§2.2.13#2πρῶτον μὲν οὖν τοῦτο φεῦδος·
First, then, this is false; for it is not according to every difference that a thing is other.
οὐ γὰρ κατὰ πᾶσαν διαφορὰν ἕτερον· πολλαὶ γὰρ διαφοραὶ ὑπάρχουσι τοῖς αὐτοῖς τῷ εἴδει, ἀλλʼ οὐ κατʼ οὐσίαν οὐδὲ καθ’ αὑτά.
For many differences belong to things that are the same in species, but not according to their substance nor in themselves.
εἶτα ὅταν λάβη τἀντικείμενα καὶ τὴν διαφορὰν καὶὅτι πᾶν ἐμπίπτει ἐνταῦθα ἢ ἐνταῦθα, καὶ λάβη ἐν θατέρῳ τὸ ζητούμενον εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο γινώσκῃ, οὐδὲν διαφέρει εἰδέναι ἢ μὴ εἰδέναι ἐφʼ ὅσων κατηγοροῦνται ἄλλων αἱ διαφοραί.
Next, when one grasps the opposites and the difference, and that everything falls here or there, and grasps that the object of inquiry is in one of them, and knows this, it makes no difference whether one knows or does not know of how many other things the differences are predicated.
φανερὸν γὰρ ὅτι ἄν οὕτω βαδίζων ἔλθῃ εἰς ταῦτα ὧν μηκέτι ἔστι διαφορά, ἔξει τὸν λόγον τῆς οὐσίας.
For it is clear that if, proceeding in this way, one arrives at those things of which there is no longer a difference, one will have the definition of the substance.
τὸ δʼ ἅπαν ἐμπίπτειν εἰς τὴν διαίρεσιν, ἄν ᾖ ἀντικείμενα ὧν μὴ ἔστι μεταξύ, οὐκ αἴτημα· ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἅπαν ἐν θατέρῳ αὐτῶν εἶναι, εἴπερ ἐκείνου διαφορά ἐστι.
And that everything falls into the division, if they are opposites of which there is no intermediate, is not an assumption; for of necessity everything must be in one of them, if indeed it is a difference of that.
Εἴς δὲ τὸ κατασκευάζειν ὅρον διὰ τῶν διαρέσεων τρῶνἢ δεῖ στοχάζεσθαι, τοῦ λαβεῖν τὰ κατηγοροτμενα ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι, καὶ ταῦτα τάξαι τί τπρῶτον ἢ δεύτερον, καὶ ὅτι ταῦτα πάντα.
And for constructing a definition through divisions, one must aim at three things: grasping what is predicated in what a thing is, arranging these as to which is first or second, and ensuring that these are all of them.
ἔστι δὲ τούτων ἓν πρῶτον διὰ τοῦ δύνασθαι, ὥσπερπρός συμβεβηκὸς συλλογίσασθαι ὅτι ὑπάρχει, καὶ διὰ τοῦ γένους κατασκευάσαι.
The first of these is achieved through being able to construct it through the genus, just as one would syllogize that an accident belongs to something.
τὸ δὲ τάξαι ὡς δεῖ ἔσται, ἐὰν τὸ πρῶτον λάβη.
And arranging as one ought will be possible if one grasps the first term.
τοῦτο δʼ ἔσται, ἐὰν ληφθῇ ὃ πᾶσιν ἀκολουθεῖ, ἐκείνῳ δὲ μὴ πάντα· ἀνάγκη γὰρ εἶναί τι τοιοῦτον.
And this will be possible if that is taken which follows all the others, but is not followed by all of them; for of necessity there must be some such thing.
ληφθέντος δὲ τούτου δτη ἐπὶ τῶν κάτω ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος· δεύτερον γάρ τὸ τῶν ἄλλων πρῶτον ἔσται, καὶ τρίτον τὸ τῶν ἐχομένων· ἀφαιρεθέντος γὰρ τοῦ ἄνωθεν τὸ ἐχόμενον τῶν ἄλλων πρῶτον ἔσται.
