§2.2.13#1Πῶς μὲν οὖν τὸ τί ἐστιν εἰς τοὺς ὅρους ἀποδίδοται, καὶ τίνα τρόπον ἀπόδειξις ἢ ὁρισμὸς ἔστιν αὐτοῦ ἢ οὐκ ἕστιν, εἴρηται τπρότερον· πῶς δὲ δεῖ θηρεύειν τὰ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορούμενα, νῦν λέγωμεν.
How, then, what a thing is is attributed to definitions, and in what way there is or is not a demonstration or definition of it, has been said before; but how one should hunt for the things predicated in what a thing is, let us now state.
Τῶν δὴ ὑπαρχόντων ἀεὶ ἑκάστῳ ἔνια ἐπεκτείνει ἐπὶ τπλέον, οὐ μέντοι ἔξω τοῦ γένους.
Of the attributes that always belong to each thing, some extend further, but not, however, outside the genus.
λέγω δὲ ἐπὶ πλέον ὑπάρχειν ὅσα ὑπάρχει μὲν ἑκάστῳ καθόλου, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλῳ.
I say that those attributes belong further which belong to each thing universally, but nevertheless also belong to another thing.
οἷον ἔστι τι ὅ πάσῃ τριάδι ὑπάρχει, ἀλλὰ καὶ μὴ τριάδι, ὥσπερ τὸ ὂν ὑπάρχει τῇ τριάδι, ἀλλὰ καὶ μὴ ἀριθμῷ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ περιττὸν ὑπάρχει τε πάσῃ τριάδι καὶ ἐπὶ πλέον ὑπάρχει (καὶ γὰρ τῇ πεντάδι ὑπάρχει), ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἕξω τοῦ γένους· ἡ μὲν γὰρ πεντὰς ἀριθμός, οὐδὲν δὲ ἔξω ἀριθμοῦ περιττόν.
For example, there is something which belongs to every triad, but also to what is not a triad, just as being belongs to the triad, but also to what is not a number; but also being odd belongs to every triad and extends further (for it belongs also to the pentad), but not outside the genus; for the pentad is a number, and nothing outside number is odd.
τὰ δὴ τοιαῦτα ληπτέον μέχρι τούτου, ἔως τοσαῦτα ληφθῇ πρῶτον ὧν ἕκαστον μὲν ἐπὶ πλέον ὑπάρξει, ἅπόντα δὲ μὴ ἐπὶ πλέον· ταύτην γὰρ ἀνάγκη οὐσίαν εἶναι τοῦ πράγματος.
Such attributes must be taken up to this point, until so many are first taken of which each belongs further, but all together do not belong further; for this must be the essence of the thing.
οἷον τριάδι ὑπάρχει πάσῃ ἀριθμός, τὸ περιττόν, τὸ πρῶτον ἀμφοτέρως, καὶ ὡς μὴ μετρεῖσθαι ἀριθμῷ καὶ ὡς μὴ συγκεῖσθαι ἐξ ἀριθμῶν.
For example, to every triad there belong: number, odd, prime in both ways—both as not being measured by a number and as not being composed of numbers.
τοῦτο τοίνυν ἤδη ἐστὶν ή τριάς, ἀριθμὸς περιττὸς πρῶτος καὶ ὡδὶ πρῶτος.
This, then, is already the triad: an odd number, prime, and prime in this way.
τούτῶν γὰρ ἕκαστον, τὰ μὲν καὶ τοῖς περιττοῖς πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει, τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον καὶ τῇ δυάδι, πάντα δὲ οὐδενί.
For of these, some belong also to all odd numbers, while the last belongs also to the dyad, but all of them together belong to nothing else.
ἐπεὶ δὲ δεδήλωται ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς ἄνω ὅτι καθόλου μέν ἐστι τὰ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορούμενα (τὰ καθόλου δὲ ἀναγκαῖα), τῇ δὲ τριάδι, καὶ ἐφʼ οὗ ἄλλου οὕτω λαμβάνεται, ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι τὰ λαμβανόμενα, οὕτως ἐξ ἀνάγκης μὲν ἄν εἴη τριὰς ταῦτα.
