§1.1#1Τῶν καλῶν καὶ τιμίων τὴν εἴδησιν ὑπολαμβάνοντες, μᾶλλον δʼ ἑτέραν ἑτέρας ἢ κατʼ ἀκρίβειαν ἢ τῷ βελτιόνων τε καὶ θαυμασιωτέρων εἶναι, διʼ ἀμφότερα ταῦτα τὴν περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἱστορίαν εὐλόγως ἄν ἐν πρώτοις τιθείημεν.
Holding knowledge to be of the class of things beautiful and honorable, and yet one kind of knowledge more so than another, either in respect of its accuracy or because it is of better and more wonderful things, for both these reasons we should reasonably place the inquiry concerning the soul among the first.
δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ πρός ἀλήθειαν ἅπασαν ἡ γνῶσις αὐτῆς μεγάλα συμβάλλεσθαι, μάλιστα δὲ πρὸς τὴν φύσιν· ἔστι γὰρ οἷον ἀρχὴ τῶν ζῴων.
And it seems that the knowledge of it contributes greatly to all truth, and especially to nature; for it is, as it were, the principle of animal life.
ἐπιζητοῦμεν δὲ θεωρῆσαι καὶ γνῶναι τήν τε φύσιν αὐτῆς καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν, εἶθ’ ὅσα συμβέβηκε περὶ αὐτήν· ὧν τὰ μὲν ἴδια πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς εἶναι δοκεῖ, τὰ δὲ δι’ ἐκείνην καὶ τοῖς ζῴοις ὑπάρχειν.
We seek to contemplate and know both its nature and its essence, and then all its accidents; of which some seem to be properties peculiar to the soul, while others belong to animals also because of it.
πάντη δὲ πάντως ἐστὶ τῶν χαλεπωτάτων λαβεῖν τινὰ πίστιν περὶ αὐτῆς.
But in every way and altogether, to obtain any conviction about it is one of the most difficult things.
καὶ γὰρ ὄντος κοινοῦ τοῦ ζητήματος καὶ πολλοῖς ἑτέροις, λέγω δὲ τοῦ περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ τί ἐστι, τάχʼ ἄν τῳ δόξειε μία τις εἶναι μέθοδος κατὰ πάντων περὶ ὧν βουλόμεθα γνῶναι τὴν οὐσίαν, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἰδίων ἀπόδειξις, ὥστε ζητητέον ἂν εἴη τὴν μέθοδον ταύτην.
For since the inquiry is common to many other things—I mean, the inquiry concerning essence and what a thing is—it might seem to someone that there is some single method for all things whose essence we wish to know, just as there is demonstration for their accidental properties; so that we would have to seek this method.
εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστι μία τις καὶ κοινὴ μέθοδος περὶ τὸ τί ἐστιν, ἔτι χαλεπώτερον γίνεται τὸ πραγματευθῆναι· δεήσει γὰρ λαβεῖν περὶ ἕκαστον τίς ὁ τρόπος.
But if there is not a single and common method concerning what a thing is, the business becomes still more difficult; for we shall have to determine, in regard to each thing, what the method is.
ἐὰν δὲ φανερὸν ᾖ πότερον ἀπόδειξίς ἐστιν ἢ διαίρεσις ἢ καί τις ἄλλη μέθοδος, ἔτι πολλὰς ἀπορίας ἔχει καὶ πλάνας, ἐκ τίνων δεῖ ζητεῖν· ἄλλαι γὰρ ἄλλων ἀρχαί, καθάπερ ἀριθμῶν καὶ ἐπιπέδων.
And even if it is clear whether it is demonstration, or division, or some other method, there are still many difficulties and wanderings as to from what principles we ought to seek; for different things have different principles, as is the case with numbers and planes.
πρῶτον δʼ ἴσως ἀναγκαῖον διελεῖν ἐν τίνι τῶν γενῶν καὶ τί ἐστι, λέγω δὲ πότερον τόδε τι καὶ οὐσία ἢ ποιὸν ἢ ποσόν ἢ καί τις ἄλλη τῶν διαιρεθεισῶν κατηγοριῶν, ἔτι δὲ πότερον τῶν ἐν δυνάμει ὄντων ἢ μᾶλλον ἐντελέχειά τις· διαφέρει γὰρ οὔ τι μικρόν.
Perhaps, then, it is first necessary to distinguish in which of the genera it is, and what it is; I mean, whether it is a particular thing and substance, or quality, or quantity, or some other of the distinguished categories; and further, whether it is among things existing in potentiality, or rather is some actuality; for this makes no small difference.
σκεπτέον δὲ καὶ εἰ μεριστὴ ἢ ἀμερής, καὶ πότερον ὁμοειδὴς ἅποσα ψυχὴ ἢ οὔ εἰ δὲ μὴ ὁμοειδής, πότερον εἴδει διαφέρουσα ἢ γένει.