And when this is taken, the same method applies to the lower terms; for the second will be the first of the remaining terms, and the third the first of those that follow; for when the term above is removed, the next will be the first of the remaining terms.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.
And likewise also for the others.
ὅτι δʼ ἅπόντα ταῦτα, φανερὸν ἐκ τοῦ λαβεῖν τό τε πρῶτον κατά διαίρεσιν, ὅτι ἅπαν ἢ τόδε ἢ τόδε ζῷον, ὑπάρχει δὲ τόδε, καὶ πάλιν τούτου ὅλου τὴν διαφοράν, τοῦ δὲ τελευταίου μηκέτι εἶναι διαφοράν, ἢ καὶ εὐθὺς μετά τῆς τελευταίας διαφορᾶς τοῦ συνόλου μὴ διαφέρειν εἴδει ἔτι τοῦτο.
And that these are all of them is clear from grasping the first term according to the division—that every animal is either this or that, and this belongs to it—and again grasping the difference of this whole, and that of the last there is no longer a difference, or also that immediately with the last difference the whole no longer differs in species from this.
δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὔτε πλεῖον πρόσκειται (πάντα γὰρ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν εῦληπται τούτων) οὔτε ἀπολείπει οὐδέν· ἢ γὰρ γένος ἢ διαφορὰ ἄν εἴη.
For it is clear that neither is anything extra added (for all of these have been grasped in what it is) nor is anything missing; for it would be either a genus or a difference.
γένος μὲν οὖν τό τε πρῶτον, καὶ μετὰ τῶν διαφορῶν τοῦτο προσλαμβανόμενον· αἱ διαφοραὶ δέ πᾶ σαι ἔχονται·
The genus is the first term, and this taken together with the differences; and the differences are all held.
οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ἔστιν ὑστέρα· εἴδει γὰρ ἄν διέφερε τὸ τελευταῖον, τοῦτο δʼ εἴρηται μὴ διαφέρειν.
For there is no longer any later difference; for then the last would differ in species, but this has been said not to differ.
Ζητεῖν· δὲ δὲ ἐπιβλέποντα ἐπὶ τὰ ὅμοια καὶ ἀδιάφορα, πρῶτον τί ἅπόντα ταὐτὸν ἔχουσιν, εἶτα πάλιν ἐφʼ ἑτέροις, ἃ ἐν ταὐτῷ μὲν γένει ἐκείνοις, εἰσὶ δὲ αὑτοῖς μὲν ταὐτὰ τῷ εἴδει, ἐκείνων δʼ ἕτερα.
And one must investigate by looking at things that are similar and undifferentiated, first asking what they all have in common, and then again in other cases which are in the same genus as those, and are the same as one another in species, but different from the former.
ὅταν δʼ ἐπὶ τούτων ληφθῇ τί πάντα ταὐτόν, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως, ἐπὶ τῶν εἰλημμένων πάλιν σκοπεῖν εἰ ταὐτόν, ἕως ἄν εἰς ἕνα ἔλθῃ λόγον· οὗτος γὰρ ἔσται τοῦ πράγματος ὁρισμός.
And when in these cases it is grasped what all have in common, and likewise in the other cases, one must again consider whether the grasped features are the same, until one arrives at a single definition; for this will be the definition of the thing.
ἐὰν δὲ μὴ βαδιῇ εἰς ἕνα ἀλλ εἰς δύο ἢ πλείους, δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἄν εἴη ἕν τι εἶναι τὸ ητούμενον, ἀλλὰ πλείω.
But if one does not arrive at a single one but at two or more, it is clear that the object of inquiry cannot be one thing, but must be more.
οἷον λέγω, εἰ τί ἐστι μεγαλοψυχία ζητοῖμεν, σκετπτέον ἐπί τινων μεγαλοφύχων, οὓς ἴσμεν, τί ἔχουσιν ἕν πάντες ᾗ τοιοῦτοι.
For example, I mean, if we were inquiring into what magnanimity is, we must consider in the case of some magnanimous people whom we know, what single thing they all have in common in so far as they are such.
