§2.2.17Πότερον δʼ ἐνδέχεται μὴ τὸ αὐτὸ αἴτιον εἶναι τοῦ αὐτοῦ πᾶσιν ἀλλʼ ἕτερον, ἢ οὔ;
Is it possible for the cause of the same thing not to be the same for all but different, or not?
ἢ εἰ μὲν καθʼ αὐτὸ ἀποδέδεικταιI καὶ μὴ κατὰ σημεῖον ἢ συμβεβηκός, οὐχ οἶόν τε·
Or, if it is demonstrated essentially and not by a sign or an accidental attribute, is it not possible?
ὁ γὰρ λόγος τοῦ ἄκρου τὸ μέσον ἐστίν·
For the middle term is the definition of the major term.
εἰ δὲ μὴ οὕτως, ἐνδέχεται.
But if not in this way, it is possible.
ἔστι δὲ καὶ οὗ αἴτιον καὶ σκοπεῖν κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οὐ μὴν δοκεῖ προβλήματα εἶναι.
And it is also possible to examine the cause and that of which it is the cause accidentally; however, these do not seem to be scientific problems.
εἰ δὲ μή, ὁμοίως ἕξει τὸ μέσον· εἰ μὲν ὁμώνυμα, ὁμώνυμον τὸ μέσον, εἰ δʼ ὡς ἐν γένει, ὁμοίως ἔξει.
Otherwise, the middle term will behave in the same way: if they are homonymous, the middle term is homonymous; if as in a genus, it will behave in the same way.
οον διὰ τί καὶ ἐναλλὰξ ἀνάλογον;
For example, why is alternating proportion also reciprocal?
ἄλλο γὰρ σἴτιον ἐν γραμμαῖς καὶ ἀριθμοῖς καὶ τὸ αὐτό γε, ἧ μὲν γῳραμμή, ἄλλο, ᾖ δʼ ἔχον αὐξησιν τοιονδί, τὸ αὐτό.
For the cause is different in lines and numbers, and yet it is the same: in so far as it is a line, it is different, but in so far as it has such an increase, it is the same.
οὕτως ἐπὶ πάντων.
Thus it is in all cases.
τοῦ δʼ ὅμοιον εἶναι χρῶμα ρώματι καὶ σχῆμα σχήματι ἄλλο ἄλλῳ.
And for a color to be similar to a color and a shape to a shape, there is a different cause for each.
ὁμώνυμον γὰρ τὸ ὅμοιον ἐπὶ τούτων· ἔνθα μὲν γὰρ ἴσως τὸ ἀνάλογον ἔχειν τὰς πλευρὰς καὶ ἴσας τὰς γωνίας, ἐπὶ δὲ χρωμάτων τὸ τὴν αἴσθησιν μίαν εἶναι τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον.
For the 'similar' is homonymous in these cases; for in the former, it is perhaps having proportional sides and equal angles, while in the case of colors, it is the sensation being one or some other such thing.
τὰ δὲ κατʼ ἀναλογίαν τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ τὸ μέσον ἔξει κατʼ ἀναλογίαν.
But things that are the same by analogy will also have their middle term the same by analogy.
Ἔχει δʼ οὕτω τὸ παρακολουθεῖν τὸ αἴτιον ἀλλήλοις καὶ οὗ αἴτιον καὶ ὧ αἴτιον· καθʼ ἕκαστον μὲν λαμβάνοντι τὸ οὗ σιτίον ἐπὶ πλέην, οἶον τὸ τέτταρσιν ἴσας τὰς ἔξω ἐπὶ πλέον ἢ τρίγωνον ἢ τετράγωνον, ἅπασι δὲ ἐηʼ ἴσον (ὅσα γὰρ τέτταρσιν ὀρθαῖς ἴσας τὰς ἔξω)· καὶ τὸ μέσον ὁμοίως.
The way in which the cause, that of which it is the cause, and that for which it is the cause follow one another is as follows: if one takes them individually, that of which it is the cause is of wider extension—for example, having external angles equal to four right angles is of wider extension than triangle or quadrangle— but for all of them together, it is of equal extension (namely, as many as have external angles equal to four right angles); and the middle term likewise.
ἔστι δὲ τὸ μέσον λόγος τοῦ τπρώτοο ἄκρου, διὸ πᾶσαι αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι διʼ ὁρισμοῦ γίγνονται.
And the middle term is the definition of the first term, which is why all sciences are produced through definition.
οἶον τὸ φυλλορροεῖν ἅμα ἀκολουθεῖ τῇ ἀμπέλῳ καὶ ὑτπερέχει, καὶ συκῇ, καὶ ὑπερέχει· ἀλλʼ οὐ πάντων, ἄλλʼ ἴσον.
For example, shedding of leaves at the same time follows the vine and exceeds it, and the fig tree, and exceeds it; but not all plants, but is equal to them.
εἰ δέὴ λάβοις τὸ πρῶτον μέσον, λόγος τοῦ φυλλορροεῖν ἐστιν.
If, then, you take the first middle, it is the definition of shedding of leaves.
ἔσται γὰρ πρῶτον μὲν ἐπὶ θάτερα μέσον, ὅτι τοιαδὶ ἅπόντα· εἶτα τούτοο μέσον, ὅτι ὀπὸς πήγνυται ᾖ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον.