And since it has been shown by us in the previous discussions that the things predicated in what a thing is are universal (and universals are necessary), and for the triad—or for any other thing for which it is so taken—the attributes taken are in what it is, thus the triad must necessarily be these things.
ὅτι δʼ οὐσία, ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον.
And that this is the essence is clear from the following.
ἀναάγκη γάρ, εἰ μὴ τοῦτο ἦν τριάδι εἶναι, οἶον γένος τι εἶναι τοῦτο, ἢ ὐνομασμένον ἢ ἀνώνυμον.
For it is necessary, if this were not what it is to be a triad, that this should be a certain genus, either named or unnamed.
ἔσται τοίνυν ἐπὶ πλέον ἢ τῇ τριάδι ὑπάρχον.
It will therefore be something that belongs to more than the triad.
ὑποκείσθω γὰρ τοιοῦτον εἶναι τὸ γένος ὥστε ὑπάρχειν κατὰ δύναμιν ἐπὶ πλέον.
For let the genus be assumed to be such as to belong potentially to more.
εἰ τοίνυν μηδενὶ ὑπάρχει ἄλλᾳῳ ἢ ταῖς ἀτόμοις τριάσι, τοῦτʼ ἄν εἴη τὸ τριάδι εἶναι (ὑποκείσθω γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο, ἡ οὐσία ἡ ἑκάστου εἶναι ἡ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀτόμοις ἔσχατος τοιαύτη κατηγορία)· ὥστε ὁμοίως καὶ ἄλλῳ ὁτῳοῦν τῶν οὕτω δειχθέντων τὸ αὐτῷ εἶναι ἔσται.
If, therefore, it belongs to nothing else than the individual triads, this would be what it is to be a triad (for let this also be assumed, that the essence of each thing is the last such predication over the individuals); so that likewise for any other thing demonstrated in this way, its essence will be this.
Χρὴ δέ, ὅταν ὅλον τι πραγματεύηταί τις, διελεῖν τὸγένος εἰς τὰ ἄτομα τῷ εἶδει τὰ πρῶτα, οἷον ἀριθμὸν εἰς τριάδα καὶ δυάδα, εἴθ’ οὕτως ἐκείνων ὁρισμοὺς πειρᾶσθαι λαμβάνειν, οἷον εὐθείας γραμμῆς καὶ κύκλου, καὶ ὀρθῆς γωνίας, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο λαβόντα τί τὸ γένος, οἷον πότερον τῶν ποσῶν ἢ τῶν ποιῶν, τὰ ἴδιαα πάθη θεωρεῖν διὰ τῶν κοινῶν πρώτων.
It is necessary, when one is dealing with some whole subject, to divide the genus into the primary things that are indivisible in species, for example, number into triad and dyad, and then in this way to try to obtain the definitions of those things, for example, of a straight line, a circle, and a right angle; and after this, having grasped what the genus is, for example, whether it is of quantities or of qualities, to view its proper attributes through the primary common terms.
τοῖς γὰρ συντιθεμένοις ἐκ τῶν ἀτόμων τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἐκ τῶν ὁρισμῶν ἔσται δῆλα, διὰ τὸ ἀρχὴν εἶναι πάντων τὸν ὁρισμόν καὶ τὸ ἁπλοῦν καὶ τοῖς ἁπλοῖς καθʼ αὑτὰ ὑπάρχειν τὰ συμβαίνοντα μόνοις, τοῖς δʼ ἄλλοις κατʼ ἐκεῖνα.
For to those things composed of the indivisibles, the attributes that occur will be clear from the definitions, because the definition is the starting-point of all things and is simple, and the attributes that occur belong in themselves only to the simple things, and to the others through those.
αἱ δὲ διαιρέσεις αἱ κατὰ τὰς διαφορὰς χρήσιμοί εἰσιν εἰς τὸ οὕτω μετιέναι· ὡς μέντοι δεικνύουσιν, εἶρηται ἐν τοῖς πρότερον.
But divisions according to differences are useful for pursuing things in this way; how, however, they demonstrate has been said in our previous discussions.
χρήσιμοι δʼ ἄν εἶεν ὧδε μόνον πρὸς τό συλλογίζεσθαι τὸ τί ἐστιν.