οἷον εἰ Ἀλκιβιάδης μεγαλόφυχος ἢ ὁ Ἀχιμλλεὺς καὶ ὁ Αἴας, τί ἓν ἄπαντες;
For example, if Alcibiades is magnanimous, or Achilles and Ajax, what single thing do they all share?
τὸ μὴ ἀνέχεσθαι ὑβριόμενοι· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐπολέμησεν, ὁ δʼ ἐμήνισεν, ὁ δʼ ἀπέκτεινεν ἑαυτόν.
Not enduring to be insulted; for one went to war, another raged, and another killed himself.
πάλιν ἐφʼ ἑτέρων, οἷον Λυσάνδρουυ ἢ Σωκράτους.
Again in other cases, such as Lysander or Socrates.
εἰ δὴ τὸ ἀδιάφοροι εἶναι εὐτυχοῦντες καὶ ἀτυχοῦντες, ταῦτα δύο λαβὼν σκοπῶ τί τὸ αὐτὸ ἔχουσιν ἥ τε ἀπάθεια ἡ τπερὶ τὰς τύχας καὶ ἡ μὴ ὑπομονἡ ἀτιμαομένων.
If, then, it is being indifferent to good and bad fortune, taking these two, I consider what same thing is shared by apathy regarding fortunes and not enduring being dishonored.
εἰ δὲ μηδέν, δύο εἴδη ἄν εἴη τῆς μεγαλοψυχίας.
And if there is nothing, there would be two species of magnanimity.
αἰεὶ δʼ ἐστί πᾶς ὅρος καθόλου· οὐ γάρ τινι ὀφθαλμῷ λέγει τὸ ὑγιεινὸν ὁ ἰατρός, ἀλλʼ ἢ παντὶ ἢ εἴδει ἀφορίσας.
And every definition is always universal; for a doctor does not state what is healthy for some eye, but either for all eyes or by defining a species.
ῥᾷόν τε τὸ καθ’ ἕκαστον ὁρίσασθαι ἢ τὸ καθόλου, διὸδε ἀπὸ τῶν καθʼ ἕκαστα ἐπὶ τὰ καθόλου μεταβαίνειν· καὶ γὰρ αἱ ὁμωνυμίαι λανθάνουσι μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς καθόλου ἢ ἐν τοῖς ἀδιαφόροις.
And it is easier to define the individual than the universal, which is why one must pass from the individuals to the universals; for homonyms also lie hidden more in universals than in undifferentiated things.
ὥσπερ δὲ ἐν ταῖς ἀποδείξεσι δεῖ τό γε συλλελογίσθαι ὑπάρχειν, οὕτω καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὅροις τὸ σαφές.
And just as in demonstrations there must be the fact of having syllogized, so also in definitions there must be clarity.
τοῦτο δʼ ἔσται, ἐὰν διὰ τῶν καθʼ ἕκαστον εἰλημμένων ἦ τὸ ἐν ἑκάστῳ γένει ὁρίζεσθαι χωρίς, οἶον τὸ ὅμοιον μὴ πᾶν ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν χρώμασι καὶ σχήμασι, καὶ ὀξύ τὸ ἐν φωνῇ, καὶ οὕτως ἐπὶ τὸ κοινὸν βαδίζειν, εὐλαβούμενον μὴ ὁμωνυμίᾳ ἐντιύχῃ.
And this will be possible if, through the individuals that have been grasped, one defines what is in each genus separately—for example, defining similar not of everything but of what is in colors and shapes, and sharp of what is in voice, and in this way proceeding to the common term, taking care lest one run into a homonym.
εἰ δὲ μὴ διαλέγεσθαι δεῖ μεταφοραῖς, δῆλον ὅτι οὐδʼ ὁρίζεσθαι οὔτε μεταφοραῖς οὔτε ὅσα λέγεται μεταφοραῖς· διαλέγεσθαι γὰρ ἀνάγκη ἔσται μεταφοραῖς.
And if one must not discuss in metaphors, it is clear that one must neither define in metaphors nor define those things which are spoken of in metaphors; for then it will be necessary to discuss in metaphors.