For there will be a middle term in the other direction first, namely that they are all of such a kind; then the middle of this, that the sap solidifies or something of that sort.
τί δʼ ἐστὶ τὸ φυλλορροεῖν;
What is shedding of leaves?
τὸ πήγνυσθαι τὸν ἐν τῇ συναφεῖ τοῦ στπέρματος ὀπόν.
The solidification of the sap at the connection of the seed.
Επὶ δὲ τῶν σχημάτων ὧδε ἀποδώσει ητποῦσι τὴν παρακολούθησιν τοῦ αἰτίου καὶ οὗ αἴτιον.
For the figures of syllogism, those who seek the follow-up of the cause and that of which it is the cause will state it as follows.
ἔστω τὸ Α τῷ Β ὑπάρχειν παντί, τὸ δὲ Β ἑκάστῳ τῶν Δ, ἐπὶ πλέον δέ.
Let A belong to all B, and B to each of the Δ, but be of wider extension.
τὸ μὲν δἡ Β καθόλου ἂν εἴη τοῖς Δ τοῦτο γὰρ λέγω καθόλου ὧ μὴ ἀντιστρέφει, τπρῶτον δὲ καθόλου ᾦ ἕκαστον μὲν μὴ ἀντιστρέφει, ἄτπαντα δὲ ἀντιστρέφει καὶ παρεκτείνει.
Then B would be universal for the Δ; for I call 'universal' that which does not convert, and 'primary universal' that with which each individual does not convert, but all together convert and extend equally.
τοῖς δὴ Δ αἴτιον τοῦ ἀ τὸ Β. δεῖ ἄρα τὸ ἐπὶ πλέον τοῦ Β ἐπεκτείνειν·
Therefore, for these Δ, B is the cause of A.
εἰ δὲ μή, τί μᾶλλον αἴτιον ἔσται τοῦτο ἐκείνου;
A, then, must extend wider than B; otherwise, why would this be the cause of that rather than vice versa?
εἰ δὴ πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει τοῖς ʼ τὸ Α, ἔσται τι ἐκεῖνα ἓν ἀπόντα ἄλλο τοῦ Β. εἰ γὰρ μή, πῶς ἔσται εἰπεῖν ὅτι ᾦ τὸ E, τὸ Α παντί, δὲ τὸ, οὐ παντὶ τὸ Ε;
If indeed A belongs to all E, there will be some one thing which those E all are, other than B. For if not, how will it be possible to say that to whatever E belongs, A belongs to all, but to whatever A belongs, E does not belong to all?
διὰ τί γὰρ οὐκ ἔσται τι αἴτιον οον τὸ Α] ὑπάρχει πᾶσι τοῖς Α;
For why will there not be some cause, such as A belonging to all E?
ἀλλʼ ἆρα καὶ τὰ ἔσται τι ἕν;
But must the E also be some one thing?
ἐπισκέψασθαι δεῖ τοῦτο, καὶ ἔστω τὸ ' ἐνδέχεται δὴ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πλείω αἴτια εἶναι, ἀλλʼ οὐ τοῖς αὐτοῖς τῷ εδει, οἶον τοῦ μακρόβια εἶναι τὰ μὲν τετράτποδα τὸ μὴ ἔχειν χολήν, τὰ δὲ πτηνὰ τὸ ξηρὰ εἶναι ἢ ἕτερόν τι.
This must be considered, and let it be Γ. It is indeed possible for there to be more than one cause of the same thing, but not for the same things in species—for example, of being long-lived, for quadrupeds the cause is not having gall, but for birds, being dry or something else.
Εἰ δὲ εἰς τὸ ἄτομον μὴ εὐθὺς ἔρχονται, καὶ μὴ μόνον §2.2.18ἓν τὸ μέσον ἀλλὰ πλείω, καὶ τὰ αἴτια πλείω.
But if they do not arrive immediately at what is indivisible, and the middle is not only one but more, the causes are also more.
τπότερον δʼ αἴτιοντῶν μέσων, τὸ πρὸς τὸ καθόλου πρῶ τὸν ἢ τὸ πρὸς τὸ καθʼ ἕκαστον, τοῖς καθʼ ἕκαστον;
But which of the middles is the cause for the individuals: the one which is primary towards the universal, or the one towards the individual?
δῆλον δὴ ὅτι τὸ ἐγγύτατα ἑκάστῳ ᾧ αἴτιον.
Clearly, the one closest to each individual for which it is the cause.
τοῦ γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον ὑπὸ τὸ| καθόλου ὑπάρχειν τοῦτο αἴτιον, οἷον· τῷ Δ τὸ Γ τοῦ τὸ Β| ὑπάρχειν αἴτιον.
For this is the cause of the first term's belonging under the universal; for example, Γ is the cause for Δ of B's belonging to it.
τῶ μὲν οὖν Δ τὸ Γ αἴτιον τοῦ Α, τῷ δὲ Γ |τὸ Β, τούτῳ δὲ αὐτό.
For Δ, then, Γ is the cause of A; for Γ, B is the cause; and for B, itself is the cause.