§2.2.16Περὶ δʼ αἰτίου καὶ οὗ σἴτιον ἀπορήσειε μὲν ἄν τις, ἄρα ὅτε ὑπάρχει τὸ αἰτιατόν, καὶ τὸ αἴτιον ὑπάρχει (ὥσπερ εἰ φυλλορροεῖ ἢ ἐκλείπει, καὶ τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ ἐκλείπειν ἢ φυλλορροεῖν ἔσται· οἶον εἰ τοῦτʼ ἔστι τὸ πλατέα ἔχειν τὰ φύλλα, τοῦ δʼ ἐκλείπειν τὸ τὴν γῆν ἐν μέσῳ εἶναι· εἰ γὰρ 98 b μἡ ὑπάρχει, ἄλλο τι ἔσται τὸ αἴτιον αὐτῶν), εἴ τε τὸ αἴτιον ὑπάρχει, ἄμα καὶ τὸ αἰτιατόν (οἷον εἰ ἐν μέσῳ ἡ γῆ, ἐκλείπει, ἢ εἰ πλατύφυλλον, φυλλορροεῖ).
Regarding the cause and that of which it is the cause, one might raise a question: whether, when the effect belongs, the cause also belongs (just as, if there is shedding of leaves or an eclipse, the cause of the eclipse or of the shedding of leaves will also exist—for example, if this is having broad leaves, and for the eclipse, the earth being in the middle; for if it does not belong, some other thing will be their cause); and whether, if the cause belongs, the effect also belongs at the same time (for example, if the earth is in the middle, there is an eclipse, or if broad-leaved, there is shedding of leaves).
εἰ δʼ οὕτως, ἅμʼ ἄν εἴη καὶ δεικνύοιτο διʼ ἀλλήλων.
If this is so, they would exist at the same time and could be proved through each other.
ἔστω γὰρ τὸ φυλλορροεῖν ἐφʼ οὔ Α, τὸ δὲ πλατύφυλλον ἐφʼ οὗ Β, ἄμπελος δὲ ἐφʼ οὗ Γ. εἰ δὴ τῷ Β ὑπάρχει τὸ (πᾶν γὰρ πλατύφυλλον φυλλορροεῖ), τῷ δὲ Γ ὑπάρχει τὸ Β (πᾶσα γὰρ ἄμπελος πλατύφυλλος), τῷ Γ ὑπάρχει τὸ Α καὶ πᾶσα ἄμτελος φυλλορροεῖ.
For let shedding of leaves be A, broad-leaved be B, and vine be Γ. If, then, A belongs to B (for every broad-leaved thing sheds its leaves), and B belongs to Γ (for every vine is broad-leaved), then A belongs to Γ, and every vine sheds its leaves.
αἴτιον δὲ τὸ Β τὸ μέσον.
And the cause is the middle term, B.
ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτι πλατύφυλλον ἡ ἄμπελος, ἔστι διὰ τοῦ φυλλορροεῖν ἀποδεῖξαι.
But also, that the vine is broad-leaved can be demonstrated through its shedding of leaves.
ἔστω γὰρ τὸ μὲν Δ πλατύφυλλον, τὸ δὲ Ε τὸ φυλλορροεῖν, ἄμπελος δὲ ἐφʼ οὗ Ζ. τῷ δὴ Ζ ὑπάρχει τὸ Ε (φυλλορροεῖ γὰρ πᾶσα ἄμπελος), τῷ δὲ E τὸ Δ (ἅπαν γὰρ τὸ φυλλορροοῦν πλατύφυλλον)· πᾶσα ἄρα ἄμπελος πλατύφυλλον.
For let Δ be broad-leaved, Ε be shedding of leaves, and vine be Ζ. Then Ε belongs to Ζ (for every vine sheds its leaves), and Δ belongs to Ε (for everything that sheds its leaves is broad-leaved); therefore, every vine is broad-leaved.
αἴτιον δὲ τὸ φυλλορροεῖν.
And the cause is shedding of leaves.
εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐνδέχεται αἴτια εἶναι ἀλλήλων (τὸ γὰρ αἴτιον πρότερον οὗ αἴτιον, καὶ τοῦ μὲν ἐκλείπειν αἴτιον τὸ ἐν μέσῳ τὴν γῆν εἶναι, τοῦ δʼ ἐν μέσῳ τὴν γῆν εἶναι οὐκ αἴτιον τὸ ἐκλείπειν)—εἰ οὖν ἡ μὲν διὰ τοῦ αὐτίου ἀπόδειξις τοῦ διὰ τί, ἡ δὲ μὴ διὰ τοῦ αὐτίου τοῦ ὅτι, ὅτι μὲν ἐν μέσῳ, οἶδε, διότι δʼ οὔ.
