ φοβεῖσθαι, ἐνίοτε δʼ ὑπὸ μικρῶν καὶ ἀμαυρῶν κινεῖσθαι, ὅταν ὀργᾷ τὸ σῶμα καὶ οὕτως ἔχη ὥσπερ ὅταν ὀργίζηται.
This is indicated by the fact that sometimes, when strong and obvious occurrences happen, we are not provoked or frightened, while at other times we are moved by small and weak ones, when the body is aroused and is in such a state as when it is angry.
ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦτο φανερόν· μηθενὸς γὰρ φοβεροῦ συμβαίνοντος ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι γίνονται τοῖς τοῦ φοβουμένου.
And this is still more obvious; for when nothing fearful is happening, people find themselves in the affections of one who is frightened.
εἰ δʼ οὕτως ἔχει, δῆλον ὅτι τὰ πάθη λόγοι ἔνυλοί εἰσιν.
If this is so, it is clear that the affections are enmattered formulas.
ὥστε οἱ ὅροι τοιοῦτοι οἶον “τὸ ὀργίζεσθαι κίντησίς τις τοῦ τοιουδὶ σώματος ἢ μέρους ἢ δυνάμεως ὑπὸ τοῦδε ἕνεκα τοῦδεʼʼ. καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ἤδη φυσικοῦ τὸ θεωρῆσαι περὶ ψυχῆς, ἢ πάσης ἢ τῆς τοιαύτης.
Consequently, their definitions are of this sort, for example, "being angry is a certain movement of such-and-such a body or part or faculty by this agent for the sake of this end." And for these reasons, it is already the task of the natural philosopher to investigate the soul, either all soul or this kind of soul.
διαφερόντως δʼ ἄν ὁρίσαιντο ὁ φυσικός τε καὶ ὁ διαλεκτικός ἕκαστον αὐτῶν, οἶον ὀργὴ τί ἐστιν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὄρεξιν· ἀντιλυπήσεως τι τοιοῦτον, ὁ δὲ ζέσιν τοῦ περὶ καρδίαν αἵματος καὶ θερμοῦ.
But the natural philosopher and the dialectician would define each of them differently, for instance, what anger is; for the latter would define it as a desire for returning pain or something of this sort, while the former would define it as the boiling of the blood or heat around the heart.
τούτων δὲ ὁ μὲν τὴν ὕλην ἀποδίδωσιν, ὁ δὲ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸν λόγον.
Of these, the one gives the matter, while the other gives the form and the formula.
ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος ὅδε τοῦ πράγματος, ἀνάγκη δʼ εἶναι τοῦτον ἐν ὕλῃ τοιᾳδί, εἰ ἔσται· ὥσπερ οἰκίας ὁ μὲν λόγος τοιοῦτος, ὅτι σκέπασμα κωλυτικόν φθορᾶς ὑπʼ ἀνέμων καὶ ὄμβρων καὶ καυμάτων, ὁ δὲ φήσει λίθους καὶ πλίνθους καὶ ξύλα, ἕτερος δʼ ἐν τούτοις τὸ εἶδος ἕνεκκα τωνδί, τίς οὖν ὁ φυσικός τούτων;
For this is the formula of the thing, but it is necessary for this to be in such-and-such matter, if it is to exist; just as in the case of a house, one formula is that it is a shelter protective against destruction by winds, rains, and heat, while another will say it is stones, bricks, and timber, and yet another will say it is the form in these materials for the sake of these ends.
πότερον ὁ περὶ τὴν ὕλην, τὸν δὲ λόγον ἀγνοῶν, ἢ ὁ περὶ τὸν λόγον μόνον;
Who, then, among these is the natural philosopher?
ἢ μᾶλλον ὁ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν;
Is it the one concerned with the matter but ignorant of the formula, or the one concerned with the formula alone?
ἐκείνων δὲ δὴ τίς ἑκάτερος;
Or rather the one concerned with both?
ἢ οὐκ ἔστι τις ὁ περὶ τὰ πάθη τῆς ἄλης τὰ μὴ χωριστὰ μηδʼ ᾗ χωριστά, ἀλλʼ ὁ φυσικός περὶ ἅπανθ’ ὅσα τοῦ τοιουδὶ σώματος καὶ τῆς τοιαύτης ὕλης ἔργα καὶ πάθη·
And who is each of those others?
ὅσα δὲ μὴ τοιαῦτα, ἄλλος, καὶ περὶ τινῶν μὲν τεχνίτης, ἐὰν τύχη, οἶον τέκτων ἢ ἰατρός, τῶν δὲ μὴ χωριστῶν μέν, ᾗ δὲ μὴ τοιούτου σώματος πάθη καὶ ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως, ὁ μαθηματικός, δὲ κεχωρι·
Or is there no one concerned with the affections of matter which are not separable nor treated as separable, but the natural philosopher is concerned with everything that is a function or affection of such-and-such a body and such-and-such matter?
σμένα, ὁ πρῶτος φιλόσοφος; ἀλλʼ ἐπανιτέον ὅθεν ὁ λόγος.
While for those things which are not of this sort, it is someone else—and for some things, a craftsman, if it so happens, like a carpenter or a physician; and for those which are not separable indeed, but are not affections of such-a-body and are treated by abstraction, it is the mathematician; and for things qua separated, is it the first philosopher?
ἐλέγομεν δὴ ὅτι τὰ πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς οὕτως ἀχώριστα τῆς φυσικῆς ὕλης τῶν ζῴων, γε τοιαῦθʼ ὑπάρχειοἷα θυμὸς καὶ φόβος, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ γραμμὴ καὶ ἐπίπεδον.
But we must return to where our discussion began. We were saying, then, that the affections of the soul are in this way inseparable from the natural matter of animals, at least insofar as they are such as anger and fear, and not like a line and a plane.