§2.2.19Περὶ μὲν οὖν συλλογισμοῦ καὶ ἀποδείξεως, τί τε ἑκάτερόν ἐστι καὶ πῶς γίνεται, φανερόν, ἅμα δὲ καὶ περὶ ἐπιστήμης ἀποδεικτικῆς· ταὐτὸν γάρ ἐστιν.
Now, concerning syllogism and demonstration, both what each is and how it is produced, is clear, and at the same time concerning demonstrative science; for they are the same.
περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀρχῶν, πῶς τε γίνονται γνώριμοι καὶ τίς ἡ γνωρίζουσα ἕξις, ἐντεῦθεν ἔσται δῆλον τπροαπορήσασι πρῶτον.
But concerning the principles, both how they become known and what is the state that knows them, will be clear from what follows, after we have first raised some difficulties.
Ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἐπίστασθαι διʼ ἀποδείξεως· μὴ γιγνώσκοντι τὰς πρώτας ἀρχὰς τὰς ἀμέσους, εἴρηται τπρότερον.
That it is not possible, then, to understand through demonstration without knowing the first, immediate principles, has been said before.
τῶν δʼ ἀμέσων τὴν γνῶσιν, καὶ πότερον ἡ αὐτή ἐστιν ἢ οὐχ ἡ αὐτή, διαπορήσειεν ἄν τις, καὶ πότερον ἐπιστήμη ἑκατέρου, ἢ τοῦ μὲν ἐπιστήμη τοῦ δʼ ἕτερόν τι γένος, καὶ πότερον οὐκ ἐνοῦσαι αἱ ἔξεις ἐγγίνονται ἢ ἐνοῦσαι λελήθασιν.
But concerning the knowledge of the immediate principles, one might raise difficulties both whether it is the same or not the same, and whether there is science of each, or science of the one and some other kind of state of the other, and whether the states, not being present in us, are acquired, or being present in us have escaped our notice.
εἰ μὲν δὴ ἔχομεν αὐτάς, ἄτοπον· συμβαίνει γὰρ ἀκριβεστέρας ἔχοντας γνώσεις ἀποδείξεως λανθάνειν.
For if we indeed possess them, it is absurd; for it follows that we possess cognitions more accurate than demonstration without its being noticed.
εἰ δὲ λαμβάνομεν μὴ ἔχοντες πρότερον, πῶς ἄν γνοωρίοιμεν καὶ μανθάνοιμεν ἐκ μὴ προίῦπαρχούσης γνώσεως;
But if we acquire them without possessing them beforehand, how could we know and learn from no pre-existing knowledge?
ἀδύνατον γάρ, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀποδείξεως ἐλέγομεν.
For that is impossible, just as we also said in the case of demonstration.
φανερόν τοίνυν ὅτι οὔτʼ ἔχειν οἶόν τε, οὐὔτʼ ἀγνοοῦσι καὶ μηδεμίαν ἔχουσιν ἔξιν ἐγγίγνεσθαι.
It is clear, then, that it is neither possible to possess them, nor for them to be produced in those who are ignorant and possess no state.
ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἔχειν μέν τινα δύναμεν, μὴ τοιαύτην δʼ ἔγειν ἢ ἔσται τούτων τμιωτέρα κατʼ ἀκρίβειαν.
We must therefore possess some capacity, but not such a one as will be superior to these in accuracy.
φαίνεται δὲ τοῦτό γε πᾶσιν ὑπάρχον τοῖς ἴὥοις.
And this indeed appears to belong to all animals.
ἔχει γὰρ δύναμιν σύμφυτον κριτικήν, ἢν καλοῦσιν αἴσθησιν·
For they have an innate discriminatory capacity, which they call perception.
ἐνούσης δʼ αἰσθήσεως τοῖς μὲν τῶν ἴὥων ἐγγίγνεται μονἡ τοῦ αἰσθήματος, τοῖς δʼ οὐκ ἐγγίγνεται.
But though perception is present in them, in some animals there is a retention of the percept, while in others there is not.
ὅσοις μὲν οὖν μὴ ἐγγίγνεται, ἢ ὅλως ἢ περὶ ἄ μὴ ἐγγίγνεται, οὐκ ἔστι τούτοις γνῶσις ἔξω τοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι·
For those in whom it is not produced, either completely or concerning the things of which it is not produced, there is no knowledge outside of perceiving.
ἐν οἷς δʼ ἔνεστιν αἰσθομένοις ἔχεινἔτι ἐν τῇ φυχῇ.
But in those in whom it is present, they can still keep it in their soul after perceiving.
πολλῶν δὲ τοιούτων γινομένων δή διαφορά τις γίνεται, ὥστε τοῖς μὲν γίνεσθαι λόγον ἐκ τῆς τῶν τοιούτων μονῆς, τοῖς δὲ μή.
When many such things have occurred, a difference already arises, so that in some, a systematic account arises from the retention of such things, while in others it does not.
Ἐκ μὲν οὖν αἰσθήσεως γίνεται μνήμη. ὥσπερ λέγομεν, ἐκ δὲ μνήμης πολλάκις τοῦ αὐτοῦ γινομένης ἐμπειρία· αἱ γὰρ πολλαὶ μνῆμαι τῷ ἀριθμῷ ἐμπειρία μία ἐστίν.