And they would be useful only in the following way for syllogizing what a thing is.
καίτοι δόξειέν γʼ ἄν οὐδέν, ἀλλʼ εὐθὺς λαμβάνειν ἅπαντα, ὥσπερ ἄν εἰ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐλάμβανέ τις ἄνευ τῆς διαιρέσεως.
And yet it might seem that they are of no use, but that one immediately takes everything, just as if one took them from the beginning without the division.
διαφέρει δέ τι τὸ πρῶτον καὶ ὕστερον τῶν κατηγορουμένων κατηγορεῖσθαι, οἷον εἰπεῖν ζῷον ἥμερον δίπουν ἢ δίπουν ἴον ἥμερον.
But it makes some difference whether the predicated terms are predicated first or later, for example, to say 'tame two-footed animal' or 'two-footed tame animal'.
εἰ γὰρ ἅπαν ἐκ δύο ἐστί, καὶ ἕν τι τὸ ζῷον ἥμερον, καὶ πάλιν ἐκ τούτου καὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἢ ὅ τι δήποτʼ ἐστὶ τὸ ἓν νόμενον, ἀναγκαῖον διελόμενον αἰτεῖσθαι.
For if everything is from two things, and 'tame animal' is one thing, and again from this and the difference comes man or whatever is the one thing that comes to be, it is necessary to make the request by dividing.
Ἔτι πρὸς τὸ μηδὲν παραλιπεῖν ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν οὕτω μόνως ἐνδέχεται.
Moreover, only in this way is it possible to leave nothing out in what a thing is.
ὅταν γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον ληφθῇ γένος, ἄν μὲν τῶν κάτωθέν τινα διαιρέσεων λαμβάνῃ, οὐκ ἐμπεσεῖται ἅπαν εἰς τοῦτο, οἷον οὐ πᾶν ζῷον ἢ ὁλόπτερον ἢ σχιζόπτερον, ἀλλὰ πτήνον ζῷον ἅπαν· τούτου γὰρ διαφορὰ αὕτη.
For when the first genus is taken, if one takes some of the lower divisions, not everything will fall into this—for example, not every animal is either whole-winged or split-winged, but every winged animal is; for this is a difference of this.
πρώτη δὲ διαφορά ἐστι ζῴ εἰς ἣν ἅπαν ζῷον ἐμπίπτει.
But the first difference of animal is that into which every animal falls.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἑκάστου, καὶ τῶν ἔξω γενῶν καὶ τῶν ὑπʼ αὐτό, οἷον ὄρνιθος, εἰς ἣν ἅπας ὄρνις, καὶ ἰχθύος, εἰς ἣν ἅπας ἰχθύς.
And likewise for each of the other things, both for the genera outside and for those under it, for example, of bird, that into which every bird falls, and of fish, that into which every fish falls.
οὕτω μὲν οὖν βαδίζοντι ἔστιν εἰδέναι ὅτι οὐδὲν παραλέλειπται· ἄλλως δὲ καὶ παραλιπεῖν ἀναγκαῖον·
For one who proceeds in this way, then, it is possible to know that nothing has been left out; but in any other way it is necessary to leave things out and not to know it.
καὶ μὴ εἰδέναι, οὐδὲν δὲ δὲ τὸν ὁριζόμενον καὶ διαιρούμενον ἅπόντα εὐδέναι τὰ ὄντα.
And there is no need for the one who defines and divides to know all existing things.
καίτοι ἀδύνατόν φασί τινες εἶναι τὰς διαφορὰς εὐδέναι τὰς τπρὸς ἕκαστον μὴ εὐδότα ἕκαστον· ἄνευ δὲ τῶν διαφορῶν οὐκ εἶναι ἕκαστον εἰδέναι· οὗ γὰρ μὴ διαφέρει, ταὐτὸν εἶναι τούτῳ, οὗ δὲ διαφέρει, ἕτερον τούτου.
And yet some say that it is impossible to know the differences in relation to each thing without knowing each thing; and without the differences, it is impossible to know each thing; for that from which it does not differ is the same as it, and that from which it differs is other than it.