But if it is not possible for things to be causes of each other (for the cause is prior to that of which it is the cause, and the cause of the eclipse is the earth being in the middle, but the eclipse is not the cause of the earth being in the middle)—if, then, the demonstration through the cause is of the 'why', while the demonstration not through the cause is of the 'fact', one knows that the earth is in the middle, but does not know why.
ὅτι δʼ οὐ τὸ ἐκλείπειν αἴτιον τοῦ ἐν μέσῳ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο τοῦ ἐκλείπειν, φανερόν· ἐν γὰρ τῷ λόγῳ τῷ τοῦ ἐκλείπειν ἐνυπάρχει τὸ ἐν μέσῳ, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι διὰ τούτουω ἐκεῖνο γνωρίεται, ἀλλʼ οὐ τοῦτο διʼ ἐκείνου.
And that the eclipse is not the cause of the earth being in the middle, but the latter is the cause of the eclipse, is clear; for in the definition of the eclipse, the earth being in the middle is present, so that it is clear that the former is known through the latter, but not the latter through the former.
Ἤ ἐνδέχεται ἑνὸς πλείω αἴτια εἶναι;
Or is it possible for there to be more than one cause of one thing?
καὶ γὰρ εἰ ἔστι τὸ αὐτὸ πλειόνων τπρώτων κατηγορεῖσθαι, ἔστω τὸ Α τῷ Β πρώτω ὑπάρχον, καὶ τῷ Γ ἄλλῳ πρώτω, καὶ ταῦτα τοῖς Δ Ε. ὑπάρξει ἄθρα τὸ Α τοῖς Δ Ε. αἴτιον δὲ τῷ μὲν Δ τὸ Β, τῷ δὲ Ε τὸ Γ· ὥστε τοῦ μὲν αἰτίου ὑπάρχοντος ἀνάγκη τὸ πρᾶγμα ὑπάρχειν, τοῦ δὲ πράγματος ὑπάρχοντος οὐκ ἀνάγκη πᾶν ὅ ἄν αἴτιον, ἀλλʼ αἴτιον μέν, οὐ μέντοι πᾶν.
For indeed, if the same thing can be predicated of more than one primary term, let A belong to B as primary, and to Γ as another primary, and these to Δ and E. A, then, will belong to Δ and E. And the cause for Δ will be B, and for E it will be Γ; so that when the cause belongs, it is necessary for the thing to belong, but when the thing belongs, it is not necessary for every possible cause to belong, but some cause, though not every one.
ἢ εἰ ἀεὶ καθόλου τὸ πρόβλημά ἐστι, καὶ τὸ αἴτιον ὅλον τι, καὶ οὗ σἴτιον, καθόλου;
Or, if the problem is always universal, and the cause is some whole, and that of which it is the cause is universal?
οἵον τὸ φυλλορροεῖν ὅλῳ τινὶ ἀφωρισμένον, κἄν εἶδη αὐτοῦ ᾖ, καὶ τοισδὶ καθόλου, ἢ φυτοῖς ἢ τοιοισδὶ φυτοῖς· ὥστε καὶ τὸ μέσον ἴσον δεῖ εἶναι ἐπὶ τούτων καὶ οὗ αἴτιον, καὶ ἀντιστρέφειν.
For example, shedding of leaves is determined for some whole, even if there are species of it, and it is universal for these, either for plants or for such plants; so that in these cases, the middle term and that of which it is the cause must be equal and must convert.
οἷον διὰ τί τὰ δένδρα φυλλορροεῖ;
For example, why do trees shed their leaves?
εἰ δὴ διὰ πῆξιν τοῦ ὑγροῦ, εἴτε φυλλορροεῖ δένδρον, δεῖ ὑπάρχειν πῆξιν,ῇ εἴτε πῆξις ὑπάρχει, μὴ ὁτῳοῦν ἀλλὰ δένδρῳ, φυλλορροεῖν.
If indeed it is because of the solidification of the moisture, then if a tree sheds its leaves, there must be solidification, and if solidification belongs—not to just anything, but to a tree—it must shed its leaves.