From perception, then, memory arises, as we say, and from memory, when it is produced many times of the same thing, experience; for the memories which are many in number are a single experience.
ἐκ δʼ ἐμπειρίας ἢ ἐκ παντὸς ἠρεμήσαντος τοῦ καθόλου ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, τοῦ ἑνὸς παρὰ τὰ πολλά, ὃ ἂν ἐν ἅπασιν ἓν ἐνῇ ἐκείνοις τὸ αὐτό, τέχνης ἀρχὴ καὶ ἐπιστήμης, ἐὰν μὲν περὶ γένεσιν, τέχνης, ἐὰν δὲ περὶ τὸ ὄν, ἐπιστήμης.
And from experience, or from the whole universal that has come to rest in the soul, the one besides the many, which is one and the same in all of them, arises the principle of art and of science: if it is concerned with coming to be, of art; if with what is, of science.
οὔτε δὴ ἐνυπάρχουσιν ἀφωρισμέναι αἱ ἕξεις, οὔτʼ ἀπʼ ἄλλων ἕξεων γίνονται γνωστικωτέρων, ἀλλʼ ἀπὸ αἰσθήσεως, οἷον ἐν μάχῃ τροπῆς γενομένης ἑνὸς στάντος ἕτερος ἔστη, εἶθ᾿ ἕτερος, ἕως ἐπὶ ἀρχὴν ἦλθεν.
So these states neither possess existence in us in a determinate form, nor do they arise from other states that are more cognitive, but from perception, as in a battle when a rout has occurred, one man having stood, another stands, and then another, until it has reached the starting point.
ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ὑπάρχει τοιαύτη οὖσα οἵα δύνασθαι πάσχειν τοῦτο.
And the soul is of such a nature as to be capable of undergoing this.
δʼ ἐλέχθη μὲν πάλαι, οὐ σαφῶς δὲ ἐλέχθη, πάλιν εἴπωμεν.
What was said just now, but not said clearly, let us say again.
στάντος γὰρ τῶν ἀδιαφόρων ἑνός, πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καθόλου (καὶ γὰρ αἰσθάνεται μὲν τὸ καθʼ ἕκαστον, ἡ δʼ αἴσθησις τοῦ καθόλου ἐστίν, οἷον ἀνθρώπου, ἀλλʼ οὐ Καλλίου ἀνθρώπου)·
For when one of the undifferentiated things has stood, for the first time there is a universal in the soul (for although one perceives the individual, perception is of the universal—for example, of man, but not of Callias the man).
πάλιν ἐν τούτοις ἵσταται, ἕως ἂν τὰ ἀμερῆ στῇ καὶ τὰ καθόλου, οἷον τοιονδὶ ζῷον, ἕως ζῷον, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ὡσαύτως.
Again, in these a stand is made, until the partless things and the universals stand—for example, such and such an animal, until animal, and in this likewise.
δῆλον δὴ ὅτι ἡμῖν τὰ πρῶτα ἐπαγωγῇ γνωρίζειν ἀναγκαῖον· καὶ γὰρ ἡ αἴσθησις οὕτω τὸ καθόλου ἐμποιεῖ.
It is clear, then, that it is necessary for us to know the primary things by induction; for perception also implants the universal in this way.
Ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἕξεων αἷς ἀληθεύομεν αἱ μὲν ἀεὶ ἀληθεῖς εἰσιν, αἱ δὲ ἐπιδέχονται τὸ ψεῦδος, οἷον δόξα καὶ λογισμός, ἀληθῇ δʼ ἀεὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ νοῦς, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐπιστήμης ἀκριβέστερον ἄλλο γένος ἢ νοῦς, αἱ δʼ ἀρχαὶ τῶν ἀποδείξεων γνωριμώτεραι, ἐπιστήμη δʼ ἅπασα μετὰ λόγου ἐστί, τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐπιστήμη μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη, ἐπεὶ δʼ οὐδὲν ἀληθέστερον ἐνδέχεται εἶναι ἐπιστήμης ἢ νοῦν, νοῦς ἂν εἴη τῶν· ἀρχῶν, ἔκ τε τούτων σκοποῦσι καὶ ὅτι ἀποδείξεως ἀρχὴ οὐκ ἀπόδειξις, ὥστ᾿ οὐδ᾿ ἐπιστήμης ἐπιστήμη.
Since of the states concerning thought by which we reach the truth, some are always true, while others admit of falsehood, such as opinion and reasoning, whereas science and comprehension are always true, and no other kind of state is more accurate than science except comprehension, and the principles of demonstrations are more known, and all science is accompanied by an account, there would not be science of the principles; and since nothing can be truer than science except comprehension, comprehension would be of the principles, both for those who consider it from these points, and because the principle of demonstration is not a demonstration, so that neither is the principle of science science.
εἰ οὖν μηδὲν ἄλλο παῤ ἐπιστήμην γένος ἔχομεν ἀληθές, νοῦς ἂν εἴη ἐπιστήμης ἀρχή.
If, then, we have no other true kind of state besides science, comprehension would be the principle of science.
καὶ ἡ μὲν ἀρχὴ τῆς ἀρχῆς εἴη ἄν, ἡ δὲ πᾶσα ὁμοίως ἔχει πρὸς τὸ πᾶν πρᾶγμα.
And the principle of the principle would be it, while the whole science is similarly related to the whole of the object.