We must also consider whether it is divisible or partless, and whether every soul is of the same kind or not; and if not of the same kind, whether they differ in species or in genus.
νῦν μὲν γὰρ οἱ λέγοντες καὶ ζητοῦντες περὶ ψυχῆς περὶ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης μόνης ἐοίκασιν ἐπισκοπεῖν· εὐλαβητέον δʼ ὅπως μὴ λανθάνῃ πότερον εἶς ὁ λόγος αὐτῆς ἐστι, καθάπερ ζῴου, ἢ καθʼ ἑκάστην ἕτερος, οἶον ἵππου, κυνός, ἀνθρώπου, θεοῦ, τὸ δὲ ζῷον τὸ καθόλου ἤτοι οὐθέν ἐστιν ἢ ὕστερον· ὁμοίως δὲ κἄν εἴ τι κοινόν ἄλλο κατηγοροῖτο·
For those who now speak and investigate concerning the soul seem to inquire about the human soul alone; but we must be careful not to overlook whether there is a single definition of it, as of animal, or a different one for each kind, as of horse, dog, man, god—the universal animal being either nothing or posterior; and similarly if any other common term were predicated.
ἔτι δέ, εἰ μὴ πολλαὶ ψυχαὶ ἀλλὰ μόρια, πότερον δεῖ ζητεῖν πρότερον τὴν ὅλην ψυχὴν ἢ τὰ μόρια.
Further, if there are not many souls but parts, we must consider whether we should investigate the whole soul first or the parts.
χαλεπὸν δὲ καὶ τούτων διορίσαι ποῖα πέφυκεν ἕτερα ἀλλήλων, καὶ πότερον τά μόρια χρὴ ζητείν πρότερον ἢ τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν, οἶον τὸ νοεῖν ἢ τὸν νοῦν, καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ τὸ αἰσθητικόν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.
And it is difficult also to determine which of these parts are by nature different from one another, and whether we should investigate the parts first or their functions—for instance, thinking or the intellect, sensing or the sensitive faculty; and likewise in other cases.
εἰ δὲ τὰ ἔργα πρότερον, πάλιν ἄν τις ἀπορήσειεν· εἰ τὰ ἀντικείμενα πρότερον τούτων ζητητέον, οἶον τὸ αἰσθητὸν τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ, καὶ τό νοητὸν τοῦ νοῦ.
But if the functions are first, one might again raise the difficulty: whether we should investigate their objects before these functions—for instance, the sensible before the sensitive faculty, and the intelligible before the intellect.
ἔοικε δʼ οὐ μόνον τὸ τί ἐστι γνῶναι χρήσιμον εἶναι πρός τὸ θεωρῆσαι τὰς αἰτίας τῶν συμβεβηκότων ταῖς οὐσίαις (ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασι τί τὸ εὐθὺ καὶ τὸ καμπύλον, ἢ τί γραμμὴ καὶ ἐπίπέδον, πρός τὸ κατιδεῖν πόσαις ὀρθαῖς αἱ τοῦ τριγώνου γωνίαι ἴσαι), ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνάπαλιν τὰ συμβεβηκότα συμβάλλεται μέγα μέρος πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι τὸ τί ἐστιν·
And it seems that not only is knowing what a thing is useful for contemplating the causes of the properties belonging to substances (as in mathematics, knowing what straight and curved are, or what a line and a plane are, is useful for seeing to how many right angles the angles of a triangle are equal), but also, conversely, the properties contribute a great part toward knowing what the thing is.
ἐπειδὰν γὰρ ἔχωμεν ἀποδιδόναι κατὰ τὴν φαντασίαν περὶ τῶν συμβεβηκότων, ἢ πάντων ἢ τῶν πλείστων, τότε καὶ περὶ τῆς οὐσίας ἕξομεν λέγειν κάλλιστα· πάσης γὰρ ἀποδείξεως ἀρχὴ τὸ τί ἐστιν, ὥστε καθʼ ὅσους τῶν ὁρισμῶν μὴ συμβαίνει τὰ συμβεβηκότα γνωρίζειν, ἀλλὰ μηδʼ εἰκάσαι περὶ αὐτῶν εὐμαρές, δῆλον ὅτι διαλεκτικῶς εἴρηνται καὶ κενῶς ἅπαντες.
For when we are able to give an account of the accidental properties according to our mental image, either of all or of most of them, we shall then be in the best position to speak of the essence also; for the principle of every demonstration is what a thing is, so that whatever definitions do not lead to a knowledge of accidental properties, or even make it easy to conjecture about them, are clearly all stated dialectically and emptily.